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 In June 1932, workers at the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) discovered oil in 
Bahrain, at what is today known as the Awali oilfield [Map 1: The Arabian Sea].1 The discovery 
of oil at Awali was the first time oil was found in one of the countries of the Arabic-speaking 
Gulf. This find by BAPCO, a Canadian subsidiary of the American-owned Standard Oil of 
California (SoCal), came seven years after the Sheikh of Bahrain granted the first oil concession. 
It also came days after SoCal sold half of its shares of BAPCO to Texaco, another American oil 
company. Today, forty percent of the world’s proven oil reserves are located in the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf and almost one quarter of the oil consumed annually comes from Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.2 The consequences of oil 
production in the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf have impacted politics, social life, and 
economics in the Gulf, and continue to have reverberations throughout the Arabian Sea and, 
indeed, the world. 
                                                
1 Today, all of Bahrain’s proven oil reserves, 125 million barrels, are located in the Awali field, although 
there is the potential for offshore oil production. See: Energy Information Administration, U.S. 
Department of Energy. 
2 International Energy Statistics, U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/data.cfm. Last visited 2/28/15. Together, these countries are also referred to 
as the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, originally and still colloquially referred to as 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Established in 1981, the GCC is an economic and political alliance 
based on shared political and cultural identities. 
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Map 1: The Arabian Sea 
 
 Almost six years after oil was discovered in Bahrain, the workers at the Awali oilfield 
held their first organized strikes.3 The fact that workers went on strike in order to agitate for 
better working conditions is not surprising. What is surprising is that these strikes involved a 
coalition of workers that included Bahrainis, other Arab workers, and Indians. After Bahrainis, 
British Indians were the largest nationality working at BAPCO. The 352 British Indians at 
BAPCO comprised thirteen percent of BAPCO’s workforce and outnumbered all Americans, 
Canadians, and British workers combined.4 These Indians in Bahrain were just a few of the 
                                                
3 Jane Kinninmont, “Bahrain,” in Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, ed. Christopher 
Davidson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 35. 
4 Annual Report of the Bahrain Petroleum Co. Ltd 1940. National Archives of India, External Affairs, 
Near East Branch, 1941. F 360-N/41.  
 3 
increasing numbers of Indians working in the Gulf, and by 1950, approximately fifteen thousand 
Indians worked in oil and related industries in the Arabic-speaking Gulf.5  
Even more surprising is that worker strikes to effect change in their working conditions 
today are extremely rare. In Dubai on March 10, 2015, a few hundred South Asian construction 
workers took to the streets to protest their working conditions [Image 1: South Asian Workers 
Strike in Dubai, UAE]. Within hours, the Dubai police issued a statement that the workers had 
returned to work. Who are these Indians working in the Gulf oilfields? And how do their stories 
today connect with those of the past? What impact have laborers past and present had on the 
production of oil in the Gulf?  
Beginning in the 1940s, this 
dissertation uses ethnographic and 
archival materials in order to examine 
the ways in which oil and the staffing 
of oil projects helped to develop 
networks between India and the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf. Some of these 
networks are new and fostered by the 
growing oil industry, while other 
networks built upon earlier relations of trade, imperialism, and cultural exchange that have 
moved through the Indian Ocean for millennia. I examine how actors formed associations, the 
tools actors use to form these associations, and the effects of these associations on governance, 
citizenship, families, and economies of the Arabic-speaking Gulf and India. I explore the 
                                                
5 I J Seccombe and R I Lawless, “Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil 
Companies: 1910-50,” International Migration Review 20, no. 3 (August 1986), pp. 564-565. 
Image 1: South Asian Workers Strike in Dubai, UAE, 
March 10, 2015 (Photo Credit: Matthew Spurgeon) 
 4 
migration of Indians to work in the oilfields of the Gulf in order to understand how migrants, 
bureaucrats, oil company managers, and recruiting agents use networks to facilitate and, at times, 
impede migration. What emerges is a view of oil that draws on and reconfigures the scales of 
analysis. 
In this dissertation, I view the circulation of labor and oil in the Indian Ocean. The 
production of oil was and continues to be shaped by preexisting forms of politics and social 
relations. Oil drew upon these preexisting forms, but also reconfigured them into a phenomenon 
that is particular to the Arabian Sea. Often when we think of oil, we think of it as a national or 
regional phenomenon: the Middle East has a wealth of oil, but no labor to extract it, while South 
Asia has an excess of laborers and little wealth. In contrast to this perspective, I argue that the 
production of oil does not fall neatly into the bounded units of nations or regions. Rather, oil and 
labor create their own scale that is informed by two things: colonialism/imperialism and 
exchange in the Arabian Sea. It is this place, constructed through movement and networks, that I 
consider in the following dissertation. This view elucidates how oil company managers, 
government bureaucrats, recruiting agents, laborers, and the materiality of oil create networked 
pipelines that span the Arabian Sea. 
 
Networked Pipelines 
Oil production in the Persian Gulf is not simply global, regional, or local. Rather, 
circulations of men and oil create a certain kind of place in the Arabian Sea, a place that is 
shaped by the movement itself.6 Scholars have followed the tendrils of oil that spread from the 
Middle East to Europe and North America in order to understand such interactions as those 
                                                
6 Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006), p. 31. 
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between oil and democracy and oil and imperialism.7 The international and fluid qualities of oil 
and its production are key elements to its examination. Amitav Ghosh characterizes oil as 
occupying “a space that is no place at all, a world that is intrinsically displaced, heterogeneous, 
and international.”8 Oil circulates. It is not consumed in the place of its production. Multiple, 
disparate actors are involved in its production and circulation, and transnational institutions and 
actors often direct the path of these processes.   
Timothy Mitchell traces the relationships, or associations, related to oil and examines 
how carbon helps produce differing types of agency and the relationship of these types of 
agencies with democratic practices and institutions. Central to his exploration are the 
connections and alliances developed during carbon’s transformation from material in the ground 
to energy. Mitchell follows these interconnections by “tracing how these connections are built, 
the vulnerabilities and opportunities they create, and the narrow points of passage where control 
is particularly effective.”9 Like Mitchell, I also trace the connections of oil, but I start from a 
different place. Considering oil production from the perspective of labor circulations, I look at 
the staffing of oil projects. In particular, I examine how workers, managers at oil companies, 
recruiting agents, and government bureaucrats form networks that give shape to oil production in 
the Arabian Sea. 
In this dissertation, I attend to the fluid and viscous aspects of oil that facilitate its 
transnational and transregional movement, but I do so through a focus on the specificity of oil 
production in the Arabian Sea. I trace imperial and trade networks to show this specificity of oil 
                                                
7 See, for example, Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous 
Path in the Middle East, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010); Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political 
Power in the Age of Oil, (New York: Verso, 2011); Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on 
the Saudi Oil Frontier, (New York: Verso, 2009). 
8 Amitav Ghosh, “Petrofiction: The Oil Encounter and the Novel,” in The Imam & the Indian, (New 
Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2002): 75–89. 
9 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, p. 7. 
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production. This specificity illuminates the role of laborers in oil production. I argue the 
production of oil and the circulation of labor in the Arabian Sea impact the culture and politics of 
South Asia and the countries of the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf. In turn, the practices and 
networks located in the Arabian Sea give oil production its specific character. In order to 
understand how laborers impact oil production and how oil impacts states and communities, I 
explore the apparatuses that facilitate the migration of men to work in the oil industry in the 
Gulf. In particular, I look at how the apparatuses used to move labor are developed through 
relationships, or associations, between workers, managers, and government bureaucrats. This 
middle view of migration looks closely at oil’s extraction and refinement in order to see how oil 
runs along channels already excavated through trade, empire, or religion. I examine the ways in 
which oil becomes a particularly situated phenomenon, and reimagine how we might understand 
the dynamics of regions, national borders, and global flows. 
This analysis of oil production relies on how actors involved develop associations and 
choose paths for migration. With this in mind, scale is constructed as actors enter into networks 
and circulate. In his work on the Hydrami diaspora in the Indian Ocean, Engseng Ho explores 
how the Indian Ocean as a region is formed by the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. Ho 
follows the movements of goods and people. These circulating actors may travel on the same 
ships in the Indian Ocean, but they are imbricated in “social geographies of different shapes.” 
Different social geographies, and the hierarchies contained within them, allowed for actors to 
begin from multiple starting points and end in a multitude of destinations.10 My exploration of oil 
as a regional phenomenon is also reliant on historical affiliations and circulations. I explore how 
social associations were central to the development of the oil industry, how they changed over 
time, and their current importance in the oil industry. I examine how people and goods move 
                                                
10 Ho, The Graves of Tarim, pp. 121-122. 
 7 
through villages, government offices, and oilfields. To do this, I follow the associations 
constructed by workers, managers, and government bureaucrats in order to understand how oil is 
developed in the Arabian Sea and the relationships that structure oil production.  
I explore the relationships actors use to shape and delineate scales through the analytic of 
networks. This approach differs from studies of labor migration that focus on push/pull factors or 
sending/receiving countries. Instead, my approach destabilizes both a focus on the individual and 
on the nation-state in favor of examining transnational networks that are composed of differing 
actors.11 This approach addresses the central questions of how to understand the multiple actors 
that shape regional oil production.12 In this examination, the order of oil production in the 
Arabian Sea is brought into being by the networks developed by actors. 
Recently, networks have been most commonly associated with Bruno Latour, Michel 
Callon, and John Law. This analytic of networks is useful in questioning assumptions about the 
                                                
11 Attention to the networks that shape transnational labor migration helps destabilize the central role of 
the nation-state in studies of labor.  A focus on transnational migration illuminates how laborers build 
solidarities and how laborers working outside national borders inform the policies of the nation-state. 
Much like studies that highlight the histories of colonialism and new nations through examining the 
movements of goods and people on the Indian Ocean, I argue that the migration of Indians to the oilfields 
of the Gulf shaped the postcolonial history of India. Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian 
Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2009); Thomas R Metcalf, 
Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
12 This engagement with networks differs from earlier anthropological engagement with social networks 
that used networks to get out of the bounded nature of communities. That use of networks, by J Clyde 
Mitchell, Jeremy Boissevain, and J A Barnes, among others, took Max Gluckman’s attention to situations 
and importantly tried to attend to both individual agency and structural forces. Unlike the metaphorical 
use of networks by Radcliffe-Brown, the use of networks in this case was analytical. As such, networks 
are understood to explain relationships within groups and between groups, but are not subsumed to 
structural forces. Networks, then, allowed researchers to explain the interactions they observed. In 
addition, use of networks, Mitchell argued, would help anthropologists overcome the community 
boundedness of their research. See, for example, J Clyde Mitchell, “The Concept and Use of Social 
Networks,” in Social Networks in Urban Situations, ed. J Clyde Mitchell, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1969), 1–50; Jeremy Boissevain, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and 
Coalitions, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), pp. 4-5; Bruce Kapferer, “Situations, Crisis, and the 
Anthropology of the Concrete: The Contribution of Max Gluckman,” in The Manchester School: Practice 
and Ethnographic Praxis in Anthropology, ed. T M S Evens and Don Handelman, (Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2006), p. 145. 
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concreteness of scales and the boundedness of communities. Latour critiques the idea of the 
social, because it “designates a stable state of affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may be 
mobilized to account for some other phenomena.”13 Instead of assuming that society is 
homogenous, Latour suggests that society should be analyzed as “associations between 
heterogeneous elements.” These elements should be diverse and inclusive, and we should not 
assume any “hidden social force” in order to explain society.14 Similar to how Callon and Law 
examine the building of an airplane and follow the networks that are built and the differing scales 
arising from these networks, I trace the process of supplying labor for the oil industry.15 In doing 
so, I “follow the actors” and trace the associations these actors develop.16  
These scholars’ approach to networks is attentive to the process by which social 
associations are formed. Timothy Mitchell’s use of networks in Rule of Experts offers a model 
for scholars attempting to consider diverse actors in historical examinations. In his own work, 
Mitchell looks at families, colonial administrations, mosquitoes, and laborers in order to 
understand what kinds of hybrid agencies, or uneasy alliances, shape “the development and 
expansion of capitalism.”17 This analytic allows us to understand how diverse agents come 
together to give shape to oil production and how their practices produce different forms of scale. 
                                                
13 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Clarendon Lectures 
in Management Studies), (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 1. 
14 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, (Cambrige: Harvard University Press, 1993); Bruno 
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Clarendon Lectures in Management 
Studies). 
15 John Law and Michel Callon, “The Life and Death of an Aircraft: a Network Analysis of Technical 
Change,” in Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. Wiebe E Bijker 
and John Law, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992): 21–52. 
16 Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Clarendon Lectures in 
Management Studies). 
17 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), p. 53. 
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Importantly, a network does not have an implicit hierarchy or set relations, so it allows us to see 
how laborers shape transnational institutions. 
The use of networks as an analytic illuminates the particular qualities of oil production in 
the Arabian Sea. Oil is a global commodity and undoubtedly a key aspect of contemporary 
international politics and geopolitical order. The analysis of oil presented here suggests that oil 
production developed with factors specific to the Arabian Sea that built upon earlier histories of 
trade, imperialism, and localized affinities. I follow social associations developed by the actors 
involved in labor migration to the oilfields in order to understand oil as a phenomenon emerging 
out of a set of relations. I argue the specificity of oil in the Arabian Sea has influenced regimes of 
citizenship, politics, and family life in India and the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf. Given that oil 
production in the Gulf emerged as a key economic activity in conjunction with the fall of the 
British Empire, explorations of its impact on the nascent Indian nation and the governments of 
the Gulf States also shed important light on the role of international, non-state actors in 
postcolonial nations.  
In turn, oil production and circulation were shaped by practices and affiliations fostered 
by participants in the oil industry. Attention to how oil projects were, and continue to be staffed, 
shows that trade apparatuses that were used to move goods throughout the Indian Ocean, along 
with the colonial processes to oversee indentured labor, are now used to supply labor for oil 
companies. Furthermore, labor is not necessarily dependent on the needs of an industry; by 
exploring the localized affiliations that workers develop, I show that who travels to work on oil 
projects is dependent upon the social associations developed by workers. In order to understand 
these networks, I will consider the history of oil and imperialism in the Persian Gulf and then I 
will turn to the role of contemporary migration. 
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Oil Companies and British Imperialism in the Gulf 
 While the discovery of oil in the Arabic-speaking Gulf had long-term implications, oil 
development did not begin in the large quantities present today with the discovery of the Awali 
oilfield in Bahrain. The British government had been interested in oil production in the Persian 
Gulf since the beginning of the twentieth century, but most of their attention was focused on 
Persia. In 1901, William D’Arcy, an Englishman who amassed a substantial fortune in the 
mining industry, acquired oil concessions in Persia. In 1908, oil was discovered at Masjid-i-
Sulaiman in southwest Persia, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was founded the 
following year. This company held an oil concession for all of Persia with the exception of the 
five most northern provinces, where Russia controlled oil production. Following D’Arcy’s 
discovery of oil and the formation of APOC, the British government acquired fifty-one percent 
of the shares of APOC in 1914. Unlike other administrative areas of the Gulf, which were 
overseen by the Bombay Presidency in India, the Foreign Office in London was charged with 
oversight of the Persian oilfields. During the first decades of the twentieth century, new uses for 
oil made the Gulf an area of great importance to the British government. In particular, Winston 
Churchill’s decision in 1911 to use oil to power the British navy not only revitalized the British 
navy, but also increased Britain’s dependence on oil.18 The British government’s controlling 
interest in APOC allowed the government to secure oil production as it moved towards 
increasing use of oil in the military and other industries.  
 Hoping to maintain and extend Britain’s control of Persian Gulf oil, the British 
government obtained oil concessions with the rulers of the Gulf countries. These concessions 
specified that if oil was found within their territories, the rulers would not give concessions to 
                                                
18 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, p. 83. 
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foreigners except those approved by the British government.19 The first of these treaties was 
signed with the Sheikh of Kuwait in 1913. Sheikhs, or rulers, of the Gulf signed similar treaties 
with the British throughout the following decade. The Sheikh of Bahrain signed in 1914, Sheikh 
of Qatar in 1916, the Sheikhs of the Trucial States (contemporary United Arab Emirates or UAE) 
in 1922, and the Sheikh of Muscat in 1923.20 Lord Curzon, the former viceroy of India from 
1898 to 1905, spearheaded these treaties in an effort to gain control over Middle Eastern oil for 
Great Britain and provide a buffer between the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and British India. 
 These oil concessions built upon earlier treaties signed between the Gulf rulers and the 
British. The British pursued these earlier treaties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as a means to provide a “buffer zone” between British India and the Ottoman Empire.21 
With this end in mind, the British signed treaties in 1880 and 1883 with the Sheikh of Bahrain, in 
1892 with the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast, in 1899 with the Sheikh of Kuwait, and in 1916 with 
the Sheikh of Qatar. These treaties prohibited the sheikhs from establishing any contact with 
foreign powers without British permission and also required the rulers to end all hostilities at sea. 
In return, the British government recognized the sheikhs’ independence and promised to protect 
them if attacked. These treaties bolstered the rulers’ internal authority, while relying on 
government structures already in play in the Gulf. With this type of administration, the British 
Empire in the Arabic-speaking Gulf was, as historian James Onley argues, largely indigenous. 
Administratively, the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf was overseen from the Bombay Presidency 
                                                
19 Letter from Shaikh Khaled bin Ahmad, Sharjah, to Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire. 19 Jamada 
ath-Thaniya  1340 (17 February 1922). British Library, 189-S Of/922, RE(7), 773. 
20 The exception in the Gulf to these treaties was Saudi Arabia, a country not under the purview of the 
British protectorate. 
21 Frederick F Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 44–62; James Onley, “The Raj Reconsidered: British India's 
Informal Empire and Spheres of Influence in Asia and Africa,” Asian Affairs 40, no. 1 (March 2009): 44–
62; James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the 
Nineteenth-Century Gulf, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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in India. The benefits of the Trucial system were not limited to protecting India, and the system 
also secured British trade routes.22 These treaties gave the British an advantage when the Gulf 
rose to prominence for its potential oil reserves. 
Of course, the British were not the only ones interested in developing the Gulf’s oilfields. 
In addition to Russia’s influence in Persia, American companies were also vying to develop oil 
projects in the Gulf. In the 1920s, two American companies gained oil concessions in the Gulf. 
Profiting from the fact that they, unlike many of the other oil companies in the Middle East, had 
not signed the Red Line Agreement, Gulf Oil Corporation of Pennsylvania (Gulf) and the 
Standard Oil Company of California (SoCal) were able to negotiate concessions in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia.23 In Kuwait, in 1934, joint concessions were negotiated by APOC and Gulf. The 
British administration in the Persian Gulf had differing opinions on the fact that American 
companies held oil concessions in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. On one hand, the British 
saw the benefits of increased revenue in the Gulf, and this was one reason BAPCO was allowed 
to search for oil in 1932. On the other hand, the British wanted to stop Americans from moving 
farther south into the Gulf. As a result, in 1930, APOC, an oil company majority owned by the 
British government, signed an agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) obtaining 
permission to explore Qatar. To prevent additional American involvement in the Gulf, the British 
administration in the Gulf advised rulers in the Gulf to give concessions to British, instead of 
                                                
22 Hassan Mohammad Abdulla Saleh, “Labor, Nationalism and Imperialism in Eastern Arabia: Britain, 
the Shaikhs and the Gulf Oil Workers in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, 1932-1956” (PhD diss., University 
of Michigan, 1991), p. 3; Onley, “The Raj Reconsidered: British India's Informal Empire and Spheres of 
Influence in Asia and Africa;” James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre‐Oil 
Gulf: An Historical–Anthropological Study,” History and Anthropology 17, no. 3 (September 2006): 
189–208. 
23 The Red Line Agreement, signed in 1928, was an agreement between French, British, and American oil 
companies regarding the oil resources in the former Ottoman Empire. Most important for this discussion, 
is that it did not have power over oil companies that did not sign the Agreement. This allowed for some 
American oil companies excluded from the Agreement to pursue oil concession where other companies 
were unable. 
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American, oil companies. Finally, the British government “actively supported” companies that 
had partial British ownership by, for example, providing manpower, as oil companies vied for oil 
concessions in the Trucial Coast and Oman.24 
 The British government tried to prevent American companies from participating in the 
Gulf oil industry outside of Saudi Arabia. It also sought to curb American influence in all of the 
oil companies working in the Gulf. One way the British administration did this was by insisting 
that British subjects, including persons from British India, staff oil companies. This staffing 
policy was possible given the already strong presence of Indians in the Persian Gulf. In addition, 
many of the British managers of oil companies had begun their careers in British India before 
moving across the Arabian Sea. For example, since APOC’s founding, Indians had worked for 
the company and British businessmen often moved from working in industries in India to 
positions as managers at APOC. Notably, the Director of APOC from 1909 to 1934 had worked 
previously at Shaw, Wallace & Co. in India, a whiskey manufacturer with offices in Calcutta and 
Bombay.25 The oil companies needed not only managers, but also other skilled and unskilled 
staff to work in the oilfields, build and maintain refineries, and develop new sites of oil 
production. In addition, workers were needed for the numerous secondary businesses that 
supplied the necessary goods and services to the oil industry. This included everything from 
construction work to manufacturing to service provision.  
 The British were worried that large numbers of Americans in the Gulf would undermine 
British political authority. Even the opening of an embassy by the United States was viewed by 
the British administration as having potentially negative consequences. The British went to great 
lengths to forestall greater American influence, including giving BAPCO assistance via the 
                                                
24 Seccombe and Lawless, “Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil 
Companies: 1910-50,” pp. 550-551. 
25 ibid., p. 558. 
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British army when the company needed additional workers. The British only approved oil 
agreements with the stipulation that the companies would hire large numbers of locals and 
British subjects. As a consequence, the British Political Resident in the Gulf had considerable 
control over the recruitment of employment. In addition to restricting the numbers of Americans 
working in the Gulf, the British also limited the numbers of skilled Persians and Iraqis working 
there, for fear of political upheaval. The political agreements between the British authorities and 
oil companies enforced the recruiting of workers from British India. Many of these employees 
came from APOC, but others were sent from Burmah Oil, where over six thousand Indians 
worked in 1904.26 Still other Indian workers were recruited in Bombay by a British recruiting 
agent based there. By the beginning of World War II, the number of Indians working in the Gulf 
was rapidly rising. The growth of the Gulf was further spurred by Japan’s entrance into the war. 
Japan’s involvement meant a loss of Asian oil resources for the Allied forces, and oil in the Gulf, 
particularly Iranian oil, became of greater importance. Increased demand for oil meant more 
workers were needed in the oil industry. As the industry grew, more and more Indians went to 
work in the oilfields of the Gulf. 27 
 In order to move the large numbers of Indian workers necessary to power the oil industry, 
the British colonial administration refashioned the system that had been in place since 1833 to 
move indentured laborers from India to other parts of the British Empire. British recruiting 
agents were central actors in the process of moving indentured labor from India. These agents, 
often located in large cities, worked through subagents to find Indian workers to travel abroad. 
Recruiting agents were overseen by “protectors” who were responsible to the British colonial 
authorities for the welfare of migrants. Protectors ensured migrants were not coerced, were 
                                                
26 T A B Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, 1886-1924, (London: Heinemann, 1983). 
27 Seccombe and Lawless, “Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil 
Companies: 1910-50,” pp. 553-554, 558, 561-562, 564-565. 
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healthy, and that they were treated fairly in their destination country.28 This network moved 
Indian workers to the oilfields and continued after India’s independence in 1947. 
 In the second half of the twentieth century, Indians continued to move to the Gulf. As the 
nascent Indian nation sought to define its boundaries, the migration of workers to the Gulf 
became a key arena in and through which Indian bureaucrats worked out the meaning of Indian 
citizenship and the obligation of the government to citizens abroad. At the same time, for their 
part, Indian migrants traveling to the Gulf called upon the Indian government to do this work as 
they made a growing number of claims for protection based on the rhetoric of citizenship and 
rights. Vazira Zamindar shows that in the wake of the partition of India and Pakistan, the 
category “refugee” became central to the working of Indian citizenship.29 I argue migrants to the 
Gulf were also central to this debate. While fewer in number than those displaced by partition, 
migration and the recruiting practices of oil companies provided new challenges for the Indian 
government. By exploring this migration, the construction and limits of state sovereignty comes 
to the fore. 
 Labor and oil also played a role in the formation of the Gulf States. Strikes by Gulf Arab 
workers in the oilfields n the 1960s shaped the political structures of the Gulf today. Oil and its 
nationalization were key factors in a wave of anticolonial movements. In 1951, the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (AIOC, formerly known as APOC), including the refinery in Abadan, Iran, was 
nationalized by Iran. As a consequence, the British built an oil refinery in Aden and additional oil 
projects were pursued in the rest of the Gulf. In the 1960s, the Arabic-speaking Gulf countries 
joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and subsequently 
nationalized their oil supplies. In 1973, an Arab oil embargo caused oil prices to skyrocket. With 
                                                
28 Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, pp. 136-144. 
29 Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: 
Refugees, Boundaries, Histories, (Columbia University Press, 2013). 
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increased oil prices, oil projects grew and additional manpower was needed. As a result, 
increasing numbers of Indians moved to work in the Gulf. 
I argue that labor practices and migrant networks help shape regional oil production. 
Using both archival and ethnographic sources, I show that transnational labor circulations are 
integral to oil companies’ policies and states’ regulation of migration. While much research on 
migration uses national polities as central sites of engagement and approaches the Middle East 
and South Asia as separate and distinct regions, I take a divergent approach. This dissertation 
considers the entire process of migration – from villages to oilfields – and all parties involved in 
this process – from migrants to corporations. What emerge are migrants’ and their networks’ 
dynamic capacities to form and reform communities, states, and regions. By critically examining 
migrant networks, I explore migration from multiple sites and perspectives. I find that 
contemporary labor hierarchies cannot be read into the past and the logic of movement is more 
complex than the needs of an industry. 
 
Contemporary Migration to the Gulf: Indians on the Arabian Sea 
 The migration of workers from India to the Gulf continues today. Furthermore, many of 
the networks that facilitated this migration in the middle of the twentieth century remain central 
to the migration of workers today. Oil companies continue to hire workers by contracting with 
Indian recruiting agents. These agents, like the agents who worked for oil companies in the 
1940s and 1950s, serve as middlemen between Indian workers and the oil companies. Likewise, 
just as in the late British colonial era, the Indian government continues to regulate these agents in 
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the postcolonial era. Specifically, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) has overseen 
emigration from India and provided services for Indians abroad since 2004.30  
Today, over one million Indians travel to work in the oilfields annually. In order to 
facilitate this movement, recruiting agents and Indian bureaucrats work with oil company 
managers to manage the movement of workers on such a large scale. The MOIA collects partial 
data on workers requiring emigration clearance from the Indian government before they migrate. 
This category of Emigration Check Required (ECR) includes all those who have not matriculated 
and are migrating to one of seventeen countries, including all of the countries of the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf.31 In 1992, it was estimated that 1,250,000 Indian migrant workers lived in 
the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, often referred to as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). By the late 1990s, approximately one million workers from 
South Asia moved to these countries annually. The MOIA’s most recent numbers on migration 
come from 2012. In 2012, over 720,000 men who required emigration clearance migrated to 
work in one of the countries of the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf [see TABLE 1: Indian Labor 
Outflows to the GCC]. 
  
                                                
30 Before the formation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and the 
Ministry of the External Affairs oversaw different parts of Indian emigration. 
31 From 2008 to 2012, male migrants who had not matriculated and who traveling to the following 
countries required emigration clearance: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
From 2003-2010, the Indian government had a ban on travel to Iraq. This ban was lifted in 2010, and, 
from 2010-2012, travel to Iraq required emigration clearance. Women who have ECR passports must be 




TABLE 1: Indian Labor Outflows to the GCC32 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain 31,924 16,541 15,101 14,323 20,150 
Kuwait 35,562 42,091 37,667 45,149 55,868 
Oman 89,659 74,963 105,807 73,819 84,384 
Qatar 82,937 46,292 45,752 41,710 63,096 
Saudi 
Arabia 228,406 281,110 275,172 289,297 357,503 
UAE 349,827 130,302 130,910 138,861 141,138 
Total 818,315 591,299 610,409 603,159 722,139 
 
In 2009 and 2012, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar were the top 
five states of origin for workers to the Gulf and workers from these five states made up 
approximately seventy-five percent and seventy-three percent of the ECR workforce going to the 
Gulf, respectively, those years. In the past few years, approximately forty percent of the workers 
requiring emigration clearance to the Gulf have migrated from Kerala or Uttar Pradesh [see 
TABLE 2: Indian Migration by State].33  
  
                                                
32 Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Annual Report 2012-13, (Government of India, 2013). 




  TABLE 2: Indian Migration by State 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Andhra Pradesh 97,530 69,233 72,220 71,589 92,803 
Bihar 60,642 50,227 60,531 71,438 84,078 
Delhi 4,512 2,501 2,583 2,425 2,842 
Goa 2,210 1,659 1,380 1,112 1,338 
Gujarat 15,716 9,185 8,245 8,369 6,999 
Haryana 1,779 1,052 958 1,058 1,196 
Karnataka 22,413 18,565 17,295 15,394 17,960 
Kerala 180,703 119,384 104,101 86,783 98,178 
Madhya 
Pradesh 2,321 1,897 1,564 1,378 1,815 
Maharashtra 24,786 19,128 18,123 16,698 19,259 
Orissa 8,919 6,551 7,344 7,255 7,478 
Punjab 54,469 27,291 30,974 31,866 37,472 
Rajasthan 64,601 44,744 47,803 42,239 50,295 
Tamil Nadu 128,791 78,841 84,510 68,732 78,185 
Uttar Pradesh 139,254 125,783 140,826 155,301 191,341 
West Bengal 26,094 21,187 28,900 29,795 36,988 
Others 13,861 13,044 13,999 15,133 18,814 
TOTAL 848,601 610,272 641,356 626,565 747,041 
 
Migrants to the Gulf comprise a sizable percentage of the Gulf States’ populations. In 
2007, expatriates were approximately eighty percent of Dubai’s population and Indians were the 
largest expatriate community in the emirate.34 All of the countries of the Gulf have large non-
                                                
34 Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population 
Movements in the Modern World, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Karen Isaksen Leonard, Locating 
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national populations. Saudi Arabia has the most non-citizen residents living there, but also the 
largest overall population. In 2004, foreigners made up twenty-seven percent of Saudi Arabia’s 
population and, in 2008, foreigners made up fifty percent of the workforce. In the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, Qatar had the largest percentage of expatriates living and working in the 
state. In 2006, eighty-one percent of the population was foreign and foreigners comprised ninety-
two percent of the workforce.35 [See TABLE 3: Population of Gulf and TABLE 4: Foreign 
Workers in Gulf] 
TABLE 3: Population of Gulf36 





Bahrain (2007) 527,433 511,864 1,039,297 49.25% 
Kuwait (2006) 1,023,316 2,159,644 3,182,960 67.85% 
Oman (2003) 1,781,558 559,367 2,340,925 23.90% 
Qatar (2006) 122,779 543,730 666,509 81.58% 
Saudi Arabia (2004) 16,527,340 6,150,922 22,678,262 27.12% 
United Arab 
Emirates 825,495 3,280,932 4,106,427 79.90% 
Total 20,807,921 13,206,459 34,014,380 38.83% 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
Home: India's Hyderabadis Abroad, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); A K Pasha, 
Perspectives on India and the Gulf States, (New Delhi: Détente Publications, 1999). 
35 Shane McGinley, “Revealed: Where Gulf Expats Sent Remittance in 2012,” Arabian Business, May 13, 
2013, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/revealed-where-gulf-expats-sent-remittance-in-2012-501232.html. 
36 Nora Ann Colton, “The International Political Economy of Gulf Migration,” Middle East Institute 
Viewpoints, February 2010, p. 34. 
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TABLE 4: Foreign Workers in the Gulf37 
Country Nationals Non-nationals Total Population 
% Non-
nationals 
Bahrain 140,000 438,000 578,000 75.78% 
Kuwait 445,000 1,780,000 2,225,000 80.00% 
Oman  374,000 795,000 1,169,000 68.01% 
Qatar 62,000 766,000 828,000 92.51% 
Saudi Arabia 4,170,000 4,280,000 8,450,000 50.65% 
United Arab 
Emirates 455,000 2,588,000 3,043,000 85.05% 
Total 5,646,000 10,647,000 16,293,000 65.35% 
 
The majority of Indians in the Gulf work in unskilled or semi-skilled positions. 
Unskilled and semi-skilled are two categories used by the Indian government historically and 
today to classify workers. The term “unskilled workers” refers to manual laborers who, in my 
research, mostly worked in construction in the Gulf. “Semi-skilled workers” usually have some 
technical training or experience and their positions include pipe fitters, steel binders, electricians, 
plumbers, bar benders, pressmen, masons, welders, and drivers. Other categories used by the 
Indian government include skilled and professional workers – a category that includes doctors, 
engineers, and bank managers; service workers; trade and business migrants or migrants who 
start their own businesses abroad; and non-technical workers, including school teachers, typists, 
                                                
37 Onn Winckler, “Labor Migration to the GCC States,” Middle East Institute Viewpoints, February 2010, 
p. 12. 
 22 
and clerks. [GRAPH 1: Occupation Category of Migrants in Gulf38 and GRAPH 2: Occupations 
of Migrants in UAE39]  
 
 
                                                
38 Anisur Rahman, Indian Labour Migration to the Gulf, (New Delhi: Rajat Publications, 2001), p. 57. 
39 S Irudaya Rajan, V J Varghese, and M S Jayakumar, “Looking Beyond the Emigration Act 1983: 
Revisiting the Recruitment Practices in India,” in Governance and Labour Migration, (New Delhi: 
Routledge India, 2010), p. 18. 
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Why do these Indians travel to the Gulf? The factors are varied.  Many of the men with 
whom I spoke told me they migrated in order to provide for their families. Many migrants told 
me that they worked in the Gulf in order to provide dowries for their wives and daughters. These 
familial obligations shape what it means to be a man in India. In addition, familial obligations 
and forms of masculinity impact the oil industry in the Gulf and help shape the specificities of oil 
production on the Arabian Sea.  
Some Indians told me they work in the Gulf in order to mitigate the social inequality they 
face in India. In Abu Dhabi, UAE, one Indian Muslim from Bihar told me the following when I 
asked why he did not work in India: 
Hindus get jobs easier [in India]. We [Indians] have a secular 
government, but in fact mostly non-Muslims are favored…. When there 
is a Muslim name [on a job application or CV], they [the employers] have 
a different attitude, and this almost always applies to government, 
education, and business. 
 
He then went on to narrate how he experienced this discrimination first hand when he was 
traveling to Abu Dhabi for work. He describe his arrival at the airport in Mumbai, India: 
When I was coming here [Abu Dhabi], I was asked ten types of questions 
[by Indian emigration officials] and when non-Muslims went through 
immigration, they [the emigration officials] just stamped [the passports] 
and let them go. This is the reason that Muslims tend to go abroad. We 
don’t get opportunity there [in India]. And this is the same in most every 
state…. The good thing about L Corp [a European multinational 
corporation] is that they don’t care about religion, caste, sect. They just see 
skilled workers. 
 
Indian Muslims in the Gulf repeatedly told me that they faced discrimination in India. This 
discrimination and the higher salaries earned in the Gulf were seen by many as a means for 
economic and social mobility. In particular, hopes of increasing their income were a central 
motivator for migration. Almost all of the workers I interviewed, regardless of their religion and 
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education, told me that they would make at least six times the income they made in their village 
and three times the income they made working in urban areas or on oil and gas projects in India. 
However, economic and social pressures are not the only reasons for migration. These 
migrants do not move in a vacuum, and migration occurs as part of a network that involves 
agents, government workers, and oil company managers. These actors’ motivations, histories, 
and participation in transnational institutions help shape the migration of workers to the Gulf. 
Recruiting agents in India – many of which have family histories as traders with the Gulf – are 
central in this process; their choices and preferences have far-reaching implications. The choices 
agents make while recruiting and their business practices shape the specificity of oil in the 
Arabian Sea and impact the experiences of workers. These agents work closely with oil company 
managers and bureaucrats in the Indian government. The motivations of these groups are diverse 
and the expectations of migrants, government officials, recruiting agents, and managers often 
vary widely. Throughout my dissertation, I find places where actors translate their goals, 
motivations, and beliefs. These translations occur as actors collectively attempt to define such 
things as India as a “brand” or define such things as “best business practices.” As they work 
through the meaning of these concepts, the actors together shape the migration of Indians to the 
Gulf and oil production there.  
 
******** 
In the first half of this dissertation, I examine the development of the oil industry in the 
Gulf through the perspective of labor relations, politics, and trade. In Chapter 1, I investigate 
historical labor unrest in the oilfields of the Gulf by Indian workers, particularly strikes by Indian 
workers during the late 1940s and early 1950s. I find that the processes through which workers 
move and the connections workers make vary and that these associations, in turn, shape how 
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solidarities were formed and worker claims were presented. In Chapter 2, I consider the Indian 
government’s response to labor unrest in the Gulf and ask how emigration was significant in 
shaping state polices and national approaches to citizenship. In the case of the nascent Indian 
nation-state, emigration to the Gulf and negotiations with oil companies over contracts opened 
conversations about the nature of citizenship, the state’s obligations to citizens, and the rights of 
citizens abroad. Over the second half of the twentieth century, increasing numbers of Indians 
became employed as laborers in the oilfields and khalījī, or Gulf Arab, workers were hired less 
frequently. I argue, in Chapter 3, there was an evacuation of politics from the oilfields. This 
evacuation occurred with many of the tools and techniques that were developed in the oil and 
coal industries in the United States. These policies include racialized discrimination and the 
segregation of the work force. However, the unique political structures in the Gulf, including the 
close connection between British oil companies and the British administration, in conjunction 
with sheikhly authority, allowed for a restructuring of the worksite. This restructuring, along 
with the inclusion of oil rents, made possible the evacuation of politics from the oilfields. The 
result was a method of staffing oil projects with expatriates. In Chapter 4, I explore the history of 
oil concessions in the Gulf and the legacy of colonialism. I argue that the regime of citizenship 
that allows for Indian workers to be vulnerable to abuse from employers was constructed by oil 
companies, British colonial authorities, and merchants in the Gulf in the middle of the twentieth 
century.  
In the second half of the dissertation, I engage with Indian migration to the Gulf using 
both ethnographic and historical materials in order to understand the consequences of migration 
on individuals, families, communities, and states. I argue this migration has helped to define the 
specificity of the oil industry in the Arabian Sea. In Chapter 5, I examine how networks, 
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historical entanglements, and bureaucratic processes shape labor migration. I look at networks 
and scale-making by bureaucrats, business men, and laborers. I follow the process of migration 
and uncover how circuits of mobility are shaped. In Chapter 6, I describe the process of 
contemporary migration by charting how workers use networks to secure jobs and how 
employers use networks to find and evaluate potential employees. In the process of developing 
and negotiating networks, workers and employers come into contact with differing concepts of 
best business practices, expertise, hierarchy, and knowledge. I argue these differing frames 
converge at certain moments and spaces – such as interviews to hire for oil projects – as oil 
production attempts, and often fails, to attain a homogenized form. Then, in Chapter 7, I explore 
the ways in which the oil industry is dependent upon kinship practices in India. The idea of 
masculinity that requires men to go and work in the oilfields in order to supply gold for their 
daughters’ and sisters’ dowries is shaping of global economic movements and practices. Finally, 
in the conclusion, I reflect on the impact of migration not only on oil production in the Arabian 
Sea, but on the lives of Indian migrants living in the Gulf. 
Following the social associations that emerge around oil production illuminates the 
possible paths that oil and migrants may take through the Arabian Sea. I illustrate how locality is 
constructed and the consequences of locality for politics, families, and workers. Looking at the 
specificities of oil in the Arabian Sea redraws the areas and assumptions of our analyses. Instead 
of seeing India and the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf as two disparate regions, we can see that 
the networks shaped during the extraction, refinement, and movement of oil and labor give the 
production of oil on the Arabian Sea its specificity. 









A Politics of Locality: 
Indian Worker Movements in the Persian Gulf 
 
The migration of Indians to work in the oilfields of the Persian Gulf grew as the oil 
industry expanded in the area. By the mid-twentieth century, work on the oilfields had become a 
major source of employment for Indian emigrants, and oil companies were hiring almost one-
quarter of the Indian emigrants going overseas for jobs in 1951.40 Though increasing numbers of 
Indians were moving to work in the Gulf, conditions were far from ideal. Both skilled 
professionals and day laborers faced discrimination and difficult working conditions. In the 
1940s and early 1950s, workers living in Aden, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar all had similar 
complaints. These complaints revolved around poor living conditions, lack of medical and 
recreational facilities, “gross discrimination … between senior staff which is American or British 
and the Indian or local junior staff,” poor sanitation, and the absence of any means for workers to 
redress grievances.41 In order to improve their working conditions, Indian workers in the oilfields 
deployed multiple methods – from work stoppages to hunger strikes to appealing to the Indian 
government for support. These actions by Indian workers in the Gulf helped form the oil industry 
in the Arabian Sea.  
                                                
40 Oil Companies in the Persian-Gulf and Mid-east – Recruit of Indian workers from India. NAI, Ministry 
of External Affairs [MEA], Emigration Section, 1953. F.6-6/53-Emi. 
41 Skilled workers engaged by the Bahrein [sic] Petroleum Co., Bahrein. NAI, MEA, Emigration. F. 22-
8/48-Emi. 
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How did workers form the solidarities that guided their workplace struggles? What role 
did India’s independence play in worker actions in the Gulf? Did the process of migration 
influence worker action? In this chapter, I look at how Indian worker mobilizations were 
dependent on solidarities built around a shared origin. Such forms of solidarity represent, to 
borrow a phrase from Farina Mir, a highly localized aspect of social lives – localized social lives 
that workers maintained as they moved from their natal villages to the Gulf.42 I examine the 
social associations developed by workers and how workers used these associations to change 
their working conditions in order to demonstrate the key role of natal villages and the nation-
state for workers’ mobilization. I also show how the politics of locality among workers shifted 
over time, as did the class dimensions of worker action. The result was inter- and intra-group 
solidarities informed by the process of migration.  
 This exploration of worker agitation in the oilfields does two things. First, examining 
transnational migration analytically decouples the nation and labor. Historically, much labor 
history has relied on the nation-state as the “main analytic or expository frame.”43 Focusing on 
migration that crosses national borders does not negate the importance of the nation, but it 
reminds us that nation-states are only one factor informing labor politics. I examine how workers 
construct scales by examining oil production, the transnational movements and mobilizations of 
labor, and the significance of localized affiliations, national sovereignty, and shifting economic 
policies. Through critically following circulations in the Arabian Sea, the power of national and 
transnational institutions to obfuscate power and the limits of their power is revealed. Removing 
the automatic association between labor and the nation illuminates when and how workers 
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selectively invoke the nation. In the context of Indian independence, transnational migration 
highlights that nationalism and citizenship were used by workers to push for additional rights. 
Exploring these claims, in conjunction with other localized political claims, allows us to look at 
the construction of nationalism outside of the nation.44  
Second, by investigating the networks used by workers to move through the circuits 
connecting India and the Gulf, one sees the formation of a localized politics with transnational 
implications. The experiences of Indians working in the Gulf offers new insights into how the 
production of oil, the international managerial practices of natural resource extraction, and the 
politics of new nations were developed in the Gulf through engagements between actors 
participating in the oil network. These interactions helped develop labor regimes and oil 
complexes that impacted the development and growth of the countries of the Arabic-speaking 
Persian Gulf, and of international oil companies themselves.  
In order to understand the production of labor politics, one must consider the materiality 
of oil and the managerial techniques used by the oil industry. In addition, one must consider how 
worker actions extend beyond the sites of production to workers’ networks of affiliation. This 
extension challenges the boundaries of organizations, nations, and empires. In this chapter, I 
examine three sites of oil projects that Indians worked at in the Gulf in the 1940s and 1950s: 
Abadan, Bahrain, and Aden [see Map 2: Sites of Indian Worker Action]. I consider how workers 
registered complaints at these sites, with whom they formed alliances, and how and when they 
mobilized ideas of rights and citizenship. 
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Map 2: Sites of Indian Worker Action 
 
Labor History and the Specificities of Oil Production 
During the colonial period in India, thousands of Indians moved from their natal villages 
to work in industrial factories in India. Notably, labor historians have explored workers’ ties to 
their natal villages, how workers’ local affiliations impacted their labor practices, and how local 
affiliations informed labor politics. They have also considered the class and caste aspects of 
these migrations.45 In addition to looking at the origin points of migrant workers, scholars have 
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also considered why workers move, including the relationship between the needs of an industry 
and the migration of workers. For example, Ranajit Das Gupta’s examination of migration to 
work in the factories of Calcutta argues that the most important factor in determining the 
composition of the workforce was the technology of the industry.46 In the case of Indians 
working in the Gulf oilfields, I find that industry needs must be considered along with local 
affiliations and how workers migrate.  
The oil industry in the Gulf was and continues to be structured by a disarticulated process 
– a process that is not determined solely by the needs of an industry and that is not centrally 
coordinated. This is not an accident of history; rather, it is an active goal of companies to 
disarticulate the process. Today, as in the past, many large oil companies do not want to hire 
their own laborers – thereby absolving themselves of direct responsibility for worker welfare. 
Instead, large oil companies work with subcontractors who, in turn, work with agents based in 
India to find workers there. This form of disarticulation combines with laborers’ own selective 
affinities. As I seek to illustrate, given the ways in which labor circulates in the Arabian Sea, 
workers are central to, but not necessarily bound by, the oil industry and the history of the nation. 
My analysis deprioritizes industrial needs and focuses instead on how workers move, noting both 
the constraints on and possibilities of that movement. Here, in particular, I am interested in how 
migrant workers formed solidarities, how these solidarities were continually in flux, and how 
these solidarities were shaped and reshaped in key moments such as work stoppages or hunger 
strikes at oil projects. 
The oil industry has some unique characteristics that are rooted in both the material 
qualities of oil and the managerial development of the industry. In his examination of the 
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connection between oil and democracy, Timothy Mitchell investigates how the materiality of 
carbon and the differences between coal and oil have led to differing forms of political action. 
He notes that shifts in social relations came with the greater harnessing of energy produced by 
coal and helped support cities and large-scale manufacturing. In addition, the manner in which 
coal was transported and mined – namely, its requirement that laborers work in autonomous 
underground spaces and that coal transportation had chokepoints – enabled workers to strike 
effectively. Coal’s materiality and the worker relations it helped foster shaped “the kinds of mass 
politics that emerged, or threatened to emerge, in the first half of the twentieth century.”47  
The materiality of oil has likewise influenced its production in key ways and shaped 
forms of political engagements different than those surrounding coal. Some key differences 
between the mining of coal and the production of oil are that oil requires a smaller workforce and 
workers are continuously aboveground and therefore open to continuous supervision. In addition, 
oil’s lightness and fluidity allow it to be transported through pumping stations and pipelines 
and/or to be shipped. This flexibility of transportation means that oil is transported in a “grid.” 
This grid-like transportation differs from the “dendritic networks” coal followed via railway. 
Oil’s grid makes it less vulnerable to strikes of the kind that caused chokeholds for coal’s 
transport. Consequently, the transportation and working conditions used in the production of oil 
curtailed “the democratizing potential of petroleum.”48 Despite the limitations imposed in 
political action by the materiality of oil, workers in the Gulf oilfields have, nonetheless, formed 
alliances and negotiated their working situations through political mobilization. 
The material qualities of oil are not the only criteria that have influenced labor relations; 
management techniques and tools specific to the oil industry have also played an important role. 
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Techniques and tools used to manage workers in copper and coalmines in the United States were 
transplanted to the Arabian Gulf and applied to the production of oil in the Middle East. As 
Robert Vitalis illustrates in his history of the United States’ involvement with oil production in 
Saudi Arabia, key methods developed by American oil companies to curtail labor strikes 
included the racial segregation of workers and discrepancies in pay based on race.49 Of course, 
the use of racism as a management technique was not unique to the oil industry.50 What were 
unique, I argue, were the attempts of the oil industry to homogenize labor practices globally. The 
internationalization of such managerial practices provided a unique site for worker protests, 
which, in turn, highlighted the specificities of oil production in the Arabian Sea. By looking at 
worker action in Abadan, Bahrain, and Qatar we see how Indian labor history, the materiality of 
oil, and American managerial practices influenced and were influenced by imperial 
administrators, workers, and managers. 
 
Communist Strikes at the Abadan Oil Refinery 
Beginning in March 1946, the employees at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) 
participated in a series of strikes without the approval of union officials, so-called “wildcat” 
strikes. The Tudeh Party of Iran or, literally, the Party of the Masses of Iran, was thought by 
British and Iranian officials to be the driving force of these strikes. This communist party had 
much influence in 1940s and early 1950s Iran and was able to mobilize tens of thousands of 
demonstrators in Iran’s capital, Tehran, and on the streets of Abadan, where the AIOC oil 
refinery was located. This was the largest refinery in the world at the time and the site where 
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most Indians working in Iran were stationed.51 While Iranians officials understood the Tudeh 
Party to be a movement by workers to instigate for higher wages and better living conditions, 
British officials based in India and the Gulf saw the Party as symptomatic of Russia’s growing 
influence in the Persian Gulf and harmful to British companies’ businesses, especially the oil 
industry. This view by the British was reinforced when, also in 1946, the Iranian government, in 
response to pressure from Tudeh Party leaders, gave the USSR concessions to the northern 
Iranian oilfields. 
The mass agitations against working conditions were not surprising. Manucher 
Farmanfarmaian, a high-ranking Iranian official,52 visited the camps and was appalled at the 
conditions in which workers lived. He wrote, “Wages were 50 cents a day. There was no 
vacation pay, no sick leave, no disability compensation. The workers lived in a shanty town 
called Kaghazabad, or Paper City, without running water or electricity….” He contrasted 
Kaghazabad to the British management’s accommodations, which included air conditioning, 
swimming pools, and tennis courts.53 Iranian officials were not the only ones to notice this stark 
disjuncture between the treatment of British workers and others. A British parliamentary 
delegation characterized the conditions of the (non-British) workers as “‘a penal settlement in the 
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dessert’ with accommodation ‘little better than pig-styes [sic].’”54 The wildcat strikes at AIOC’s 
oilfields and refinery culminated in a large general strike in July 1946, during which fifty 
employees were killed and 170 injured. 
Scholars who discuss these strikes often consider the strikes’ effects and, in particular, 
the relations formed by the AIOC, the Iranian Government, the British Government, and Iranian 
citizens as a result.55 However, the laborers who participated in these activities were not limited 
to Iranians and a diverse group of workers participated in collective action against AIOC. One 
scholar attentive to this diversity is Ervand Abrahamian. In his discussion of the Tudeh Party’s 
actions in Iran, Abrahamian explores the high percentage of minorities within the Party and the 
Party’s promise of citizenship and secularism.56 His focus on the multi-generational residents of 
Iran who supported the Tudeh Party indicates the diversity of workers who participated in the 
strikes, and sheds light on how solidarities were formed across groups and the complexity of 
political development in Iran. What Abrahamian does not engage with in depth are the temporary 
migrant laborers who also participated in the Party’s political movements.  
Attentiveness to the temporary workers at oil projects in Iran and their role in collective 
action expands the implications of the July 1946 strikes by decentering the nation from labor 
narratives and examining instead the global construction of the working class. One place the 
importance of temporary workers arises is in the case of Indian laborers at the refinery. At 
Abadan, four days before the general strike, five Muslim men from the Punjab were forced to 
resign from their positions at the Abadan refinery in Iran because they had joined the Tudeh 
Party. Despite their resignation, they continued to live in the camps near Abadan. In the coming 
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days, these five men helped organize a coalition of hundreds of Indians who, in solidarity with 
Arab-speaking and Farsi-speaking laborers, went on a strike that influenced AIOC and imperial 
policies in the coming years. A few days after these July strikes, the company, recognizing the 
danger of the expansion of the localized politics, paid for the five Tudeh Party labor organizers 
from the Punjab to fly back to Karachi as their “continued presence on the oilfields was 
considered so undesirable.”57 
Some aspects of this coalition deserve attention. First, the coalition was class-based. 
Indian managers did not participate in the strike and remained “loyal” to the company.58 While 
they lived in the same conditions as the striking workers, their managerial position influenced 
their actions and oriented them towards a set of politics that was not tethered to their place of 
origin or native language. The coalition for the July 14 strike gained momentum from shared 
ideological (Tudeh) and class sympathies and formed multi-lingual and multi-ethnic alliances. 
Despite this broad coalition of actors, the five men who were considered the Indian organizers of 
the strike all came from a few districts in the Punjab near Lahore. These men shared a natal 
home, a religion, and spoke the same language. This points to the second interesting 
characteristic of the strike: while the workers were forming broad coalitions, local affective ties 
rooted in India influenced Indian worker actions. These actions were both based on and 
formative of a political sensibility that had local roots and followed, but was not limited to, the 
contours of the British Empire.  
These strikes were just one set of a larger number of strikes occurring in the Gulf prior to 
India’s independence. Other strikes by Indians in the Gulf included strikes at the Kuwait Oil 
Company in 1946; in Bahrain in 1942 and 1947; in Saudi Arabia in 1943 and 1945; and in Qatar. 
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British administrators in the Gulf often read these strikes as being signs of the “unrestrained 
nationalism” of Indian employees.59 Yet, a closer look at the strikes at Abadan will show that 
these strikes were, indeed, influenced by a politics of locality, but a locality not limited to the 
boundaries of the nation. Rather, transnational migration opens up the space to see how migrants 
construct communities, nations, and empires. 
Many narratives of the closing years of British rule in India focus on the departure of the 
British administration from the Indian subcontinent. Another history of this period is possible. In 
1946, as the British Raj was preparing to depart from India, one British military intelligence 
officer based in Karachi was not devoting his time to the upcoming independence of India. 
Rather, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas was focusing on the Persian Gulf and the Indian workers 
based there. In the letters he wrote to his superiors in New Delhi that year, Thomas detailed his 
travels and long hours spent investigating the strikes discussed above, as well as other strikes in 
the Persian Gulf. Thomas spent the majority of the year locating the men who were dismissed 
from their jobs in these strikes, interviewing workers on leave from the Gulf, and searching for 
the organizers of the strikes at their homes in northern India.  
 Thomas’s research and the shifting policies at AIOC elucidate the strength of an 
imagined locality in informing larger political mobilizations; the lasting, powerful effects of 
affective local ties in transnational movements; and the importance of inter-group solidarity. For 
example, in order to mitigate the effects of these strikes, the management at AIOC attempted to 
break apart this inter-group solidarity. One strategy AIOC used was to encourage Arab-speaking 
employees to form their own union that operated, and negotiated, separately from the Farsi-
speaking employee union. The hope of this policy was that it would decrease the Tudeh Party’s 
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influence amongst non-Iranian employees. And to some extent, the policy was effective as 
strikes increasingly segmented along linguistic and native lines.   
 For the Indian laborers, local networks intersecting with international carbon politics 
continued to inform worker attempts to renegotiate their labor and living conditions, but often 
their mobilizations were unsupported by other laborers at AIOC. On August 4, 1947, Indians 
again tried to strike in the hope of negotiating better working conditions. Organizers of this strike 
were able to get between four hundred and five hundred Indians to participate. Despite the 
success of mobilizing Indian workers, however, organizers were unable to bring Iranians or other 
nationalities into the strike. The result was that the Indians returned to work on August 6 without 
any changes in their labor conditions. This second, smaller strike in the Iranian fields indicates 
the importance of solidarity amongst workers for their actions to be effective. It also points to the 
power of a regional or national identity to mobilize workers from all over the Indian 
subcontinent. Like the earlier July strikes, the suspected organizers of the strike were 
dismissed.60 
 Despite the absence of these workers, strikes continued in the Abadan refinery and Gulf 
oilfields with varying impact. In Iran, the government’s response to these strikes was mixed from 
worker perspectives. The first minimum wage law came into effect and day rate workers (or 
unskilled workers) were converted into a more stable form of employment.61 However, the 
government also implemented marshal law and began the regulation of unions.62 While the 
strikes were small and seemed, at times, to be ineffective, they produced results over time and 
ultimately had a lasting impact on oil company management. Even today it is an informal policy 
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of oil companies not to hire too many workers from the same area in order to avoid political 
action. 
 In 1946, workers not only went on strike in Iran, but workers at Kuwait Oil in Kuwait, a 
subsidiary of AIOC and Gulf Oil (an American company), also carried out a series of strikes that 
were influenced by the Tudeh Party. These strikes utilized multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic 
solidarities and in many ways appear similar to strikes at AIOC in Iran. Also, like the strikes in 
Iran, the Indian organizers of the Kuwait strikes were all from the same area of India and shared 
a linguistic background. Kuwait Oil, too, deported these workers before they could cause further 
disturbances.63  
 British agents, such as Thomas, were troubled by the return of these workers to India and 
feared the consequences of “Tudeh propaganda” in the subcontinent. While many British 
officials in the Gulf were concerned with maintaining Britain’s access to oil, Thomas was also 
worried about the rise of communist sentiments among workers in India.  He believed the 
communist ideas that spurred the strikes came to workers based in Iran and Kuwait via the Soviet 
Union, and he feared such ideas would spread throughout India. Thomas reported that many of 
the participants in the strikes were “fervent admirers” of the Tudeh Party. He wrote repeatedly to 
warn his superiors that the workers would continue to disseminate information on communism in 
India.64  
 Through localized networks of affiliation, workers participated in and promoted 
subversive movements. These localized networks intersected with and informed transnational 
labor networks. According to British agents and oil company management, the blame for the 
strikes did not rest solely with the strike organizers. While both agents and management believed 
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the organizers of the strikes were “a bad type of men,” they also laid blame on the “labour 
recruiting organisation in India for sending” these men to work in the oilfields.65 This recruiting 
organization was instrumental in mobilizing thousands of Indians traveling to work in the 
Persian Gulf and was composed of government representatives, oil company recruiters, and local 
recruiters. The recruiting organization’s network spanned the Arabian Sea and was composed of 
the above key participants, along with workers and managers in the oilfields. The network also 
included oil company headquarters and management in places as far away as England and the 
United States. The political actions, debates, and collusions engendered within this network 
indicate the centrality of the materiality of oil, local affiliations, and international carbon 
managerial practices in structuring the labor politics of the Gulf.  
While strikes, such as the July 1946 strike in Iran, were successful because of intergroup 
solidarity, at other times workers were segregated along linguistic, regional, or ethnic lines and 
did not have the opportunity to form such solidarities. Divisions were not always imposed from 
the top down. What also must be considered is how workers, managers, government officials, 
and local agents formed networks that shaped oil production in the Arabian Sea. Especially 
important was India’s independence in 1947. After India gained independence, some workers 
began to ask the nascent Indian nation-state directly to protect their rights abroad. 
 
Skilled Workers in Bahrain and Claims for Universal Human Rights 
In 1948, the nascent Indian government received a series of complaints from eight Indian 
chemists previously employed by the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) in Bahrain. The 
chemists were all well-educated Hindus; one was Sindhi, two Bengali, and five Malayalee.  In 
their letters and petitions to the Indian government, the chemists claimed that they had been fired 
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from their jobs because they had complained about the racist inequalities they faced at their 
worksite in Bahrain. The chemists argued that their dismissal violated the contract they had 
signed and they appealed to the Indian government to act as an advocate for their rights. The 
chemists made this claim for government action based on their citizenship and using the rhetoric 
of universal rights and the equality of Indians on a global stage. According to the chemists, the 
American management’s refusal to recognize the equality of the chemists was the root of the 
problem. The chemists wrote letters to the government and newspapers and received 
considerable attention from the local Bombay press, as well as the federal government in Delhi. 
In response to the chemists’ letters and the press coverage, the Indian government investigated 
the conditions of workers in the Gulf and, in particular, Bahrain.66  
The key problem, according to the Indian chemists, was that they were not treated fairly 
by the management at BAPCO. They blamed their unfair treatment on the managerial techniques 
used by Americans in the company. In a letter to the Indian government, the chemists stated that 
the Americans fostered a racist attitude towards the Indians. The chemists were offended that 
they were so poorly treated in spite of their education and accomplishments. Their treatment, 
however, was not out of the ordinary; it was a common American managerial tactic to divide the 
labor force at oil projects in terms of race, both in the Gulf and in North America.67 Unlike the 
initial policies at AIOC that enabled diverse workers to form solidarity through shared religious 
beliefs and experiences, American managerial practices separated employees. This separation, at 
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least in Bahrain in 1948, was proving quite effective at preventing workers from forming the 
kind of political alliances that resulted in strikes.  
The chemists, however, developed a new strategy: they asserted solidarity based on their 
profession and their citizenship in the new Indian nation. Also different from Indian participation 
in the strikes at Abadan, the workers in this case were appealing to a country outside of the 
country in which they were working, in an attempt to improve their labor conditions. Instead of 
forming the inter-ethnic, linguistic, and religious affiliations that enabled the Tudeh Party strikes, 
the chemists applied a rhetoric of international rights. Their demand for rights did not simply 
appeal to the Indian government based on their nationality and the nation’s obligations to them 
as citizens, but also used the language of citizenship to appeal to a universal value of human 
rights. The Indian chemists wrote to BAPCO and the Indian government arguing for the 
“fundamental Right of Association and of speech recognised even under the U.N.O. [United 
Nations Organization] charter” and used this argument to critique their dismissal by BAPCO. 
Instead of seeking to form alliances with other workers to improve their working conditions, the 
chemists based their action in a new regime of rights and citizenship. In doing so, their largest 
complaint after their termination was not about their working conditions, but that they were 
dismissed from their position in a manner that, they argued, violated their human rights.  
In order to raise awareness of their situation, the chemists appealed to the Indian press 
and a local Bombay newspaper took up their cause.68 This local paper discussed the experience 
of workers at BAPCO as one of “racial hatred” and compared these experiences with Indian 
experiences in South Africa – only with the caveat that Bahrain was much worse than South 
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Africa.69 In one of the Bombay news articles, one of the chemists was quoted as saying, “The 
Americans are careful not to over-step the boundary as far as the sentiments of the Arabs are 
concerned. But an Indian remains a slave of the Company, segregated, discriminated, and 
snubbed on account of his colour.”70 While the experiences of Indians at Bahrain was certainly 
unequal to that of Americans and northern Europeans, Arab workers, as well as Farsi-speaking 
employees, also lived in deplorable conditions and experienced what they considered racist 
treatment by the American managers.  
The discourse deployed by the chemists was one being developed and propagated in the 
United Nations (UN). In the late 1940s, the same period that the United Nations was focused on 
ratifying the Declaration of Human Rights, such a strategy was not uncommon; for example, 
Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia made similar claims.71 For the chemists, appealing to the 
Indian government on the basis of human rights had two implications. First, it made the implicit 
argument that ensuring the recognition of such rights was one of the duties of a liberal 
democratic state to its citizenry. Second, it banked on the notion that the Indian state would be 
particularly invested in protecting these rights given the country’s own anticolonial struggles. 
The Indian state, for example, had encouraged the International Labor Organization, even before 
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India’s independence, to develop a Declaration of Human Rights in 1944 as a method of 
critiquing colonial rule.72 
The rights to which the chemists referred were first articulated on an international stage 
with President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union address. In this speech, Roosevelt 
outlined four freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and 
freedom from fear – which he considered to be the right of every person in the world. The Allies 
adopted these four freedoms as their war aims during World War II and these freedoms formed 
the basis for Eleanor Roosevelt’s work in the United Nations on the Declaration of Human 
Rights. Truman also reiterated these to the UN in 1946. We see here that the racist policies 
originating out of American oil company policies and these notions of rights and freedoms 
provided both a structure of repression and of critique. Thus, two differing ideals – racist 
American managerial practices and a universal discourse of rights – were circulating in the oil 
arena. 
The chemists’ claim to these rights indicates that they understood themselves as members 
of an international community of skilled laborers, entitled to make political demands based on 
basic, universally shared rights. The chemists felt they were entitled to this respect given their 
schooling and expertise. The chemists also insisted that BAPCO’s management recognize their 
expertise, both in regards to the field of chemistry and in regards to management of oil 
companies. It was these claims, according to company management, that led to their ultimate 
dismissal from their positions and summary deportation, as the management feared the chemists 
would foster discontent with a larger swath of BAPCO employees by critiquing management 
practices and policies. 
                                                
72 Daniel R Maul, “The International Labour Organization and the Globalization of Human Rights, 1944-
1970,” in Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 301–20. 
 45  
One Indian official, based in Baghdad, visited Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Trucial Coast in 
order to ascertain the position of Indians in the oilfields. In his letters to the Indian government in 
New Delhi, he indicated that workers took oil jobs because there were no jobs in India and were 
thus compelled to sign contracts that were unfavorable for them. The lack of jobs in India, 
however, did not mitigate the conditions that workers faced. Indian government officials 
understood the end of colonialism in India to be a strong factor in mobilizing Indian citizens and 
motivating them to challenge poor treatment. One government official wrote, “As soon as they 
reach these places, they find themselves in an inferior position, and being discriminated against. 
This could be endured in the past, but the change over in India makes these young men feel 
humiliated.”73 Here, the official indicated that India’s new independence altered how workers 
understood their rights and that India’s independence influenced their understanding of their 
rights.  
Class was also a factor in the worker actions at BAPCO in the late 1940s. Despite the 
attention and support the chemists received from the Indian government, not all Indian workers 
appealed to the Indian government as a means to change their working conditions. In addition to 
the eight chemists working at BAPCO in the late 1940s, there were also over one thousand other 
Indians employed by the company.74 In 1948, approximately one-third of these employees were 
skilled employees, or monthly wage laborers, such as the chemists. The other two-thirds of the 
Indian employees working at BAPCO were daily wage laborers. In a survey of returning workers 
from BAPCO by the Protector of Emigrants in Bombay (POE), it appears that a few workers 
were terminated because of their participation in collective action. These employees were, like 
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the chemists, skilled, with many working as clerks. Those that claimed they were fired because 
of collective action said that they, along with three hundred other employees, had written a 
petition requesting medical facilities near their camps, provisions that were guaranteed in their 
contract. In speaking with the POE, these workers hoped that the Indian government would take 
action to enforce their contract and contest their unjust dismissal. Other skilled workers 
complained to the POE that they were treated with racism. These complaints, like the complaints 
of the chemists and those seeking medical facilities, came from well-educated, professional 
employees.  
The POE also interviewed twelve unskilled workers who complained about their working 
conditions in Bahrain in 1948.75 Complaints included being injured on the job, not being paid 
their full salary upon termination, and being terminated without due cause. These workers made 
no attempt to contact the Indian government to negotiate on their behalf or enforce their 
contracts. One of the key differences between these complaints and those made by the chemists 
and the clerks was that these unskilled employees were unhappy with their working conditions, 
but they did not make claims regarding citizenship status or human rights in their appeal for 
assistance from the government. Which rights of citizenship and rhetoric of rights workers 
mobilized is telling of class differences. In the wake of independence, a certain type of citizen, 
one who was of a higher education and income level than most of the population, felt able to 
situate himself within a cosmopolitan and international workforce. Through situating himself in 
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this workforce, the skilled worker made claims upon the nation-state that the nation ought to 
ensure his (or her) rights. This citizen was also, through emigration and appeal to a discourse of 
international human rights, able not only to influence the Indian nation’s emigration policies, but 
also to inform the government’s understanding of citizenship and rights. 
The form of labor mobilization that relied upon international human rights discourse and 
the citizenship differed markedly from the strikes in Iran and Kuwait just a few years earlier. 
These differences could indicate a shifting sense of both political action and national obligation 
for workers. As industry practices began to shift, companies encouraged recruiters to hire 
workers from diverse areas of India. In addition, the Indian national increasingly began to 
negotiate with oil companies on behalf of workers. These changes indicate shifting politics of 
locality that were used by workers to mobilize labor activity – a politics of locality based on the 
nascent Indian nation and an evolving category of “citizenship.” Importantly, however, ability to 
petition the nation was not equally accessible to all citizens. 
 
Racism and Hunger Strikes at the Aden Refinery 
Like the workers at BAPCO, workers in other areas of the Gulf found racism on the job 
site unacceptable after India’s independence. With the oil crisis in Iran from 1951 to 1953 and 
the related nationalization of the refinery at Abadan, AOIC directed its refinery investments 
elsewhere and, in particular, to building a new refinery in Aden. In 1952, British Petroleum 
(BP)76 hired over six hundred Indians to help build the refinery. These workers included a couple 
                                                
76 BP was subsidiary of AIOC. In 1954, AIOC renamed itself British Petroleum [BP]. 
 48  
of Indian doctors hired exclusively to attend to workers from Asia, as well as a few clerks; the 
rest of the Indian employees were hired as cooks.77 
The larger oil companies did not contract their own labor nor did they negotiate labor 
contracts directly, electing to use contractors instead. In the case of the refinery project in Aden, 
British Petroleum worked with two contractors, Bechtel Company and George Wimpey & 
Company.78  These contractors sent their general managers to negotiate the contracts with the 
Indian government.79 Embedded in the same migration network that Thomas had blamed for the 
unrest amongst Indians at Abadan, these contractors were pivotal figures between local recruiters 
and the oil companies and point to the persistence of the oil network in the Arabian Sea. These 
contractors often held great sway with the Indian government. One recruiter for both Bechtel and 
Wimpey boasted that he could move “recruits and others in and out of India without the need of 
visas or travel documents.”80 
For workers, contractors were often a source of stress – they facilitated migration, but 
often at the expense of the worker. Workers felt exploited not only by their employers, but also 
by the recruiting agents. Workers coming for the construction of the Aden refinery claimed that 
they were not told about the working conditions in Aden. In particular, they said the agent who 
recruited them did not portray the labor conditions accurately. Workers also claimed that the 
recruiting system was trying to “mak[e] capital” off workers, thereby implying that the 
contractors, local recruiters, and, perhaps, even the government were charging workers high rates 
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for jobs in the Gulf or emigration permission.81 Even paying high rates did not guarantee jobs. 
For example, one worker reported that he paid a bribe of INR 200 to be hired for a manual labor 
position at Abadan. However, when he arrived at the site, the company discovered that he was 
underage and sent him back to India.82  
 According to workers, exploitation was not limited to the recruiting process. At the Aden 
refinery construction project, workers were employed for a contract of eighteen months.83 Indian 
employees worked most Sundays and workers reported putting in at least ten hours a day.84 
While recruiters claimed ten-hour workdays were stipulated in the contract, laborers complained 
that these hours were too long and that they had not been informed of these hours before arriving 
in Aden. Workers also complained that the long hours constrained their ability to contact the 
Indian government as a form of redress. For example, one Italian priest told the Commissioner of 
the Government of India in Aden that the workers wanted to come meet with him, but had little 
time because they worked Sundays.85 Furthermore, workers were confused by the payment 
system for overtime hours. The company claimed that workers would be paid overtime upon 
completion of their contracts, but workers were unaware of this condition.86  
In addition to working long hours, workers in Aden reported mediocre living conditions. 
Indian employees lived twenty miles from the site of the refinery in tents. They were provided 
meals for a small fee (two shillings a day) and their cost of living was included in their wages. 
They ate in a common mess hall that did not allow for the employees to follow dietary 
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restrictions.87 Finally, Indian workers were not allowed to bring their families to Aden during 
their contracts.88 The shared experiences of migration and dealing with difficult working 
conditions and unresponsive employers thus served to bring Indian workers together and foster a 
sense of solidarity.  
In 1953, 350 Indian employees at the Aden Refinery construction project went on a forty-
eight-hour hunger strike.89 The workers’ complaints fell into two main categories: living 
conditions and discrimination.90 Workers reported that the food was of poor quality and 
“unpalatable to Indian taste” and that the latrines were unacceptable. Even a European personnel 
supervisor at the refinery agreed that the food was not good. This supervisor said that as a result 
of bad food, many workers lived on bread and jam and could not perform hard labor. He also 
said that the latrines were unsatisfactory and too close to the Indian employees’ tents.91 When an 
Indian government employee decided to visit the camp, he found that the bathrooms were 
“insufferable” and smelled bad; the food, he decided, was not “bad,” but “by no means good.”92 
In addition, the company insisted that the workers were happy with their hours and living 
conditions.93 
The Indian employees argued that discriminatory practices at the refinery were the main 
reason behind their long work hours, and also a factor restricting their access to recreational 
facilities. One worker said that he worked a minimum of ten hours a day, but more often worked 
twelve or fourteen hours and was given no credit for overtime. He described spending all day in 
                                                
87 Aden- Recruitment of 600 skilled workers from India. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1953. F.23-9/52-Emi. 
88 Letter to Manager, BP, from Ghatge, 23 February 1953. NAI, MAI, Emigration, 1952. D 4498/52. 
89 Telegram to Embassy of India, Cairo. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1953. F.23-9/52-Emi. 
90 Letter to POE, Bombay, from BP, 10 June 1953. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1953. G/16307. 
91 Extract from Monthly Report No. 5 of 1953. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1953. F.23-9/52-Emi. 
92 Letter to the Secretary, MEA, from Thadani, 10 June 1953. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1953. 2954/53-
Emi. 
93 Letter to Ghatge, 26 March 1953. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1953. F.23-9/52-Emi. 
 51  
the hot sun and, upon asking for a transfer, being refused. When he quit, he said that the 
European worker who replaced him who was given a “fat” salary and assistants.94 Such 
discrepancies in the treatment of Indians and Europeans were compounded by the fact that the 
American manager in charge of the Indian employees’ mess hall reportedly abused their 
nationality in the most “insulting of terms.” Indians were also barred from other spaces. The 
cinema, for example, was off limits to Indian workers and designated “European only” – 
something the Indian workers said was in breach of their contract.95 Indians also faced barriers 
accessing other leisure activities. For example, Indians did not feel they were getting adequate 
time at the cricket field.96 In addition, Indian employees were upset because the bar was only 
open part of the day, but, in the American and European mess halls, it was always open. They 
felt segregated from “Italian and other white employees” and felt that Indians were treated more 
poorly than European employees. They also pointed to their living accommodations, which were 
made of plywood and extremely hot as a result of having no fans.97 
From the perspective of the Indian employees, the discrimination they faced was based 
on skin color.98 Despite experiencing these inequalities, Indians were not above marshaling 
discriminatory discourse in their own favor, when necessary. Indian workers complained about 
being forced to live with Arabs,99 whom the Indians described as having a “lower standard of 
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living and not of clean habits.”100 Indeed, it was deemed particularly outrageous that they, Indian 
workers, were not even treated as well as the Arab employees. They complained of being paid 
less than workers coming from the Levant and the same amount as local workers with less skills 
and experience. One Indian highlighted the situation by pointing out that the Adenese “orderly 
who serves the office with tea and has little or no qualifications to be called literate draws as 
much pay as us … the Indian is getting a very raw deal.”101  
When the hunger strike began, Indian workers sent a telegram to the Indian ambassador 
in Egypt.102 Before the strike, the workers had conveyed their grievances to the Commissioner of 
the Government of India in Aden and complained that they were working ten-hour days and not 
getting overtime. Furthermore, they complained that if and when employees resigned, they were 
forced to pay for their own return passage. Paying for this passage was an economic hardship 
and had the effect of “virtually keep[ing] them in bondage for the period of their contract.”103  
The hunger strike successfully drew the attention of BP and the Indian government. The 
demographics of this strike were different from the strikes at Abadan or the complaints of the 
chemists in Bahrain. Notably, the striking workers were all Indians and did not form alliances 
with workers from other nations, as was the case in Abadan. Also distinct from both Abadan and 
Bahrain, this strike mobilized workers at all levels, from day laborers to skilled employees. The 
fact that it was not just skilled, educated Indians making claims on the Indian government based 
on citizenship, but unskilled, less educated workers as well suggests that an expanding notion of 
citizenship was forming and gaining popularity among workers abroad. This notion of 
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citizenship cut across the various differences among Indian workers, but emphasized instead 
their differences from European and Arab employees. Because they comprised such a large 
cross-section of workers, the striking Indian employees were able to garner the support of the 
Indian government, which, in turn, exerted pressure on the oil company to improve workers 
conditions. 
The hunger strike ended forty-eight hours after it began, and no one was fired as a result 
of the action.104 Rumors circulated in the camp that some employees were fired because they 
helped to organize the strike, but when the Indian government interviewed the workers, they 
reported not feeling intimidated after the strike. Rather, according to the Bombay POE, one of 
these leaders was fired because he was “incompetent and undesirable” in character and the other 
was fired because his position had become redundant.105 In response to the complaints by Indian 
employees, BP and its contractors insisted that working conditions were the same for Indians as 
they were for American and European workers. From the companies’ perspective, the whole 
strike could be blamed on “a few malcontents” who were not representative of the majority. 
Some Indian employees at the camp agreed with the company’s assessment. One Indian worker 
said of his colleagues, “while earning only a pittance in India are accustomed to low standards of 
living, come to the Aden Refinery and make fantastic demands.”106 Despite these discrepancies 
in Indian perspectives and the companies’ dismissive view of the strike, the bulk of employees 
stood by the Indian Employee Committee, which worked as a representative of Indian workers in 
their struggles with the company and organized the strike.  
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The Commissioner of the Government of India at Aden felt that the “unity exhibited by 
the Indian employees during the hunger strike has I believe made some impression on the 
European management.”107 The workers’ unity as Indians and as a negotiating block may be 
compared with the failed strikes of the early 1950s. Strikes often lost their effectiveness due to 
lack of unity among the Indian employees. The gap between employees was most pronounced 
between senior and junior employees, at least according to one Indian government observer who 
argued that senior workers were loath to join collective action. Government officials attributed 
this lack of unity to a generational difference – namely, that senior workers were more 
submissive, whereas junior workers felt more strongly about their rights and were more 
emboldened by the new independence of India.  
When employees complained to the Indian government concerning their treatment, they 
were significantly aided by employee associations. Employee associations gave legitimacy to 
employee complaints by increasing the solidarity of worker action. In turn, the Indian 
government contacted these associations in order to evaluate the claims of workers when 
government officials based in the Gulf were unable to do so. However, the Indian government 
did not view all employee associations equally. Some had only weak influence and the workers 
who joined feared losing their jobs for doing so. One employee association letter written to the 
Indian government was unsigned because the employees feared they would be fired if their 
action was discovered. Unfortunately, this strategy had a self-fulfilling effect, as government 
officials viewed the letter with skepticism and suspected the association either did not actually 
exist or did not represent a large number of employees because of the lack of signatures.108 
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During the strike, company management met with the Indian Employee Committee. 
However, management declined to keep a written record of what was discussed, arguing that it 
was not the policy of the company to “deal with a group or a nationality unless they returned to 
work and tendered their requests through the proper channels set up for them.”109 The company 
also argued that Indian employees got the same rice, fish, meat, and other food as all other 
workers at the site. They pointed out that Indian chefs cooked the food for all Indian employees. 
One company manager said, “The British Americans, and Italian personnel accept the condition 
with understanding and tolerance; not so the Indians.”  Many of the managers felt that Indian 
employees simply needed to adapt and claimed that Indian employees were “reactionary” and 
likely to “inflect other employees with radical ideas.”110 
Management also attempted to legitimate the discrepancies in pay based on global 
inequalities. One manager argued that the company was “in no way responsible for the different 
standards of living and comparative wage scales throughout the world.”111 Through such an 
argument, the managers claimed that the differences in treatment and pay of employees were 
based on the nationality of the employee, even as the management simultaneously refused to deal 
with employees through national employee unions. This argument was common in the oil 
industry in the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, one oil company claimed, “racial discrimination is 
unknown in the Company’s operation.” A manager at the company went on to say,  
Benefits given to one nationality usually extended to all others. Saudi 
Arabs are handled on an equal basis and we seldom find any one 
nationality being given any preferential treatment … This follows the 
principle laid down by Saudi Arabian Government requiring that the 
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company treat the Saudi Arab on an equal basis with personnel recruited 
from countries located east of the Atlantic.112 
 
These types of claims sought to naturalize differences between American management and 
workers hired from the Middle East or India. The international oil management practices applied 
in Bahrain and Aden, as well as in other parts of the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, used racial 
discrimination as a method both to control the workforce and then excuse such practices, by 
pointing to global inequalities that just existed “naturally.”  
In addition to discrimination, companies used outright intimidation to control their 
employees. During conversations with workers, the Commissioner learned that Indian workers 
lived in daily fear of their employer. He wrote that the Indian employees were “terrified of 
victimization” due to a “spy system” that the Company used to control employees. This spy 
system was composed of six Indian informants who provided the company with information 
about the other Indians. The result was that the rest of the Indians were afraid of the 
informants.113 This spy system was particularly perilous for the Indians who led the Indian 
Employee Committee, as they feared the company was compiling a “black list” of those 
suspected to have led the strike and that the employees on the list would be “sent packing.”114 
When the Indian government reopened recruitment shortly after the strike, this fear became more 
pronounced.115 This was because Indian workers at the refinery knew there were many Indians 
willing to take their place, so with reopened recruitment, disgruntled workers could be easily 
dismissed and replaced by workers who would not complain. 
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In the wake of the hunger strike, the Indian government looked into the living conditions 
of workers at the Aden refinery. Directed from the central government in Delhi, the 
Commissioner of the Government of India in Aden and the Protector of Emigrants in Bombay 
investigated the claims made by workers and attempted to form a plan of action to redress their 
poor treatment. One of the government’s immediate actions was to briefly halt all recruitment 
from India for the Aden refinery.116 In the inquiry into the effects of the strike, the government 
spoke with two workers who were thought to have led the strike and were subsequently 
dismissed from their employment. According to these workers, the results were mixed: there 
were still no fans in workers’ sleeping areas; cold water was available to Indians; the food had 
deteriorated, but beef was being served less often; and the hours of work had not changed 
significantly, though workers at least now knew they were accruing overtime. One worker said 
that if the living conditions improved, workers would not mind the hours.117 Finally, in 
September, the workers were able to move into a new camp.118 
The choice to go on a hunger strike and not a regular strike deserves some attention. 
Building upon the popularity of trade unions in India after World War I, strikes in India were a 
preferred method of agitating against working conditions and promoting solidarity amongst 
workers. In 1951, there were 120 registered strikes and hundreds of additional strikes in the 
Indian bidi industry alone.119 The hunger strike, in contrast, was less popular and uncommon in 
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the Gulf. Facing restrictions on labor unions and formal strikes, the hunger strike at Aden gave 
workers a means to address their working conditions. This method of protest, popularized by 
Gandhi, was especially poignant given the history of India’s colonization and the contemporary 
discrimination workers faced. By appealing to the Indian government to protest both their 
treatment during the process of migration and after arriving in Aden, these workers defined 
themselves as a community of Indians and, through their strike, evoked memories of the 
country’s own struggle for equality.  
 
Conclusion: Citizenship, Worker Rights, and Oil Companies 
Workers defined social affiliations and politics of locality from the village to the nation 
as they responded to the management practices of oil companies and attempted to improve their 
living conditions. The strikes, protests, and complaints lodged by workers illustrate that while the 
materiality of oil imposed certain parameters on labor, the production of oil was also a site where 
international carbon managerial practices and localized politics met. This conjunction presents 
opportunities to destabilize historical narratives that focus on the history of the nation-state and 
shed light instead on how workers’ various networks and solidarities created and invoked scales 
of the local, national, and transnational.  
Despite worker protests, however, the situation for workers in the Gulf did not improve.  
Throughout the 1950s, workers repeatedly complained of discrimination and lack of job stability. 
For example, in Qatar in 1953, workers pointed to continued differential treatment of Indian and 
non-Indian employees. Indian workers felt they were discriminated against on the basis of their 
nationality and religion. This discrimination was not constrained to one type of worker. Laborers 
as well as skilled professionals complained. Not unlike the chemists in Bahrain, one medical 
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doctor complained that he was treated “like an ordinary medical orderly.” Given their even lower 
pay, day laborers felt especially vulnerable to discriminatory policies. At Qatar Petroleum 
Company (QPC), laborers felt that discrimination at the company influenced everything from 
their daily interactions with management to their housing conditions. Anger over the latter came 
to a head and rig workers stopped work for a short period in 1953. Strikes by Indians, however, 
were becoming less effective. During the strike in Qatar, the ruler, Sheikh Ali al-Thani, 
intervened. With this intervention, the men returned to work, despite the fact that the company 
did not comply with their demands.120 Throughout the 1950s the ability of Indian workers to 
agitate for better working conditions was increasingly curtailed.  
Looking at worker action before and after India’s independence illustrates how India’s 
independence allowed workers to appeal to the nation-state for assistance and protection. 
Workers faced discrimination, and oil companies often hoped this discrimination would limit 
workers ability to make effective claims on management. But the dignity that Indians felt they 
were due after India’s independence served to bolster their claims. This independence also 
helped Indians to form alliances across linguistic and, at times, class divisions. In the case of 
labor strikes in the oilfields of the Persian Gulf in the 1940s and 1950s, investigations into the 
materiality of oil and its consequences for labor action may be coupled with an exploration of 
international carbon managerial practices in order to give meaning to these strikes that is not 
bound by the history of the nation or empire. It is not on oil alone that the network hinges. The 
requirements of the oil industry are not defined solely by the industry itself. Instead, one must 
consider the multiplicity of actors within the network and the localized politics those actors bring 
with them to the oilfields. By the mid-twentieth century, materials, ideas, and people were all 
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moving through circuits that cross-cut empires and nations, solidifying the salience of those 
political entities in some instances, challenging them in others. This investigation of how 
affiliations and networks informed migration and enabled workers’ actions helps us to 
understand to what ends the postcolonial nation was invoked from abroad. In the next chapter, I 
will examine the Indian government’s response to these claims from workers abroad. 
  










The Indian Government and the Regulation of Emigration 
 
 With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, the fluidity of the boundaries 
between India and the Gulf was partially restricted and the flow of labor and capital was altered. 
Despite these changes, the migration of Indians to work on oil projects continued. In the late 
1940s and 1950s, the Indian government considered and approved petitions by oil companies 
that wanted to recruit Indian workers for oilfields in the Gulf. In the 1960s, these petitions 
increased. Petitions by oil companies to recruit Indian laborers shared many similarities with the 
contracts used by the British government during the colonial period. Before approving these 
petitions, bureaucrats in the Indian government needed to decide how the state should care for 
citizens’ rights abroad through the regulation of emigration. In these conversations, regulating 
the emigration of Indians to work in the oilfields of the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf developed 
into a bureaucratic debate that influenced the Indian government’s approach to citizenship and 
sovereignty. 
 The view of citizenship arising from Enlightenment ideals stresses individual rights 
within a rule of law framework.121 For the nascent Indian nation, and today, the question of how 
the rights of individuals are best ensured by the government was, and continues to be, a pressing 
issue. The rights of citizens to emigrate, in particular, is an area where the rights of citizens to 
                                                
121 T H Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: The University of Cambridge Press, 1950). 
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make their own choices runs in tension with the government’s duties to protect its citizens. 
Within liberal democratic societies, the norm, established in the French Revolution, is that 
citizens are permitted to emigrate from their homelands.122 Often, in India, the obligations of the 
state appear to run counter to this liberal ideal. Today, emigration from India by men is free, 
except for those who have not matriculated and are traveling to one of seventeen countries, 
including all of the countries of the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf.123 The precedence for the 
restriction of emigration has its roots in the colonial period and the selective implementation of 
colonial policies by the nascent Indian government. 
 Through debates on emigration to the Gulf, the implementation of policies, and the 
negotiation of worker contracts, bureaucrats in the Indian nation-state defined the state’s 
obligations to its citizens and debated the implications of citizens working abroad for national 
sovereignty. As Akhil Gupta argues, in a postcolonial context, it is through the “discourses and 
practices of the modern nation-state” that the meaning of citizenship emerges.124 The methods 
the Indian government developed to oversee emigration of workers to the Persian Gulf in the 
early years of Indian independence bridge two competing notions of Indian citizens. In one, 
citizens are vulnerable and, in the other, citizens are rational liberal actors. This division became 
important as the Indian state sought to determine what its duties were to its citizens abroad. As 
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questions regarding the nature of the state and citizenship were being debated, bureaucratic 
practices were developed to oversee emigration, many of which remain in play today.  
 In the study of migration, much of the literature focuses on nations’ immigration policies 
and their treatment of immigrants. Just as important, but usually ignored, is the role of 
emigration in defining the nation. Emigration policies are a key mechanism through which states 
have defined their citizens and the development of passports and visas have similarly helped 
nations to define their borders and assert sovereignty.125 Furthermore, regulating emigration has 
important implications for the construction of national sovereignty. In his work on sovereignty, 
Stephen Krasner describes four different governmental conditions that “sovereignty” may be 
used to designate. These meanings include “international legal sovereignty” or the recognition of 
a state by others; “Westphalian sovereignty” or a government free from external authorities; 
“domestic sovereignty” or a government’s authority within its borders; and “interdependence 
sovereignty” or the ability of a government to control its activities and movement within and 
across its borders. These types of sovereignty are distinct, but they are not mutually exclusive – a 
nation may have one type, but not another, or a nation may have many of these types of 
sovereignty. 126 Upon India’s independence in 1947, for example, India gained Westphalian 
sovereignty, but still needed to work to establish interdependence sovereignty. Aihwa Ong 
discusses another way scholars may engage with sovereignty, which she calls “graduated 
sovereignty.” This type of sovereignty emerges as governments adjust to the demands of global 
capital. She argues, “Graduated sovereignty is an effect of states moving from being 
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administrators of a watertight national entity to regulators of diverse spaces and populations that 
link with global markets.”127 The connection between global markets, national sovereignty, and 
citizenship are central features of governments. In 1950s India, I argue the relationship between 
these features offers a new perspective on government sovereignty. At that time, the bureaucratic 
techniques the Indian state developed to manage transnational migration contributed to growing 
assertions of India’s sovereignty and the nation’s obligations to its citizens. 
 Discussions of citizenship were central in the development of governance for the new 
Indian nation. Citizenship was such a crucial issue that Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime 
Minister of India, argued that the topic “probably received far more thought and consideration 
[in 1949] than any other article contained” in India’s constitution.128 Following in the wake of 
the violence and upheaval of the partition of India and Pakistan, the Indian government defined 
who was a citizen of India and who was a citizen of Pakistan. Even before the constitution was 
passed on January 26, 1950, citizenship provisions were brought into force. As shown in Vazira 
Zamindar’s work on partition, these citizenship provisions linked “birth, residence, migration, 
and citizenship.” Importantly a “‘domicile’ and birth ‘in the territory of India’” were needed for a 
person to be a citizen of India.129 A majority of the debates in the Constituent Assembly, the 
elected body that drafted and ratified the constitution, concerned how to discern the citizenship 
of Pakistanis and Indians, but refugees were not the only group under discussion. People abroad 
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who were “Indians in origin” or who “consider themselves to some extent Indians” posed 
additional types of possible citizens for the newly formed government to consider. According to 
Nehru, procedures had to be put in place so that these Indians abroad did not become aliens 
without citizenship rights in any country. In these discussions, Nehru and other members of the 
Constituent Assembly were concerned about Indians abroad who were the descendants of 
indentured laborers. Nehru argued that these people should be able to apply at Indian Consuls 
General and register their names to be citizens.130  
 These debates regarding citizenship and the subsequent adoption of the citizenship 
articles defined the Indian government’s early approach to citizenship. Throughout the 1950s, 
this policy continued to change as government officials and the courts decided individual 
citizenship cases. The increasing numbers of Indians working in the Arabic-speaking Persian 
Gulf reinforced the need for the Indian government to establish clear guidelines for citizens 
abroad. Migration to the Gulf was different from the historic practice of indentured labor 
migration, and the Indian government needed to retool emigration policies to address the needs 
of migrants to the Gulf. Through its reinterpretation of colonial policies, the Indian government 
addressed the claims Indian citizens working abroad made on the government through the lens of 
the Emigration Act of 1922. In this process, two competing definitions of citizenship arose – 
both of which were seen as having implications for India’s reputation internationally and for the 
protection of religious groups in India. The contracts of Indians working in the Gulf became a 
key site through which the tensions between these two definitions were worked out. Examining 
these contracts and the debates around them illuminate how the bureaucratic apparatuses used to 
move manpower to the Gulf developed, and what role oil companies played in this development.  
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Staffing the Construction of the Refinery in Aden 
In 1952, British Petroleum (BP) approached the Indian government about hiring six 
hundred Indians for the construction of the Aden refinery. BP was building a refinery in Aden in 
the wake of the nationalization of oil by the Iranian government in 1951. In particular, the 
expulsion of western companies from the city of Abadan, Iran, and the loss of the refinery there 
– the world’s largest refinery at the time – necessitated BP’s new refinery project. The 
nationalization of the refinery at Abadan also meant many of the approximately two thousand 
Indians working for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company lost their jobs.131 Many of the Indian 
workers at the Abadan refinery had been working in skilled positions and faced unemployment 
upon returning to India. However, instead of rehiring these unemployed Indians, BP wished to 
hire cooks and other non-technical workers, such as clerks. As bureaucrats in the Indian 
government attempted to make a decision regarding BP’s petition, two issues came to the fore. 
These issues revolved around racism against Indians and India’s international standing as a 
nation. Both of these issues concerned India’s status as a newly independent nation and the 
nation’s representation by its citizens abroad. 
Indian cooks were categorized as semi-skilled workers by the Indian government and this 
category of worker was unlike most of the Indian workers in Aden at that time. Prior to the 
construction of the refinery at Aden, the Government of Aden had forbidden Indian domestics 
from immigrating to the country, as there were ample numbers of Adeni to perform the jobs. 
With the arrival of almost three thousand foreigners for the refinery project, there were no longer 
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sufficient numbers of local workers, and the oil companies, with the assent of Aden’s 
government, looked to India to supply domestic staff, including cooks.132 Eventually, the Indian 
government granted permission to BP and two contractors, Bechtel and Wimpey, to conduct this 
recruitment. But as the recruiting process began, Indian bureaucrats were troubled by some of the 
recruitment practices. First, the government was concerned that the company was only hiring six 
hundred Indians and that the positions for which they were hiring Indians were not skilled 
positions. They contrasted BP’s plans to hire Indian cooks with BP’s proposal to hire 1,500 
skilled workers from Italy and suggested the company was discriminating against Indians.133 
Particularly important to many bureaucrats in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was the 
fact that Indians were not being treated the same as Europeans and Americans; instead, the 
bureaucrats argued, Indians were being treated like Arabs.134 This form of discrimination caused 
many officials to claim that the oil companies were treating Indians as the British had treated 
India under colonialism.135 The most blatant source of discrimination, according to Indian 
officials, was found in oil companies’ hiring practices. These arguments were congruent with a 
general rhetoric used in discussions of Indian overseas emigration that India that was defined and 
represented by its citizens abroad. 
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 A second problem regarding BP’s recruitment was brought up by the Commissioner of 
the Government of India in Aden, A. B. Thadani, when he heard about BP’s recruitment. 
Thadani’s critique revolved around the relationship between India’s international reputation and 
the class of workers going abroad. After six cooks traveled to Aden, the Commissioner wrote to 
the government in Delhi, arguing that no more Indian cooks should be allowed to migrate to 
Aden. He pointed out that the Indians currently living in Aden were rich and the arrival of poor 
Indians to work as cooks would harm the reputation of India.136 As the Commissioner put it, the 
cooks would “lower India in the eyes of everyone.” In addition, he argued, without their families 
the “servant class” or cooks, would “get into all sorts of trouble” and their presence “would also 
start economic conflict with another class of Arabs.”137 Put bluntly, cooks were seen as poor 
international ambassadors of India. Other Indian officials vehemently disagreed with the 
Commissioner’s assessment. The Protector of Emigrants (POE) in Bombay wrote to the 
Commissioner that it was “the first time in my life that I have ever heard it suggested that the 
profession of a cook is a dishonourable one.” He further argued that every country had cooks and 
he had never heard that the profession was “degrading to the mother country.”138 In this debate, 
the idea that citizens working abroad served to embody and represent India was not disputed; 
rather, the dispute centered on the nature of the work and the class of the citizen migrating.  
 India’s new status as an independent nation provided an important framework and 
context for this debate. One official wrote that it was the view taken by the Indian government 
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that “Emigration from dependent British India was a source of embarrassment; emigration from 
free India may be a source of strength.” In order to ensure that emigration was a source of 
strength, any proposal for Indian emigration had to be considered on its own merits and would 
only be permitted if emigration was sure to be on “honourable terms, consistent with the dignity 
of India.”139 In such arguments, the honor of India was embodied in each migrant and it was the 
Indian government’s duty to oversee emigration in order to maintain India’s reputation abroad.   
 Problems with the recruitment of workers for the Aden refinery continued. As clerks 
began to migrate to Aden in increasing numbers, accusations of racial discrimination against 
Indians abounded. The oil companies were accused of hiring only the lowest level of clerks from 
India. Furthermore, these clerks were not paid enough to maintain a standard of living, and, 
similarly to the cooks, this was seen as disparaging both India’s reputation and the reputation of 
all Indians living in the Gulf. In addition, there were allegations that even though the clerks were 
paid only at the lowest skill level, they were actually working at a much higher level. Officials 
argued that the company was taking advantage of the high rates of unemployment in India.140 
Like the debates regarding the emigration of Indian cooks, questions of the respectability of 
labor, how the choices of individual citizens regarding emigration reflected back on the 
reputation of India, and how much of a choice workers had were all at the center of these 
critiques and engagements. In order to respond to worker complaints and build a consensus 
regarding the role of the state in governing emigration, bureaucrats returned to the Emigration 
Act of 1922.  
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Colonial Legacies: The Emigration Act of 1922  
 In 1922, the Government of India, under the advisement of Sir G. L. Corbett, a British 
member of the Indian Civil Service, passed the Emigration Act of 1922. This new Act replaced 
the Emigration Act of 1908. It was thought, in 1922, that a new Emigration Act was necessary 
because the 1908 Act dealt primarily with indentured labor and, since the Defense of India 
Rules, emigration with the intention of laboring for hire was illegal.141 
 In order to regulate emigration, the Emigration Act of 1922 outlined three types of 
emigrants. This categorization of emigrants was similar to the Emigration Act of 1908, but the 
categories in 1922 were defined more broadly. According to the Emigration Act of 1922, the first 
type of emigrants was unskilled workers or laborers, such as agriculturalists, porters, and 
rickshaw pullers. These workers were prohibited from emigrating to any country that was not 
approved by Parliament.142 The second type of emigrants were skilled workers “of a 
comparatively low order and status, belonging to classes of persons who by reason of their 
ignorance, were likely to be imposed upon or by reason of the number in which they emigrate 
were likely to create political or economic problems in the country of immigration.” This 
category included domestics, artisans, clerks, shop assistants, entertainers, and food servers.143 
The third category of emigrants was reserved for professionals, such as businessmen, doctors, 
lawyers, and students. These professionals were assumed to have a “higher degree of intelligence 
or knowledge” and were thus left outside of the scope of the 1922 Act and not required to obtain 
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“No Objection Certificates.”144 Women and minors faced additional impediments to emigration. 
Classified together, both were prohibited from emigrating unless the Protector of Emigrants, 
upon “examination” of the potential emigrant, was “satisfied that he/she can take care of 
himself/herself in the country of employment.”145 These laws reduced the ability of women, 
children, and unskilled workers to migrate using the discourse of protecting vulnerable groups. 
 The Emigration Act of 1922 also limited unskilled emigration to those countries 
approved by the Government of India. In the original implementation of the Act, emigration was 
only controlled when workers were emigrating overseas to work for hire and when emigrants 
were assisted in their departure. Workers who emigrated on their own did not need to follow the 
outlines of the Emigration Act, because emigrating on one’s own reflected a form of initiative 
that ought not be discouraged. This deregulation of unaided unskilled labor migration was 
overturned in 1938 by the Indian legislature and all unskilled emigrants were deemed to be 
within the scope of the Emigration Act.146  
 Since its adoption, various departments had been placed in charge of administering the 
Emigration Act of 1922. In 1937, the Department of External Affairs was established and a key 
role of the Ministry was to oversee the Emigration Act. In 1941, the Department of Indians 
Overseas oversaw the regulation of emigration within the Commonwealth and for Indian 
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pilgrims to holy sites in Saudi Arabia. In August 1946, the Commonwealth Relations 
Department oversaw all emigration as covered by the Indian Emigration Act of 1922 and 
emigration within the Commonwealth. In 1947, the Commonwealth and the External Affairs 
Departments merged and, in 1949, the Ministry became known as simply the Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA). Within the Ministry, duties were divided regionally and functionally.147 
Until 2004 and the establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs,148 the Ministry of 
External Affairs, in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour, oversaw the emigration of workers 
to the Gulf. Within the MEA, emigration was overseen centrally by the Controller-General of 
Emigration. In the early 1950s, the Controller oversaw local Protectors of Emigrants (POE) 
offices located in hubs of emigration: Madras, Mandapam, Negapattinam, Tuticorin, and 
Bombay [MAP 3: POE Offices in India, Past and Present].149 It was these local POE offices, 
administrators at the MEA and Ministry of Labour, and emigrant reports of their working 
conditions that shaped the implementation to the Emigration Act of 1922 and the Indian 
government’s response to migration to the Gulf.  
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Map 3: POE Offices in India, 1950 and 2010 
 
 For many Indian government employees, explaining the underlying principles of the 
Emigration Act of 1922 was central to bureaucratic attempts to implement it. Bureaucrats were 
clear that their purpose was not to “enlarge [the Act’s] scope or change its basic structure.”150 In 
the development of the Act, Corbett suggested that the Act prohibit emigration to countries 
where Indians did not enjoy the same rights as other classes of British subjects. It was feared that 
any imposition of an inferior status on Indians living and working in another nation would 
damage the whole country’s status and foster constant political trouble. Conversely, Corbett 
suggested that emigration to countries where rights were given to Indians should be permitted 
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and encouraged. Corbett reasoned that emigration to such countries would solve problems 
related to India’s growing population, provide economic opportunities, and “give Indians a wider 
outlook on the world in general.”151 
 While Indian bureaucrats after independence agreed upon these principles, the 
implementation of the Act was difficult. This difficulty arose from balancing the rights of 
individual citizens and the duties of the state. In the mid-1950s, Indian bureaucrats working for 
the MEA reflected on the reasons behind the 1922 Act. They discerned two ideologies behind the 
legislation. First, from Corbett’s note written in 1921,  
It would be wrong to endeavour to hamper or control free emigration. It 
would be unjustifiable interference with the liberty of the subject. No 
nation controls free emigration. Free emigration presupposes a certain 
amount of intelligence, money and enterprise, and in cases of this kind, the 
individual should be left to decide for himself.152 
 
Government officials interpreted this quote as highlighting and prioritizing the rights of citizens 
to emigrate and the need for the government to respect the freedom of its citizens. According to 
bureaucrats at the MEA, however, this notion of liberty for citizens also had to be balanced with 
the responsibilities of the government. Sir George Barn, in a speech introducing the Emigration 
Act of 1922, said,  
It is the unskilled workers who require the greatest measure of help and 
protection from the Government and the Bill endeavors to give it to them. 
The skilled worker is in a very different position to the unskilled worker. 
He is much more capable of looking after his own interests and, 
consequently requires less help and protection from the Government. At 
the same time we feel that the emigration of skilled workers should be 
under some measure of control, and that the Government should give him 
some measure of protection. 
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In this quote, Sir Barn assigned differing levels of agency to the types of workers able to 
emigrate and argued that the government owed such workers differing types of responsibility. In 
contrasting these two arguments, Indian bureaucrats laid out the two poles of the debate on 
emigration. 
 Often, in the early 1950s, Indian politicians and bureaucrats were sharply divided on the 
government’s role in regulating emigration. Some expressed concerns over the increase in 
India’s population and suggested that a program that encouraged or subsidized emigration would 
be an ideal solution.153 Other bureaucrats suggested that it was better for Indians to remain in 
India than face discrimination abroad. This perspective often drew connections between 
colonialism and Indian emigration. One official wrote:  
It would appear that in the present context of world affairs it is just as well 
that people of India in particular should not venture abroad, if only the 
reason that her experience of emigration problem ranging over a century 
and more has been one doleful saga of exploitation by the colonial powers 
to begin with, and of the denial of legitimate rights of emigrants in more 
recent times.154 
 
Arguments such as these equated the exploitation of emigrants to the exploitation of the country 
under British colonialism. A central feature of the arguments for restricting and controlling 
emigration was the changed circumstances of India after independence.155 
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Historical Understandings of Emigration 
 The connection between India’s colonial history, independence, and emigration were 
developed within a specific historical framework. In 1953, many members of the government 
considered migration to have been a problem in the past, but to no longer be a pressing concern.  
In postcolonial India, they argued, emigration affected only a “fringe” of the Indian population. 
Emigration was also understood to be a permanent activity whereby Indians settled abroad for 
the entirety of their lives. Conflating emigrants with indentured laborers, many government 
bureaucrats understood Indians abroad to have moved out of India from the 1850s through the 
1920s.156 Migrants’ roles in these new lands as indentured laborers limited the amount of money 
migrants were able to send home, and low incomes combined with slow travel times meant that 
workers rarely returned to India for visits. This view of migrants, and particularly the notion of 
migration as a historical activity involving mainly poor Indians, was largely developed in 
relation to Indian emigrants currently abroad in the early 1950s. In 1950, more than 600,000 
Indians lived in Malaya and Singapore; over 400,000 lived in the British West Indies; almost 
300,000 lived in both South Africa and Mauritius; and about 150,000 lived in Fiji and British 
East Asia. In the eyes of many bureaucrats, these populations had lost their Indian “roots.”157 
Bureaucrats assumed that these expatriate Indians maintained a tenuous connection to India by 
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occasionally sending money to relatives living in India. These remittances, however, were 
assumed to be small.158  
 How to deal with the descendants of indentured laborers abroad was discussed by Nehru 
at the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948: 
Now these Indians abroad, what are they? Are they Indian citizens? Are 
they going to be citizens of India or not? If they are not, then our interest 
in them becomes cultural, humanitarian and political…. Either they get 
franchise of the nationals of the other country or treat them as Indian 
minus franchise and ask for them the most favourable treatment given to 
the alien.159  
 
Concern over Indians abroad had been important to Nehru even before independence. In 
Singapore on March 1946, Nehru addressed a crowd of over 10,000 Indians and said, “When 
India attains independence, she would immediately decide who her nationals were and Indians 
overseas would be Indian nationals unless they choose otherwise.”160 Nehru and many Indian 
administrators focused on Indians abroad whose parents or grandparents had left India as 
indentured laborers. The result was that Indians abroad were often assumed to be synonymous 
with indentured laborers.  
 This historic understanding of migration influenced perspectives on returned migrants; 
returnees were thought to be lower class and undesirable.161 For example, administrators 
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assumed that the few emigrants who did return to India brought back no savings. Regarding 
returned migrants, one official wrote:  
Such persons are mostly those who were unable to make headway in the 
country of their emigration owing to their own shortcomings, indifferent 
health, etc. And therefore finding the circumstances uncongenial in their 
old age or on becoming otherwise inform. Being poor, they could not 
naturally be expected to bring with them any wealth on their return to 
India.162 
 
This view of indentured labor relied on class assumptions of migration. These class assumptions 
shaped, in turn, assumptions regarding the potential contributions Indians abroad could make to 
the Indian nation and the level of attachment these Indians abroad were thought to have for the 
new nation.  
 The question of overseas Indians became more salient for the nascent Indian government 
as the nature of emigration changed. In 1953, many officials in the government felt that the 
problem of nationalism and the new nation were particularly connected to emigrants. Officials 
adopted the perspective that emigration meant permanent resettlement abroad and they argued 
that Indians who settled abroad had lost their Indian identity. They argued that any emigrant who 
felt a particularly strong connection to India would not be able to go abroad for long because of 
“high emotions,” presumably emotions attached to an overwhelming nostalgia for their 
homeland.163 The new Indian migrants were different from the indentured laborers who rarely 
returned to India. Indian migrants to the Gulf were usually wealthier and of a higher class than 
indentured laborers. In addition, most migrants to the Gulf had neither the means nor intention to 
permanently live there. As seen in their petitions to the Indian government, these migrants 
continued to identify as Indians and used their citizenship to request the protection of the Indian 
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government. As overseas citizens, these migrants embodied the nascent Indian nation and, 
therefore, needed to be treated with the dignity due it as a free nation.  
 
Regulating Emigration to the Gulf 
 In the early 1950s, neither the heads of the Emigration Section of the Ministry of External 
Affairs nor a Parliamentary representative presenting at the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) on migration considered the emigration of Indians to the Middle East a population worthy 
of study.164 This, however, was rapidly changing. Only one year later, officials at the MEA said 
that after Malaya, the Persian Gulf was the mostly important area to which Indians were 
migrating.165 By 1952, the POE office in Bombay, the main POE office for emigration 
clearances to the Gulf, was busier than ever before, with increased requests for emigration 
clearances and an increased number of cases in which workers had attempted to emigrate 
illegally.166 
 Migrants to the Gulf were markedly different from the indentured laborers that had left 
India in the latter half of the nineteenth and first quarter of the twentieth century. Notably, 
migrants to the Gulf only left India on short contracts, averaging one to three years, and returned 
to India once the contracts ended. Usually, their families remained in India. These workers also 
brought back larger amounts of money, reflecting the large pay discrepancies between earlier 
indentured migrants and migrants to the Gulf. In 1938, the Indian government collected data that 
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indicated that 31,844 Indians returned from abroad and brought back INR 116,841.167 Only 
twelve years later, in 1950, the number of returned emigrants for which the government had data 
was much smaller, only 5,598 returnees, but these returnees were coming from the Gulf 
specifically and they brought with them INR 125,000.168 This indicates that the form of labor 
migration was shifting and that Indians were going abroad to more lucrative jobs for shorter 
periods of time.  
 As more oil companies became established in the Gulf and hired increasing numbers of 
Indian workers, methods of recruiting Indians also solidified into standardized practices. Some 
contractors recruited in India directly. In Bombay, in 1952, there were 670 authorized recruiting 
agents. The government, building on laws established in 1930, oversaw these agents to ensure 
that workers were not charged for the cost of recruitment. Smaller recruiting agents were 
required to deposit an amount equal to one and one-half times the single fare for a migrant and 
more established agents were able to deposit a lump sum with the POE to ensure workers were 
recruited fairly and not stuck in a foreign country.169 Some larger oil companies and contractors 
recruited directly for themselves and BP’s India branch acted as an agent for both oil companies 
and “territories” in the Gulf under British administration.170 This method of recruitment relied 
upon colonial practices, oil companies’ influence, the politics of oil production, the temporary 
nature of emigration, and India’s status as a new nation meant that this recruitment system was 
also innovating new ways of moving Indians abroad. 
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 Increased emigration to the Gulf and the unique character of this migration opened up 
debates in the Indian government regarding the Emigration Act of 1922, the Act’s interpretation, 
and its implementation. Two primary problems that arose in the early 1950s involved the scope 
of emigration – namely, which emigrants were covered by the Act – and whether the Act applied 
to emigrants that flew out of India (a distinction I elaborate on below). These debates were 
related primarily to the types of workers being hired by oil companies and how those workers 
were then treated. For bureaucrats, these issues directly related to debates on the nature of Indian 
citizenship and the role of the state. Importantly, as a new nation, Indian bureaucrats wanted to 
differentiate contemporary Indians abroad from earlier indentured laborers. In exerting controls 
over emigration, bureaucrats worked to protect citizen rights, maintain India’s reputation 
internationally, and exert the sovereignty of India to control its borders. 
 In 1953, the government estimated that 6,000 to 7,000 Indians were traveling to the Gulf 
annually, and were estimated to be remitting around INR 2,500,000 every year.171 Less than one-
third of these migrants, however, fell under the scope of the Emigration Act and, therefore, the 
jurisdiction of the MEA. One way that emigrants who would be classified as skilled emigrants 
worked around the jurisdiction of the Act was by flying out of India. The original wording of the 
Act only covered departures by sea and workers used this loophole to fly out of India without 
going through the necessary steps. In 1950, 1,584 people were documented as having left India 
in this manner. In the early 1950s, rumors circulated in the Bombay POE office and the MEA 
that “chartered aircraft left Bombay almost every month carrying workers who had not been 
registered under the Emigration Act.” Not all oil companies followed this practice and the more 
established companies were thought to register Indians and then fly them out. However, other 
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companies regularly participated in this practice and the American Independent Oil Company, a 
consortium of American oil companies, regularly flew Indians to Saudi Arabia without 
registering them.172 These companies also used this practice as a way to control workers. The 
company management could threaten to dismiss current workers by reminding them of how 
easily they could be replaced with new workers, brought in “without going through the 
Emigration formalities.”173 By utilizing air travel, oil companies, agents, and workers were able 
to circumnavigate the restrictions of the Emigration Act when it was in their interest to do so.174 
 In addition to not covering migration by plane, the categories of the Emigration Act were 
outdated and did not map well onto the types of labor used on the oilfields. One particular 
limitation was the Act’s definition of “skilled” worker. In some cases, the federal government 
defined the category; for example, in 1948, the Controller General of Emigrants wrote to the 
local POE offices and instructed them to re-categorize the occupations of darwān (watchman) 
and daftarī (clerks) as skilled.175 More often, the category of skilled worker was fluid and shifted 
as local POEs in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras variously classified candidates and sent these 
classifications to the central government. The ability of local Protectors to make such 
classification decisions stemmed from the difficulty in formally classifying all types of work and 
the fact that some occupations were skilled in one context but unskilled in another. This meant 
that POEs needed the discretion to decide the quality of employers and positions on a case-by-
case basis. But this flexibility also meant that occupations were often inconsistently 
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categorized.176 Another effect was that the category of skilled worker generally expanded, as 
more and more occupations fell under the jurisdiction of the POEs.177 This policy of allowing 
POEs to classify occupations and send their decisions to Delhi meant that the interpretation and 
implementation of the Emigration Act was constantly changing. The choices POEs made in 
enforcing the Emigration Act were made at a local level. These local choices then informed 
federal policy. 
 At times, there was tension over the classification of occupations. In 1954, the Bombay 
POE suggested that the category of skilled worker should be broadened to include engineers, 
doctors, “and other highly skilled personnel.”178 These were considered “professional” workers 
and were not considered within the jurisdiction of the Emigration Act. Some officials agreed 
with the Bombay POE, arguing it would give the government greater control over emigrants.179 
Other POEs suggested that the government should no longer classify emigrants and allow all 
prospective migrants to freely travel. In order to continue safeguarding the interests of Indians, 
these POEs suggested that workers simply be banned from traveling to countries where Indians 
were treated poorly.180  
 Questions of how to classify workers were wrapped up in officials’ competing 
understandings of the proper role of the government in relation to its citizens abroad and the 
abilities of those citizens to secure their rights as workers. Such questions also overlapped with 
questions of whether to expand the Emigration Act to apply to air travel. One official wrote that 
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since “the people involved . . . were mostly skilled workers we could afford to wink at their 
departure as normally they could be depended on to have a fair idea of their own interests.”181 
This concept of citizenship and government obligations understood these emigrants to be rational 
actors. Conversely, however, the official’s logic also suggested that less skilled workers might 
not be so rational, thus revealing the class and caste assumptions shaping which citizens were 
seen as needing more oversight from the government.  
 
Registering Worker Complaints 
 Some POEs pressed for the expansion of the Emigration Act and stressed that it was 
necessary for the government to convince citizens of the Act’s importance and, indeed, its utility 
for those who complied with it.182 One advantage of the Act, they argued, was that it facilitated 
the ability of workers abroad to register complaints regarding their treatment by employers. 
Upon arrival in India, emigrants could register complaints against their employer with the local 
Protector of Emigrants. The POE would then investigate the complaint and, if the complaint was 
found to be valid, the POE would attempt to negotiate with the company on behalf of the worker. 
If a worker did not get permission to emigrate, however, the government felt it was unable to act 
on behalf of the worker if a problem arose.  
 The proportion of complaints received regarding oil companies was not large in 
comparison with the number of workers traveling to work for the oil companies, but complaints 
did grow steadily in the early 1950s. In 1951, twenty-five complaints were lodged with the POE 
in Bombay; two of these complaints were found to be false.183 By 1952, the MEA in Delhi 
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instructed the POE offices to ask returning workers if they had complaints against their 
employer. Progress in resolving complaints was slow. In 1952, there were thirty-one complaints 
pending and four additional complaints were received.184 In 1954, forty-nine new complaints 
were received. Complaints usually involved the behavior of the employer or compensation the 
worker believed he was owed.185 
 In order to ensure the rights of Indians in the Gulf, officials proposed a plan that involved 
job site inspections. The first step was to ask British political agents in the Gulf about the 
conditions for workers there. Second, the Indian government should try to send representatives to 
the Gulf as soon as possible. The push to have Indian representatives on the ground in the Gulf 
was prompted by the idea that only Indian officials would safeguard Indians, and that the British 
could no longer be relied upon to protect Indian citizens. An additional step, officials suggested, 
was to decrease the number of complaints received by the POE offices. In order to do this, 
bureaucrats in New Delhi asked that the POE in Bombay warn workers of the situation abroad so 
that they might choose not to go in the first place.186 The warning was accompanied by a form 
signed by the worker that he was aware of the risks, understood the terms of the contract, and 
accepted those terms “without reservation.”187 The result, officials hoped, would be to dissuade 
those workers who were likely to “feel disgruntled and make complaints on returning to India” 
from migrating. By dissuading some complaints in this preventative manner, government 
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officials hoped to decrease the amount of “flimsy” complaints, thus giving the government more 
time to investigate legitimate complaints.188  
 An example of the difficulty the Indian government had in assessing the complaints that 
came from workers may be seen in the case of Mr. Diaz. Mr. Diaz was an employee at the Aden 
refinery construction project who was fired for not being able to perform his duties. When he 
was fired, Mr. Diaz was forced to pay for his own passage back to India.189 The management at 
the refinery construction project argued that Mr. Diaz was a “neurotic type of man, unsuitable for 
a strenuous construction job.” To support this assessment, the manager reported that Mr. Diaz, 
who worked as a clerk, had told one of his supervisors that stapling, his primary task, caused him 
heart palpitations and that he suffered a dislocated shoulder from excessive stapling.190 These 
health problems rendered him unable to complete his work. In addition, the company said that 
Mr. Diaz had mostly unfavorable work reviews and a belligerent attitude.191 Due to these 
complaints, BP felt it had due cause to fire Mr. Diaz without a month’s pay in lieu of a 
termination notice. According to Mr. Diaz, BP also garnished INR 500 from his wages in order 
to cover his passage back to India and this left him with only INR 5. Mr. Diaz was told that any 
additional money due to him would be sent to the Bechtel office in Bombay for him to pick up. 
 When Mr. Diaz was terminated, the Indian Employment Committee192 advised him to 
visit Mr. Thadani, the Commissioner of the Government in Aden, to complain. Upon meeting 
Mr. Diaz, the Commissioner agreed that Mr. Diaz was “a neurotic person,” but the 
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Commissioner also felt the company should pay a month’s salary in lieu of termination notice 
and cover Mr. Diaz’s return passage to India. These issues, the Commissioner claimed, were 
moral ones, and he wrote to the Ministry of External Affairs for legal advice.193 The Ministry of 
External Affairs replied that workers only have to pay for the type of passage for which they are 
entitled and were responsible for the fare only if they had quit their jobs. If a worker is fired, he 
may be responsible for his own return fare, but there should be a way for the worker to appeal. 
The case of Mr. Diaz encouraged the Indian government to renew its talks with the Government 
of Aden regarding the arbitration of complaints of Indians against the oil companies. However, 
because there was nothing in place at the time, Mr. Diaz’s only recourse was to file a complaint 
with the POE in Bombay.194 
 In order to address migrant complaints like Mr. Diaz’s dismissal, the Ministry of External 
Affairs sent the POE of Bombay a list of questions to ask returned migrants. The most important 
point of these questions, according to their memos, was to ascertain if workers registering 
complaints upon return were exaggerating their work situations in the Gulf.195 The government 
not only relied on reports from returning workers, but also actualized the plan to send 
representatives to oilfields report directly on the conditions there.196 The complaints considered 
most important by the government often revolved around discrimination against Indians at their 
worksite. In the investigation of these complaints, officials were divided in their view of workers 
as rational actors versus workers as precarious subjects in need of protection. Overlapping with 
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these competing notions of workers was another set of questions regarding the role and 
obligation of citizens abroad to represent India in a positive light.  
 
Hindus, Discrimination, and Oil Company Policies 
 The idea that temporary Gulf migrants were representatives of the new nation made 
worker complaints against employers for discrimination particularly salient to Indian officials in 
the MEA. Not wanting to perpetuate a cycle in which colonial inequalities were reinforced, 
administrators advocated that Indians should only be allowed to travel to countries where Indians 
were treated equally with locals.197 The implementation of this policy, however, was difficult 
given the international managerial practices of the oil companies, the fact that many Indians did 
not want to be treated similarly to Arabs, and the increasing numbers of uneducated Indian 
workers going abroad.  
 Class played a large role in the regulation of emigration. As seen earlier in the desire not 
to have cooks go abroad, officials worried about India’s reputation. In response to complaints by 
Indian migrants regarding their employment in the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf,198 one 
government official wrote, “I prefer millions of Indians to perish of hunger than a few to earn a 
living ignominiously and cause dishonor to our country.”199 Officials attempted to address this 
tension between allowing citizens the freedom to migrate and fears over the consequences of 
poor Indians moving abroad by negotiating the contracts for Indian workers. These negotiations 
took place at the same time that members of the Indian bureaucracy were debating the role of the 
government in regulating or encouraging emigration, the rights of citizens to emigrate, the 
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impact of India’s citizens abroad, and the ideal way to implement the Emigration Act of 1922. 
As these contracts were negotiated, religion also emerged as key defining characteristic of 
citizens. 
 In debating the class of emigrants going abroad, bureaucrats working in the MEA 
considered citizens not as a homogenous category, but within the specificity of India’s 
demography. These demographic specifics were particularly salient in terms of religion. While 
hiring for the refinery in Aden, one accusation brought against the contracting companies 
Bechtel and Wimpey was that these companies were discriminating based on religion.200 A 
“refugee” from West Pakistan had applied for a clerk position at the Aden refinery project and 
the agent for the contractors told him, “the policy of the Company is to recruit only Indian 
Christians.”201 In response, the man wrote to the President of India to complain. This complaint 
was passed to the Ministry of External Affairs, which asked the POE to investigate. This 
investigation became even more pressing when another complaint from an Indian Hindu came in 
arguing, “In all cases Hindus are discriminated against.” This was additionally problematic for 
bureaucrats because the companies were not reemploying those Indians who were forced to leave 
their jobs and return to India when BP left Iran due to the crisis between AIOC and the Iranian 
Government.202 
 The reason Bechtel and Wimpey gave for their preferential hiring of Christians was the 
need to set up a cheap kitchen. To illustrate their point that this was not racial discrimination, 
they noted that they were willing to take Hindus and Muslims who did not follow restrictive 
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(and, the companies argued, expensive) dietary restrictions. Indian officials were split on the 
reasonableness of this explanation. For example, the Protector of Emigrants based in Bombay 
believed it was reasonable, but the Undersecretary for the Ministry of External Affairs overrode 
the POE’s decision and halted recruitment until a better explanation was given.203 Thadani, the 
Commissioner of the Government of India in Aden, took a conciliatory tone between the two. In 
Thadani’s opinion, the company ought to recruit “‘persons of a broad mind’ who can eat at one 
kitchen.” In addition, he argued that this should be quite possible because the contract period was 
for a short time. Thadani developed this position after speaking with a representative of the 
contractors who explained the need for a common mess for workers. Thadani’s only complaint 
was that Arabs were given special arrangements. In reply to this complaint, the contractors relied 
on the need to make special provisions only for the host country. They said that if they were 
building a refinery in India, then they would consider special kitchens for Hindus.204 Despite 
claims to the contrary, the logic of religion did play a factor in some of the hiring decisions. The 
head recruiter for both Bechtel and Wimpey said that he was hiring “Indians of all types” except 
for Sikhs. The reasoning he gave for this was that “Sikh employees are apt to be argumentative 
when a number of them gather together in an organization.”205 Indian officials made no formal or 
written complaints regarding this discrimination. 
 In response to considerable pressure from the Indian government and the halting of 
recruitment in India, Bechtel and Wimpey agreed to recruit Hindus, Muslims, and Parsis as long 
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as they agreed to the present kitchen situation and did not need religious days off.206 Eventually, 
the Indian government allowed these contractors to restart the recruitment of Indians for the 
Aden refinery project and the companies immediately engaged a dozen Hindu and Parsi 
workers.207 Despite assurances from Bechtel and Wimpey, the Ministry of External Affairs asked 
the Protector of Emigrants in Bombay to collect information on the religion of workers being 
recruited to ensure the company was hiring a diversity of Indians.208 In June 1953, thirty-four 
Christians, five Hindus, and one Muslim were recruited. Government officials were unhappy 
with these numbers. They questioned why Christians, a minority, were still being recruited in 
larger numbers than Hindus.209  
 The discussion over diet and discrimination against Indian workers emerged again later 
that year when the Commissioner for the Government of India in Aden investigated complaints 
by workers regarding the food they were served. The employees at the Aden refinery claimed 
that fifty percent of the meals were beef and the other fifty percent were mutton. No other 
choices were served, and this was particularly problematic as Hindus do not eat beef and some 
also do not eat mutton. Perhaps forgetting his position on “open-minded” Indians working for the 
project that he had taken a year earlier, the Commissioner wrote to both the Ministry of External 
Affairs and the POE to complain, saying he could not see why Indians had to eat beef and that 
this forcing of beef upon workers struck him as discrimination against Indians. He claimed this 
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was especially true because they did not serve pork to Arab Muslims.210 The POE, in turn, 
argued that the workers were also given salad and curries, so there was no need for Indian 
workers in Aden to eat beef.211 
 Bureaucrats working in the MEA objected to the selective hiring of religious groups may 
be read in two different, but not mutually exclusive, ways. The most obvious would be that in the 
context of partition and following a period of heightened communal identities, bureaucrats 
working in the Indian government were aware of possible discrimination against Hindus and 
wanted to actively protect against it as a way of protecting Indian citizens and, metonymically, 
the nation. This was especially important in the context of the decision made by the Indian 
government in the late 1940s that Pakistani Hindus could come to India and become Indian 
citizens.212 Hinduism and the Indian nation were linked.213 In the aftermath of the violence of 
partition and the formation of a separate Islamic nation for Muslims, the Indian government 
found secularism to be a politically difficult idea; indeed, the term “secularism” did not appear in 
the Constitution until 1967.214 The question becomes, then, to what extent secularism was 
mobilized as principle of statecraft in the early years of India’s independence.215  
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 Many of the Indian officials working at the MEA were mobilizing a Gandhian view of 
secularism that promoted pluralism and tolerance.216 Indian government officials were informed 
by a definition of secularism according to which it was the government’s job to protect the 
religious rights of citizens. This view of secularism differs from that often discussed in Western 
Europe and the United States, which emphasizes instead the separation of religious and state 
institutions. The belief that bureaucrats in the Indian government were being more inclusive in 
their view of who counted as an Indian citizen is also supported by data from the population of 
Indians living in Aden at the time. In the early 1950s, over ten thousand Muslims were classified 
as “Indians” in Aden. When the Pakistani consul heard of this, he argued that they should 
“‘naturally’ be classified as Pakistani Muslims in view of their religion.” However, when he 
attempted to get them to re-register to change their nationality, not a single Indian Muslim 
changed his nationality.217 MEA officials were very proud of this fact and used it to reinforce the 
idea of the inclusive nature of the Indian state. In its debates with the oil companies regarding 
religious hiring, the Indian government was, in a sense, encouraging oil companies to interact 
with Indian citizens in a similar manner as the state itself did – by respecting and protecting 
religious practice. While this policy was by no means consistently applied, as is seen in the 
example of the exclusion of Sikhs from the Aden project without complaint, this vision of India 
as a plural nation motivated officials in the MEA.  
 Many Indian officials felt it was necessary to push for the rights of Indians abroad in 
terms of both workplace quality and religion. These bureaucrats argued that Europeans and 
Americans were better educated, drew higher salaries, and had better positions in oil companies. 
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As a result, these employees were able to fight for their rights, even if those rights were not 
explicitly stated in their contract. According to Indian government officials, most Indians abroad 
were not “sufficiently well educated, occupy comparatively only minor and inferior categories of 
service and do not have such a social and official status as to provide them with sufficient 
guarantees (unwritten) to be able to take care of their interests.”218 Through writing and 
negotiating contracts with oil companies, the government was able to ensure that Indians’ 
“rights” were assured. In writing these contracts, a logic of Indian bureaucratization was applied 
to oil company practices and a conceptualization of a vulnerable Indian emigrant emerged. This 
vision of the vulnerable Indian, we will see in Chapter 5, still dictates emigration policy. 
 
Negotiating Contracts 
 The Indian government oversaw emigration not only through interpreting the Emigration 
Act of 1922 and the principles set by the British colonial government, but also by continuing the 
British system of approving contracts signed by workers. In overseeing these contracts and 
forbidding the emigration of workers when contracts were not approved or followed, the Indian 
government relied on Section 17 of the Emigration Act of 1922 to reinforce their authority. In 
general, the oversight of emigration was thought to mean that even if workers chose to emigrate 
of their own “free will,” the government still had the last say in approving emigration. 
Withholding permission was particularly important when workers would face indignities or 
unsafe working conditions.  
The British used contracts in conjunction with the Indian Emigration Act in order to 
oversee the emigration of Indians to the Gulf during the colonial period. One reason the British 
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insisted upon contracts was that they desired a way to arbitrate worker disputes, and the 
Emigration Act provided guidelines that Indians could use to sue oil companies in the Agency 
Courts.219 Disputes often arose over contracts and the recruitment of workers. In 1936, the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), after receiving intense pressure to hire more Indians 
from both the British authorities in Bahrain and the colonial British Government of India, sent a 
representative to draft a Foreign Service Agreement (FSA) and open a recruiting office. Before 
drafting the FSA, the representative began recruiting workers with a paper contract. The POE in 
Bombay refused to allow those workers to travel to Bahrain and threatened the BAPCO 
representative with imprisonment for breach of the Emigration Act. The representative then 
drafted a FSA, but it was rejected as unfair to Indian employees. The contract was viewed as 
unfair because it gave the company the ability to fire Indian workers without notice and did not 
have provisions for migrants’ return to India. It took five months for the POE to give permission 
for workers to travel. During these five months, Indian workers bypassed the ban on hiring by 
paying for their own fair to go to Bahrain. Once in Bahrain, these workers were then hired 
directly by the oil company.220 
 In 1941 and 1943, the British considered revising the contracts for the Indian employees 
at BAPCO. The matter was dropped both times without substantive revisions, but it did set a 
precedent that was used in subsequent contract negotiations. When, in January 1952, the Kuwait 
Oil Company (KOC) contract was finalized between Kuwait Oil and the Indian government, this 
contract became the standard for Indian employers in the Gulf. Modifications were only allowed 
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on a case-by-case basis.221 With the formalization of this contract, the forms required by the 
Indian government for Indians to migrate to the Gulf were differentiated from the standard forms 
used by emigrants to other areas.222 Through the development of this contract and subsequent 
negotiations with Gulf oil companies in the early 1950s, the Indian government developed 
standards regarding living conditions and influenced the managerial practices of the oil 
companies. 
 Assuming a certain level of similarity between oil companies, the Indian government 
used the Kuwait Oil contract in negotiations that began with BAPCO in 1951. BAPCO was 
reluctant to implement the same contract as KOC. In part, BAPCO was reluctant to use the same 
contract as KOC because it meant that Indian employees would have a different contract than 
other employees. In response, bureaucrats working in the MEA attempted to use conventions 
developed by the International Labor Organization to strengthen their arguments. The Indian 
government also used oil companies’ own practices to strengthen their point. When Indian 
officials met with resistance from managers, representatives in the MEA argued that the oil 
companies already treated Indians, as well as a few other nationalities, uniquely through 
BAPCO’s method of classifying Indian and Pakistani workers as “rupee-contract employees.” 
Through these debates with oil companies, bureaucrats in the Indian government continued to 
press for greater consistency and homogeneity across oil companies with regards to their 
treatment of Indian workers. 
 Similar to the debates that surrounded emigration more generally, there was not a 
hegemonic position amongst Indian bureaucrats as to what the best conditions were for Indian 
workers in the Gulf. Some bureaucrats, working from an understanding of citizens as rational 
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actors, argued that the Indian government was not in a strong position to negotiate contracts or 
take action against oil companies. They argued that the government should not take a role in 
contracts because Indian workers could take these positions of their “own free will.” The choices 
Indians made to migrate were in response to internal pressures in India and lack of jobs. 
Unemployment was strongly felt in the oil industry and there were no positions within India for 
those with oil worker skills.223 Others pointed out that jobs in the Gulf were very lucrative for 
Indians and emigrants saved more during one contract period in the Gulf than they could hope to 
save “in a lifetime of work” in India.224 
 In contrast to these points, officials argued that Indian laborers in the Gulf needed to have 
their rights protected not only for themselves, but also for the reputation of India. As in earlier 
debates regarding India’s reputation abroad, officials argued that emigrants should not be 
allowed to travel to places that were not conducive to their “health and happiness and [were] 
derogatory to their country’s name.” The implication of this type of argument was that the Indian 
government should refuse oil companies the permission to recruit labor if those companies did 
not agree to certain key issues. These officials felt that oil companies would be quick to 
cooperate, given the high quality and inexpensiveness of Indian labor.225 
 In the early 1950s, the Indian government developed with the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company (BAPCO) a contract for Indians working at the company. According to bureaucrats at 
the MEA the key issues were disability compensation for workers, company facilitation of 
worker remittances to India, allowances for workers to bring families with them, free housing 
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and transportation, one month’s notice upon termination, paid leave, a system of arbitration for 
employees, sick pay, adequate medical facilities, limiting the workday to ten hours a day for six 
days a week, and paid overtime after ten hours of work.226 When these issues met with resistance 
from oil company executives, the Indian government reevaluated the issues in order to see which 
were the most important. In paring down their key concerns, bureaucrats decided on the 
workweek and the family clause as central concerns for Indian workers. 
 How long laborers could work was decided by an examination of the average amount of 
hours each company expected employees to work. Many officials felt the standard should be 
forty-four hours a week. This standard was developed by examining the workweek at Assam Oil 
Company.227 This workweek was a vast improvement over the workweek negotiated by British 
colonial authorities prior to independence. The contract for Indian artisans in 1941 in Bahrain 
required six workdays a week for nine hours a day. Overtime was required, but the pay remained 
the same as their regular hours pay.228 Despite their belief in the forty-four hour workweek, 
Indian officials did not feel able to enforce this position and differing maximum hours thus 
varied across companies. At Petroleum Concessions Ltd, Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd, 
and BAPCO, Indian employees were expected to work 48.5 hours per week. However, at Kuwait 
Oil the workweek was 44.5 hours and it was only forty-four hours at the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company.229 While the contracts were largely to help protect the rights of Indian workers abroad, 
the government did not wish to unfairly tip contracts in favor of employees. One way they 
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sought to balance this was by formalizing a requirement that employees who did leave their 
position abroad had to return the advance given to them.  
 The family clause was particularly important to many Indian officials, one of whom even 
brought the issue up at the annual meeting of the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
Defining the family was difficult. Indian officials were conscious of the plurality of ways Indians 
may define marriage – from having more than one wife to supporting parents and grandparents. 
Despite these multiple definitions of family in India, officials feared that too broad a definition 
would cause employers to look elsewhere and not hire Indians.230 Indian bureaucrats invested 
large amounts of work into developing and arguing for family provisions within the contracts, 
but they were unable to persuade oil companies to agree to these provisions. This desire for 
family settlement may have come from discussions regarding the allowance of family provisions 
for Indians already settled abroad in Malaya, Burma, and other places, who were living in those 
countries permanently.231 Given the short duration of contracts to work in the Gulf, oil 
companies did not want to agree to family policies there. These policies also reflected the desire 
of the British Protectorate in the Gulf to limit the influence of foreigners in the region. 
 Like the family clause, many aspects of contract negotiations were decided with the 
Indian government conceding more than the oil companies. In negotiations with BAPCO, 
however, the Indian government did gain a more clear description of employee leave as well as 
the fact that workers must be housed in constructed, as opposed to tent, housing.232 For projects 
such as the construction of the Aden refinery, during initial negotiations, the companies agreed to 
the “basic principles” of the Kuwait Oil Company’s contract and both sides agreed that when the 
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Kuwait Oil contract changed, so would the Aden contract.233 The contracts for workers at the 
Aden refinery included stipulations that the workers had to take a medical test; that they 
acknowledged that they worked “at [their] own risk;” and that their references would be checked. 
The Protectors of Emigrants in Bombay looked over these contracts and insisted that they needed 
to contain stipulations for overtime; that the companies could not stop pay during strikes; and 
that companies had to give reasons for terminating employment.234 
 In 1952 at the Aden Refinery Project, there were different contracts for artisans, 
domestics, and general class employees.235 The key issue for the Indian government 
representatives overlooking the Aden contract was the issue of jurisdiction in the form of 
arbitration. In the case of the KOC contract, the British Political Agent in Kuwait was the 
arbitrator of disputes concerning the project.236 While many Indian officials agreed that this 
situation should be continued, other Indian officials felt that the Indian government ought to look 
at the issue “from the company’s point of view” and argued that arbitration should be overseen 
by the Government of Aden and the Indian Commission in Aden.237 The actual arbitration, 
however, did not seem to be a joint project and workers had trouble appealing their case once 
they lost their position with the company.238 These debates over arbitration and the general role 
the Indian government adopted in negotiating contracts directly impacted how sovereignty and 
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citizenship were being defined by the Indian nation. Debates over the movement of Indians 
helped cement sovereign boundaries of the new nation. Furthermore, Indian bureaucrats argued 
that Indian citizens abroad were representative of India and therefore needed to be treated with 
the respect due to India.  
 
Conclusion: Emigration and the Postcolonial Nation 
 In working to ensure the proper working conditions for Indians abroad, the Indian nation-
state defined its citizens. By protecting the religious sensibilities of Indians and negotiating their 
work contracts, bureaucrats in the Indian government attempted to compel oil companies to 
engage with Indian citizens in a manner that recognized the vulnerability of Indian workers. In 
attempting to influence oil companies to adopt this position, the government reified a notion of 
Indians as vulnerable citizens and normalized a restrictive policy of emigration that continues to 
the present.  
 Emigration from India to the Gulf provided a wholly new type of emigration for the 
nascent Indian state to manage. Most studies examining the emigration of Indians to the Gulf 
start in the 1970s and end with a focus on the Emigration Act of 1983 and how that Act 
responded to increased emigration to the Gulf. Yet, this focus ignores the groundwork laid by the 
early Indian state in regulating emigration, how the management of emigration helped the Indian 
state define itself and its obligations to citizens, and how the debates that occurred in the early 
1950s have repercussions for today’s management of emigration.  
 The debates regarding the Emigration Act of 1922, policies developed to deal with 
recruiters in the 1930s, to address complaints by workers, and to negotiate contracts all 
converged to shape emigration practices regarding the oversight of emigration of workers to the 
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Gulf that still have repercussions to this day. These practices indicate that prior to the Passport 
Act of 1967 and the new Emigration Act of 1983, the processes developed to handle emigration 
were related to emigration to the Persian Gulf. They were also instrumental in developing the 
duties of the state and its obligations to its citizens. As people moved internationally after 
independence, right of citizens and restrictions on citizens’ movement were developed together. 
Developing these transnational citizenship regimes allowed the Indian government to define its 
borders and its people. Exploring the interactions between new nations, citizens, and 
transnational industry reveals how postcolonial nations attempted to establish sovereignty and 
the meanings of citizenship. 
 
 









“We are the Government Here:” 
Strikes and Shifting Labor Practices in the Arabic-speaking Gulf 
 
The previous two chapters have considered Indians in the oilfields of the Gulf. In most 
cases, Indians worked alongside khalījī, or Gulf Arab, workers. This chapter will consider the 
role of khalījī laborers on the oilfields and offer another perspective on the relationship between 
the British protectorate, oil companies, and labor. The British protectorate in the Arabic-speaking 
Persian Gulf began with the signing of treaties between the British government and the rulers of 
the Gulf in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The treaties gave the British control of the 
Arabic-speaking Gulf’s external relations, while ensuring British assistance to help Gulf rulers, 
or sheikhs, maintain internal control. The countries now known as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were under British sovereignty or protection. While Oman and 
Muscat did not fall under their direct control, the British still exercised a great amount of 
influence over the Sultanate. In 1913, the Ruler of Kuwait signed a treaty that he would only 
grant oil concessions to those companies approved by the British government. In 1914 the Ruler 
of Bahrain signed the same contract, in 1916 the Ruler of Qatar, in 1922 the Rulers of the Trucial 
Coast (today known as the UAE), and in 1923 the Rulers of Muscat and Oman. 
 In the first half of the twentieth century, another type of contract gained political and 
economic importance in the Gulf States: oil concessions. Contracts for oil concessions were first 
negotiated between an oil company and a ruler. The British government then approved these 
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contracts. In many cases, there was a blurring between British oil companies and the British 
government, with the latter holding controlling shares in such oil companies as the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company. Concession agreements signed on the Arabian side of the Gulf in the 1930s 
specifically stated that the workers brought in to work for the companies would be from the 
neighboring Arab Gulf countries. This was important to Gulf leaders given the depressed state of 
the economy after the collapse of the pearl market.239 
 Yet, despite the rulers’ requests that local subjects be hired for the oil company 
operations, locals did not have the appropriate technical training to meet oil company 
requirements. As a result, the oil companies reserved the right to hire foreign workers. For the 
British government, this was worrisome. In the case of the Bahrain Petroleum Company and 
Kuwait Oil, Americans owned these companies one hundred percent and fifty percent, 
respectively, and the British worried that such a strong presence of Americans would undermine 
British authority in the Arabic-speaking Gulf. In addition, the British worried that the oil 
companies would bring in Persian workers, whose influx would reopen Persian claims of 
sovereignty over Bahrain, in particular.240 In the case of Qatar, British officials cited the 
“backward” nature of the people to argue that foreigners should not be employed there. More 
specifically, the British worried that unrest among local workers could lead to the deaths of 
foreign workers and subsequent demands that the British Empire be responsible for bringing 
justice to these incidents.241 Ironically, we will see that the claim of “backwardness” was used 
just twenty-five years later to argue for the exclusion of nationals from the worksite and against 
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trade unions. 
Due to disruptions caused by World War II, oil company policies regarding the Arabic-
speaking Gulf, and the time it took to locate large oil reserves, it was not until the 1950s that the 
Gulf States began exporting oil in large quantities.242 Once oil production began, it quickly 
became the dominant economic activity of the Gulf States. For example, in Qatar in 1966, the 
economy was entirely dependent upon oil revenues, which were thirty million pounds a year.243 
By 1969, there were three oil companies with concessions in Qatar. Two of these companies 
produced approximately seventeen million long tons of crude and oil revenues increased to fifty 
million pounds per year.244 With increased oil production, labor relations within the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf States changed. Residents that were formally nomadic and pastoralist, 
fishermen, or at work in the pearl industry found new jobs in the oil industry. In addition to these 
new, higher paying jobs, the governments of these nations now had larger amounts of money to 
hire workers for government positions and developed plans to share the newfound oil wealth. 
A major source of concern for the oil companies was the stability of the workforce – both 
on the oilfields themselves and in the industries building infrastructure for oil production. 
Workforce stability also impacted political stability and was, therefore, a main concern of both 
the British administration and the rulers of the Gulf countries. In the wake of a series of strikes 
held by khalījī, or Gulf Arab, workers in the Gulf in the 1960s, the governments and the oil 
companies worked together to reduce the impact of these strikes. The result was an evacuation of 
politics from the oilfields through the replacement of khalījī workers with foreign workers. 
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While oil production began on a large-scale following World War II, there was oil 
production and refinement in the area before this time. Both in the pre- and post-war periods, 
worker strikes at oil projects were common. Often, these strikes were made-up of coalitions of 
workers and brought together workers of differing religions and ethnicities. In Bahrain, the first 
organized strikes occurred in November 1938. These were inspired by ideas of Arab nationalism 
that were “spreading across the increasingly well-educated Bahraini population, and reform 
movements [that] were emerging in Kuwait and Dubai.”245 These strikes were not only by Sunni 
and Shi’a Bahrainis but also involved Indians; together, the strikers sought equal pay for 
Bahrainis and Indians. Some of their demands were met, but not equal pay. There was another 
strike in 1943 that did more to further worker demands. Organizers of oil workers focused on 
common conditions as a way to bring workers together.246 From 1933 to 1945, the British 
showed little interest in such activities, as the treaties detailed that the Gulf rulers ran the internal 
workings of their sheikdoms and the British had a general policy of non-interference with the 
Gulf. This changed once worker unrest began to shift into political unrest, but even then, given 
the relative lack of interest in developing oil resources during this period, the British focused 
more on the strategic value of the Gulf than its potential as a source of oil.247 
By 1948, according to Timothy Mitchell, “the era of the mass strike was over.”248 It was 
effectively ended by industry-level changes in the way oil was extracted, processed and 
shipped.249 But while the system allowed for a more flexible energy network than coal, it did not 
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halt worker actions altogether. Instead, workers staged “brief interruptions aimed at vulnerable 
points or critical moments,” particularly in the production of petroleum.250 Such interruptions 
would sometimes pause oil production for months, but, more often, only for a matter of days. 
The changing nature of energy production and oil’s material qualities thus shifted the efficacy of 
strikes, just as social relations in the Gulf States were shifting in conjunction with changes in 
political and economic conditions.  
This chapter examines strikes by Arab workers in the Gulf during the 1960s – when the 
oil industry was beginning to standardize the mass production of oil on the Trucial Coast. I 
compare the reasons workers gave for their strikes and the competing reasons for the strikes 
outlined by Gulf governments, the British administration, and oil companies. Central factors for 
all parties were the power of rumors; the assumption that outside parties were influencing the 
strikes; and the enduring power of the idea of “tribes” as easily explaining all dynamics of Gulf 
society. I then consider the development of labor policies on the Trucial Coast and the rise of 
contractors in the oil industry. I conclude by arguing that the role of Indians as laborers in the 
Gulf was informed by these genealogies of labor policies and strikes. This argument pushes 
against a simplistic understanding of Indian labor in the Gulf as a response to the new wealth of 
the nations. Instead, I suggest that forms of governance and management practices were better 
suited to working with foreigners whose recourse to government support was tenuous. This 
merging of managerial practice and governmental style provided the foundation for the current 
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1963 Abu Dhabi Strikes 
 In late May and early June 1963, the khalījī workers, or workers from the countries of the 
Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf, at the oil projects in Abu Dhabi held a series of strikes. These 
strikes began at the onshore projects of Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC)251 and ADPC’s 
sub-contractors.252 Located over 100 kilometers west of Abu Dhabi City, the strikes were 
centered at Jebel Dhanna, Tarif, and Murban [Map 4: Abu Dhabi Strike Sites, 1963]. On May 21, 
at Jebel Dhanna, the workers guarded the gates to the camps and did not allow company officials 
to enter. The strike was well-organized, non-violent, and the order to strike was “passed around 
quickly and obeyed absolutely.”253 At other oil projects in Abu Dhabi, the strikes were more 
volatile. In Tarif, the office was “besieged” by around one hundred workers with sticks and, 
when a British agent visited the Tarif offices, he and his companions faced a crowd of thirty 
workers “armed with stones and iron bars.” The unrest radiated out to smaller camps, and at a 
nearby camp, called Santa Fe, the expatriate staff, mostly Americans, were “besieged in the 
offices and mess-hall” and property was destroyed or stolen.254 The lack of violence at Jebel 
Dhanna may have been due to the residential pattern of the project. At Jebel Dhanna there were 
eight hundred Arabs, who worked mainly as laborers and drivers; about six hundred Indians and 
Pakistanis; and about four hundred Europeans. The workers were housed separately according to 
region of origin; the Indians and Pakistanis did not share a camp with the local workers and the 
Europeans had their own camp. Beginning May 31, the strikes spread offshore and the workers 
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at Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd (ADMA)255 at Das Island also began to participate in the strikes. 
Here, too, violence erupted: two British managers were beaten and two Indian clerical staff were 
injured.256  
 
Map 4: Abu Dhabi Strike Sites, 1963 
 
Unlike the strikes in Bahrain in the late 1930s, these strikes were marked by the 
participation of less-skilled khalījī workers and the lack of participation by management. The 
labor laws in Abu Dhabi at the time may have been a factor shaping the participation of different 
groups. In 1961, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi made a temporary Labour and Worker’s Law that did 
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not apply to those under the jurisdiction of the British administration.257 The Labour and 
Worker’s Law classified two types of workers: daily and monthly. For daily workers, the 
workday was eight hours; wages were to be deducted on days workers were absent; 
transportation was made available to workers to and from work; companies provided free water 
and rest facilities; after the first month, the daily wage was paid for a day of rest each week; and 
after two weeks of employment, workers were paid for religious and official holidays. For 
monthly workers, such as drivers, watchmen, foremen, and skilled workers, the workday was 
also eight hours; but overtime was two times workers’ normal pay; nationals had to be hired first 
and foreigners were required to get permission from the municipality; the companies were 
required to supply water; and for absences, workers were to be warned three times and the 
municipality told before action was taken by the company. The municipality would then 
investigate the absence and advise the worker. Finally, companies were required to submit a list 
of all workers showing names, nationality, and occupation.258 The differences in working 
conditions for daily and monthly pay workers, the emphasis the Abu Dhabi government placed 
on oil companies hiring nationals, and the government’s attempts to track foreigners in the 
country influenced the contours of worker actions. The tendency of workers to strike along 
linguistic and ethnic lines hints at the tensions within the country between the government, oil 
companies, British government, and workers in the oilfields. 
At both Jebel Dhanna and Das Island, the British management and administration 
believed that the workers were striking out of sympathy for their compatriots at other sites. They 
offered the lack of violence at Jebel Dhanna as the basis for this claim.259 Another reason the 
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British administration feared that the offshore and onshore strikes were connected was because 
the workers at ADMA and at ADPC made a similar series of demands.260 Onshore, these 
demands included a wage increase, paying locals the same as other Arab employees (“equal pay 
for equal work”), and hiring local men for work currently done by expatriates – in particular 
hiring locals for the semi-skilled positions held by the Lebanese and other “northern” Arabs. 
Workers also demanded the dismissal of unpopular managers, one of who was an Abu Dhabi 
national, and all of whom, a British government bureaucrat pointed out, were responsible for 
discipline in the camps.261 At Das Island, worker demands were almost exactly the same as the 
demands at Jebel Dhana, with a few key differences. First, at Das Island there were more Indians 
and Pakistanis working in technical and managerial positions and, thus, the foreigners identified 
by the striking khalījī workers included not only Arabs from outside of the Gulf, but also Indians 
and Pakistanis.262 The workers at Das Island, like Jebel Dhanna, also requested that all jobs be 
given to nationals, and, going a step further, asked for educational programs in order to make this 
possible. Furthermore, they requested that three men be taken from the Island, including an 
Indian doctor. Both onshore and offshore, workers not only requested better jobs, but also 
complained about problems that arose in moments of cultural interaction. The tensions between 
foreigners and nationals must have been palpable, as a final request on Das Island was that “if a 
foreigner made a mistake (offends) he is to be prosecuted by the Ruler’s Representative or his 
deputy on the Island.”263  
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National Identity and Pan-Arab Solidarity 
The similarity of the workers’ demands, both at onshore and offshore projects, fueled 
British speculation regarding the strikes. British administrators argued that either the workers 
were copying each other or, more probably from the British perspective, the strike was being 
coordinated from the outside. While both British government officials and oil project managers 
preferred the latter theory, they had trouble finding evidence to corroborate it.264 Rumors and 
speculation fueled the British administration’s and the oil companies’ perspectives on the strikes 
and their potential consequences.265 Believing the strike in Tarif was completely unexpected and 
“without any real cause,” one official wrote that “everyone in the management of the oil 
company seems convinced that trouble is being deliberately stirred up by agitators from outside 
but no one seems to know what the motives for this are.”266 While there was no direct evidence 
that the strike was instigated by external forces, some of the Abu Dhabi workers had been 
employed elsewhere in the Gulf and this lent weight to the fear that these workers “may well 
have come under hostile influence.”267 In the months after the strikes, rumors of potential strikes 
abounded. For the British, these rumors were spurred by fears that the radio broadcast “Sawt al-
Arab,” or “Voice of the Arabs,” which discussed worker salaries and conditions, was instigating 
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workers to strike. The main problem, according to this radio broadcasts, was that foreigners were 
being given better jobs and higher pay than nationals.268 
In Jebel Dhanna, the management of both ADPC and Bechtel,269 for their part, also 
believed that the strike had no cause and was instigated by outside troublemakers.270 Echoing 
these sentiments, a British government administrator wrote:  
Although the workers may have had some genuine grievances, the strikes 
were worked up by a group of agitators and a degree of co-ordination and 
organization was displayed which is totally foreign to Abu Dhabi nature. 
Most of the companies had a small group of trouble-makers usually men 
from outside Abu Dhabi, amongst their employees, but hitherto they had 
not been allowed by Abu Dhabi authorities to sack them. It is not yet clear 
whether these trouble-makers were acting on their own initiative or 
whether they were receiving instructions from outside.271 
 
In this analysis of the strikes, the British assumed that Abu Dhabi workers imagined a locality 
that was bounded by the relatively new boundaries of the state. Belonging to this new state were 
local actors that the British believed could be defined by a type of personality. The British 
expected affiliations and actions to run along these new state lines. And yet, the perceived 
concreteness of these boundaries by the British is surprising given the difficulty the British faced 
when attempting to determine oil concessions in the first half of the twentieth century.272  
When one looks at the strikes from the perspective of the workers themselves, another 
framing emerges: one could also read these demands as Abu Dhabi locals making a claim for a 
khalījī network that moved fluidly across state boundaries. The networks defined by the workers 
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were not confined to the geographic boundaries established to ease oil concessions.273 At Jebel 
Dhanna, the strikes were attributed to the company’s proposal to fire seven workers. Only two of 
these workers were Abu Dhabians. The most influential of the men the company wanted to fire 
were three Awamir from Hadhramaut, part of the Aden Protectorate. This claim for a khalījī 
locality defined by kin and exchange relations was also reflected in workers’ demands for 
autonomy from both the British administration in the state and the oil companies’ control over 
oil projects. At times, workers conflated the government and the oil companies. During the strike 
at Jebel Dhanna, one striker told an Austrian manager, “You are not the boss now, we are the 
Government here.”274 Even after work at Jebel Dhanna resumed, workers remained resistant to 
British or oil company authority. Workers threatened management with violence and they said 
they would tell on the management to the Sheikh and he would then throw the managers out of 
the country.  
 
  Sheikhly Authority and Colonial Policing 
The workers’ claim for their role in governance also emerged in their negotiations during 
the strikes. Initially, the workers did not want to give their demands to the companies’ officials. 
At Tarif, workers refused to discuss their demands with the company there, and insisted that they 
would only speak with Sheikh Sultan, the son of Sheikh Shakhbut, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi.275  
This demand by the workers to speak directly with the Ruler or one of his sons was repeated at 
the other sites. The workers at Das Island wanted to negotiate directly with another of the Ruler’s 
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sons, Sheikh Said. Such appeals revealed the workers’ understanding of the Ruler as an advocate 
for their rights, as well as the authoritative figure with regard to work negotiations. The prestige 
workers assigned to the Ruler and members of the royal family was such that even 
representatives of the Sheikh, if not actually related to the Sheikh, were not always accepted as 
authorities; a representative for Sheikh Sultan, for example, was unable to prevent the workers 
from striking at the Santa Fe camp.276  
While the workers may have understood the Sheikh to be the legitimate authority figure, 
the British characterized the Ruler’s response to these strikes as largely ineffective.277 They saw 
him as overly sympathetic with the workers and pointed to his reluctance to punish those who 
used violence.278 When the Ruler encouraged the companies to raise wages, the British 
interpreted this as a simplistic and ineffective response, designed primarily to maintain his own 
popularity.279 Nonetheless, the British were not insensitive to this popularity and the significance 
of the Ruler’s image. Early in the days of the strikes at ADPC, Sir William Luce, the British 
Political Resident in Bahrain, met with the Ruler to impress upon him that “his primary 
responsibility [was] to enforce law and order.” Sir Luce attempted to clarify to the Ruler the 
British government’s position on the strikes. He told the Ruler, the “British were not concerned 
with industrial disputes between workers and their employers or with breaking strikes, but we 
were concerned with the security of lives and property of people under our jurisdiction who were 
working in his State.” He continued that if the Ruler was unable to maintain order and the British 
“saw that the lives and property of those to whom we have an obligation were thereby imperiled, 
I should not hesitate to take such steps necessary to protect them.” Sir Luce was confident that 
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Sheikh Shakhbut would take the appropriate action and he believed having the British interfere 
in the matter would hurt the Ruler’s reputation and standing among the populace.280  
Despite these warnings, after a few days of strikes, the British were still dissatisfied with 
the Ruler’s response. The Ruler had been using his sons, Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Said, to act as 
intermediaries with the workers, but the British believed these sons had little influence.281 At 
Jebel Dhanna, Sheikh Sultan drank heavily during the strikes. The result was that workers, the 
company, and the British government had to postpone meetings to discuss the workers’ terms. 
For his part, the Ruler’s son was also displeased with the companies and accused them of 
blatantly ignoring laws established by the Ruler.282 
At the strikes on Das Island, Sheikh Said acted as the Ruler’s representative and may 
have been more effective than his brother was at Jebel Dhanna. Sheikh Said arrived at Das Island 
after the Ruler’s representative there admitted he could not control the situation because the 
workers “regarded him as a company stooge.”283 Immediately upon arrival, Sheikh Said agreed 
to throw out the troublemakers. He also “mixed extensively with the workers during his stay on 
Das.”284 In order to resolve the strike on Das Island, Sheikh Said tried to send forty 
troublemakers back to Abu Dhabi City by ship. However, a number of other workers also wished 
to go and when the ship eventually sailed, about four hundred strikers, or two-thirds of the Arab 
workforce, left the island.285 The result was a “wholesale withdrawal of local labor.”286 The 
Ruler ordered the arrest of five principal troublemakers upon disembarkation. After the ship 
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sailed, the Island was quiet.287 When the ship arrived in Abu Dhabi, the forty troublemakers were 
arrested and the remainder of the men returned quietly to their homes.288 Over the course of the 
following few weeks, the majority of the workers returned to work on Das Island.289 
The Ruler’s response to the trouble at Das Island surprised the British because they 
thought Sheikh Shakhbut should deal more strongly with the troublemakers. Instead, he released 
the forty men he arrested, including those known to have committed violence. He also dismissed 
the affair as minor and said that the company could have avoided the strike had it paid its 
workers more. In addition, Sheikh Shakhbut used rumor as a tool to attack company management 
practices. He accused the company of causing the strike because it allowed the General Manager 
of ADMA to beat an Arab for trying to steal a car. The British accepted the validity of this story, 
but insisted that the assailant was the Lebanese manager, not the British General Manager. 
Further surprising the British, the Ruler declined to arrest the troublemakers in Tarif.290 
According to the British administration and management of oil companies, the 
ineffectiveness of Sheikh Shakhbut was compounded by the inability and reluctance of the Abu 
Dhabi police to restore order.291 In part, the British claimed the Abu Dhabi police were 
ineffective because they lacked training and leadership;292 they were also seen as identifying 
with the workers and supporting their cause. At the Tarif strikes, the police “fraternised with the 
strikers, shaking hands and rubbing noses with them.”293 And at Das Island, the police were 
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completely absent during the strike on the island, something the British attributed to police 
solidarity with the strikers.294  
Sheikh Shakhbut was “disturbed” by accounts of the unsatisfactory performance of his 
police force during the strikes; he had hoped the police would be more effective in controlling 
workers. As a result, in early July he agreed to hire a Bahraini police officer to train the Abu 
Dhabi police force for three months, with particular attention to be paid to security duties.295 In 
October of 1963, in order to improve the police force, the British administration proposed that a 
riot squad be trained and stationed near Jebel Dhanna. They also suggested that the police force’s 
salaries and conditions of service be regularized.296 Through these types of policies and moving 
of personnel, the British administration sought to develop a security apparatus that could be used 
to protect the lives of Europeans in the Gulf and the property of oil companies.  
In order to ensure effective protection of British property and persons, the British 
administrators sent two units of the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) to the area, in case there was 
additional trouble.297 The TOS were instructed to interfere only if the Abu Dhabi police force 
“failed and the Europeans and other foreign nationals’ lives are threatened.” The TOS were also 
instructed not to stop the strikes, but rather “to guard each installation and to form a defended 
centre in each area, where European and other foreign national staff can take shelter if the police 
are overwhelmed.”298 The British also sent the HMS Striker in the vicinity of Das, but “out of 
sight of the Island.” The Striker was to act as a backup in case the TOS lost control of the 
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onshore situation. In anticipation of such an event, plans were drawn up for Sir Luce to order a 
landing party from the Striker onto the island.299 
In addition to installing a larger military presence and implementing police training, in 
the weeks after the strike, representatives from ADPC and ADMA met with the Ruler to discuss 
how to avoid future strikes. The representatives suggested that the men must first give their 
complaints to the company and the Ruler’s representatives before going on strike; the police 
force should be bolstered so as to be more effective during strikes; the strikers should not be paid 
for the duration of the strike; and the present warning system should be maintained.300 The Ruler 
agreed to all of these suggestions, but later reconsidered his agreement regarding the written 
warnings and asked the companies, only a few days later, to cease giving written warnings 
because they upset the workers. The largest point of friction came when the companies said that 
they did not want to take back the men thought to be the leaders of the strikes. The Ruler 
disagreed with the company position and said these men should be taken back as a gesture of 
forgiveness. After much discussion, the Ruler conceded that the companies must do what they 
thought was right, but that it was against what he thought best.301    
 
The Politics of Khalījī Workers 
A central concern shared by the British administration, the oil companies, and the Ruler 
was how to best manage the local population of workers. One British administrator wrote, “The 
companies are working under great difficulties, far greater than they had probably anticipated, 
both in regard to nature of labour, its extraordinary ineffectualness and its apparently inimical 
demands on them.” The British believed that worker demands, the hot climate, and long work 
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hours wore on managers and made them more irritable with workers. Despite these hostile 
conditions, the British government cautioned the companies to remember that strikes were costly 
and that it was better to avoid them. The solution, the administration offered, was that the local 
workers should be treated “with a tolerant and a certain liberal attitude toward a primitive 
people.” Furthermore, the management should try to understand that these “primitive people” see 
foreigners as “intruders” in their land. The British administrators suggested that companies adapt 
to cultural norms when possible. For example, they praised the Arab company, CAT, for giving 
workers a large enough food allowance to feed not only themselves, but also “quite a number of 
hangers on” that lived in the camp with them. Both the company and the administration felt it 
was cheaper to feed extra people than lose thousands of pounds a day during a strike.302  
Such strategies sought to improve day-to-day operations, but broader industry-level 
changes were creating new problems and contributing to growing worker dissatisfaction. For 
example, after construction ended at these oil projects, the number of workers needed to maintain 
the oil projects decreased significantly and resulted in the dismissal of most workers from their 
jobs. It was feared that local workers, upon termination, would cause trouble and stop oil 
production. The termination of khalījī employees was especially problematic.303 In an effort to 
maintain their own positive reputation, oil companies contracted jobs out to smaller companies, 
thus removing themselves from the economic and political risks associated with firing workers.  
In 1960, commercial quantities of oil were found in Abu Dhabi and there was a further 
shift from exploration and drilling by the company to drilling by contractors. These contractors 
operated differently from the seismic party contractors used by the companies in the past. 
Previously, ADPC had maintained all relations with labor onshore and with the local 
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government, such that contractors appeared, to many people, to be a part of the company. In 
contrast, the new drilling contractors hired and fired employees themselves. While ADPC said it 
would do its best to ensure conditions were to its standards, there was still the fear that 
contractors were tougher on laborers, quicker to fire employees, and only looking for a quick 
profit on projects. In anticipation of these changes, the company was anxious for locals to 
understand that contractors were separate from the company and that the latter was no longer 
responsible for labor relations.304 
Both the ADPC and the British administration feared that new contractors lacked the 
experience and knowledge necessary to “handle” local labor. When the company was in charge 
of operations, for example, it saw it as part of its long-term interest to train rig crews to operate 
rigs. There was concern that contractors did not feel the same way and would not consider local 
crews sufficient. Similarly, the British administration saw any method of operating that did not 
use a maximum number of local laborers as likely to stir unrest. Thus, in 1960, there were twice 
the number of men in a shift than would be the case in North America because such a practice 
was seen as beneficial for Gulf relations. Previous contractors had learned how to interact with 
local workers through the company’s camp bosses, but the fear was that new company 
contractors would not have this experience and that workers would not be patient with a second 
round of cultural offenses. Earlier in the year, there had already been an incident involving one 
of the new contractor’s managers. The seismic team was returning and stopped the truck for one 
of the men. When the contractor’s manager saw that the worker had stopped to say his prayers, 
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the manager said he would not wait and drove off, leaving the worker miles out in the desert. In 
response to this incident, ADPC removed the contractors involved in the incident.305  
Both the large oil companies and the British administration attributed a portion of the 
strained industrial relations to contractors. However, there were two larger problems that the 
companies and the administration felt were at the root of the strikes. First, it was hard for the 
government and companies’ management to control local workers, as the workers did not 
recognize the authority of the British administration or companies. The British also worried that 
the workers were overly susceptible to outside influences, such as Pan-Arab movements, and the 
British feared these influences would destabilize the region and lead to a loss of oil revenues. 
The second problem, closely connected to the first, was the inefficient control of the Ruler, 
Sheikh Shakhbut, over the population. This, the British argued, was due to the Ruler’s 
unpopularity with the local workers in Abu Dhabi. 
The interconnected nature of these problems was illustrated, in the eyes of the British, by 
the strikes on Das Island. When the laborers were leaving the island after the strike, the British 
reported that some of the men were going through the crowd disparaging the Ruler and praising 
Nasser. One of the European managers rode on the boat back with the four hundred men and said 
that “many of the men felt a genuine sense of grievance about their pay, but almost all were 
highly critical of Shakhbut, who, they said, was receiving a vast income from the oil and was 
doing nothing for them.” These workers argued that a “new republic” should be established in 
Abu Dhabi.306 This quote was often taken as sufficient evidence for Sheikh Shakhbut’s inability 
to rule Abu Dhabi. However, not all workers were thought to be unhappy with Sheikh Shakhbut, 
and many went along on the strike in order to voice grievances about labor conditions, treatment 
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by oil management, or out of fear of being “beaten up” if they did not participate. In reading the 
issues this way, both oil companies and the British administration insisted on seeing the strikes 
as a symptom of the ineffectiveness of local rule rather than as a broader reflection on the 
managerial practices of the oil companies and their contractors. 
The British focus on the Sheikh’s role in political change and labor disputes is reflected 
in Christopher Davidson’s history of Abu Dhabi. In his discussion of the bloodless coup that 
overthrew Sheikh Shakhbut and installed the Sheikh’s younger brother, Sheikh Zayed, as the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1966, Davidson relies on a model that sees the Gulf as “hybrid 
governments . . . that fused centuries-old sheikhly and monarchical powers with new, rational-
legal ministries and appointed bureaucrats.”307 In other places Davidson collapses the economic 
and political systems and calls this “tribal capitalism.” This form of capitalism entails the 
monarchy “placing key representatives of other powerful families and loyal clans in directorial 
roles in the surfeit of new parastatals and private companies charged with overseeing the new 
economic sector.”308 These descriptions of the governmental practices in the Gulf attempt to 
explain the persistence of monarchical leaders in the present, with limited pushback from the 
general population. 
In the case of Abu Dhabi, Davidson argues that regime change was the result of Sheikh 
Shakhbut’s imperfect participation with “tribal capitalism.”  After approximately thirty-five 
years as Ruler, Sheikh Shakhbut was brought down by what Davidson characterizes as 
“miserliness.” This miserliness took the form of a lack of interest in developing the infrastructure 
of Abu Dhabi or investing in such things as public education and health care. He also resisted 
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infrastructural changes and refused building permits. Abu Dhabian merchants found this difficult 
to reconcile and believed they were losing money because of this lack of development.309 In 
addition, in order to save money in the early 1960s, Sheikh Shakhbut cut back on personal 
allowances to key al-Nahyan leaders.310 The discontent of leading merchants and family leaders 
created an opportunity for Sheikh Zayed to undermine Sheikh Shakhbut’s authority and initiate a 
coup in 1966. When Sheikh Zayed took over from Sheikh Shakhbut, “almost overnight, Sheikh 
Zayed’s oil boom government effectively ended his family’s historic tax-raising role and 
provided fresh opportunities for is people’s economic participation and self-enrichment.”311 
Sheikh Zayed’s “legitimacy” was “derived from little more than his lineage and personality.” 
Thus, he oversaw an “efficient distribution of wealth to families and individuals.”312 Davidson 
argues that Sheikh Zayed’s more successful participation in “tribal capitalism” was informed, in 
part, by the citizens’ preference for his ruling style and allocation of revenue. Whereas Sheikh 
Shakhbut did not adequately invest the profits from oil rents into the development of Abu Dhabi, 
Sheikh Zayed built infrastructure that improved the quality of life for citizens of the emirate. 
My analysis of shifting power relations in the Gulf differs from that of Davidson in that I 
do not think the category of tribe should be used to gloss the diversity of actors in Gulf politics. 
Instead, I argue that labor dynamics were directly related to the managerial practices of oil 
companies and worker response to these practices. This reading of the strikes involves not only 
the ruling families of the Gulf and their subjects, but also includes the British administration and 
oil companies. The inclusion of these actors highlights the work done by the British 
administration and oil companies to depoliticize labor in the oilfields. 
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Unrest throughout the Gulf 
Abu Dhabi was not the only state to experience strikes and political disturbances in the 
1960s. In 1965 there were disturbances in Bahrain that lasted a fortnight in March and April.  
Like many of the strikes at the time, the issue of redundancy was a pressing issue for the workers 
and employers in this instance. In addition, the British understood the strikes to be representative 
of dissatisfaction of the population under the Ruler and feared the emergence of a pan-Arab 
nationalism.313 One British administrator wrote:  
[The] pretext was redundancy of some BaPCo workers but the affairs 
rapidly developed into a trial of strength between the regime and those 
elements – mainly the youth – who chafe at the anachronism inherent in 
Shaikhly regime under British protection and long for national assemblies, 
trade unions, election, political newspapers and all other paraphernalia of 
independence and progress . . . strikers and demonstrators stressed slim 
resources of the Bahrain State Police to their limit and it was touch and go 
if British troops would have to intervene. The life of the country was 
seriously disrupted. 
 
As was the case in Abu Dhabi, generational differences were important and the youth of the 
country were thought to be a pressing problem. In Bahrain, there was an annual population 
increase of just over three percent, seventy-five percent of the population was under thirty years 
of age, and nearly fifty percent of all jobs were occupied by foreigners.314 Then, in 1967, there 
was further unrest among workers in the southern Gulf. This unrest, according to British 
intelligence reports, coincided with the Khartoum Conference and the increased pan-Arab labor 
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activity that followed that conference. In this case, the British administration believed that the 
initiative came from both the communist and Baathist parties in Damascus.315  
The following section will consider the strikes that occurred in Qatar in 1967. I will then 
consider the attempts by the British and local governments of Abu Dhabi and Qatar to regulate 
workers and develop labor laws. At the end, I will suggest that the use of foreign workers 
became preferable for local governments and the British administration due to the inability of 
these workers to make claims directly to the state. However, this inability to appeal to the state 
was not rooted in “tribal” notions of membership. I show that the idea of tribal membership had 
some fluidity: who could belong shifted and was constructed through networks of kin and 
obligation. Instead of relying on a rigid notion of tribal membership, I look at these kin networks 
in conjunction with colonial policies, oil companies’ practices, and local political actions. 
 
Qatar Strikes, 1968 
Between 1960 and 1972, the residents of Qatar experienced three regime changes. In 
1960, Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali al-Thani came to power after his father, Sheikh Ali, abdicated. 
Sheikh Ahmed implemented Qatar’s first nationality and labor laws in the early 1960s. He also 
worked to regulate trade by setting up a trade registry and a chamber of commerce and 
regulation.316 In 1972, Sheikh Ahmed’s cousin and the Deputy Ruler of Qatar, Khalifa bin 
Hamad al-Thani, disposed of Sheikh Ahmed. Similar to Sheikh Zayed in Abu Dhabi, when 
Sheikh Khalifa took the throne, he cut family spending and increased spending on social 
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programs. Also like Sheikh Zayed, Sheikh Khalifa is considered by many to be the first 
modernizing ruler of Qatar.317  
In August 1968, there was a strike in the offshore oilfields run by Shell Oil Company. In 
part, this strike was notable because it was the largest generalized industrial unrest in Qatar since 
1963. It was also notable because workers defied the instructions of the Deputy Ruler, Sheikh 
Khalifa, to return to work — an uncommon reaction to the Ruler’s intervention in Qatar. The 
British administration in Qatar viewed the strikes as similar to those by laborers in Abu Dhabi in 
1963. In both cases, the administration believed that the strikes were spearheaded by a small, 
organized group of workers who were influenced by outside forces within the Arab world. The 
majority of workers in Qatar, the British administration believed, participated in but were not 
excited by the strike. Unlike in Abu Dhabi, worker committees were unable to get all oil workers 
in the country to participate and the workers at Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC), the other oil 
company in Qatar at the time, did not participate in the strike.318  
Workers at Shell first voiced their grievances on August 24, 1968. On August 26, daily-
rate workers at both Shell Company and Shell Marketing Company went on strike. Monthly 
workers continued to work, and they maintained essential services. On August 27, workers at 
Shell on Halul Island joined and workers communicated between the onshore project and the 
island via a radio taken from a moored tanker. When the strike began, the Deputy Ruler ordered 
replacement workers to step in. This was refused by Shell because working on marine operations 
was very dangerous for untrained workers and because the company feared sabotage. By the end 
of the day on August 27, the British administration believed that most workers wanted to return 
                                                
317 See, for example, the United State’s Library of Congress page on Qatar: 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/qatoc.html 
318 QPC was a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company. “Qatar,” 7054, [illegible] 4/05 530/66; State of 
Qatar, “Report on Labour, Industrial and Social Developments: Assessment and Recommendations,” 6 
December 1968. LAB13/2164. RQ (2), 675-8. 
 
 128  
to work, but were restrained by the organizers. On August 28, the workers’ committee was 
thought to be negotiating with workers at QPC and those in government service for a general 
strike on August 31. It was assumed that if the strike had continued, the intermediate staff would 
have joined, most likely stopping Shell’s oil production in Qatar completely. Before this could 
happen, on the evening of August 28, the strike leaders saw the Deputy Ruler, apologized for 
their behavior, and instructed the men back to work, telling them the demands would be pursued 
by constitutional means.319 In addition to working with Shell, the Deputy Ruler also tried to 
pacify the workers. When Shell refused to pay workers for the days the workers were on strike, 
the Deputy Ruler said he would personally pay their wages if the workers agreed to give him, in 
writing, two weeks’ notice before striking. The workers’ committee refused this proposition.320 
During the strikes, there was no violence or damage.321  
The engagement of workers with the ruling family in Qatar was slightly different than in 
Abu Dhabi in 1963, and the British administration believed workers in Qatar were less eager to 
work with the current Sheikh or the Deputy Ruler. They also believed that the objectives of 
strike leaders in Qatar were to “cultivate a more aggressive attitude on the part of the Qatari 
people vis-à-vis the oil companies, and to encourage the workers to reject the traditional 
paternalism of the state in labour relations.”322 In addition, it seems that the workers’ 
organization was trying to undermine the position of the government in the strikes. Immediately 
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before the strike, the leaders of the workers’ committee had asked to see the Deputy Ruler, but 
the Deputy Ruler was busy thanks to a visit by the Iraqi Ambassador. The strike leaders did not 
tell the workers why the Deputy Ruler did not meet with them, giving the workers the impression 
that they were refused a meeting for no reason. On the day of the strike, the Deputy Ruler told 
leaders that they had gone on strike contrary to the Labour Law and he would not negotiate until 
workers returned to work, registered their grievances, and indicated they were willing to wait 
fifteen days before striking. On August 27, the leaders met with the Deputy Ruler and said they 
would return to work, but they did not actually do so until after a second meeting on August 28. 
During the strike, the Deputy Ruler was annoyed, angry, and suspicious of foreign influence 
behind the strike.323  
This strike followed upon an earlier strike that occurred at Shell’s operations in Qatar a 
year before.324 For the British, it was “difficult to understand” the labor troubles at Shell because 
“Shell was internationally known for the quality of its personnel management and the value it 
placed on good industrial relations.”325 In fact, both the British and the Qatari government agreed 
that the management of Shell always properly negotiated with the workers’ committee and that 
the working conditions at Shell were better than at QPC, where there were no strikes. As a result, 
the British administration and the oil company management decided that QPC workers did not 
strike because the company was staffed by older, more conservative workers and these workers 
took a leading role in labor relations between Qatari workers, the company, and the state.326  
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In contrast, the Director of Labour in Qatar, Mr. Khreis, a Jordanian,327 suggested that the 
Shell operation was “trouble prone” for a few reasons. First, it was an offshore operation, which 
generally caused labor trouble. Second, there were frequent changes on the personnel side, 
leading to a lack of continuity in policy and lack of contact with worker representatives. Third, 
the trouble tended to happen when the general manager was away. Finally, several members of 
the workers’ committee were thought to be irresponsible and “out to make trouble.”328  
The other key problem for Shell, according to Mr. Khreis, was the organization of 
workers. At QPC, there were two workers’ committees. One of the committees was at the 
Dukhan oilfield and the other was at the Umm Said terminal. At each location, the committee 
representatives represented both Qatari daily-rate workers (i.e., unskilled workers or laborers) 
and Qatari monthly-rate workers (i.e., semi-skilled, skilled, and supervisory). Ideally, the 
workers’ committees were supposed to represent all nationalities, but in practice they represented 
only Qatari workers, leaving other nationalities to raise concerns through informal channels. At 
Shell, on the other hand, there were two different workers’ committees at the same worksite. One 
committee represented Qatari daily-rate workers and the other represented Qatari monthly-rate 
workers. The monthly-rate committee was inactive and the trouble stemmed from the daily-rate 
workers’ committee.329 The leaders of the committees were becoming “professionalized as the 
same people tend to be re-elected year by year. The members are working class and illiterate, but 
they are becoming more experienced and this makes dealing with them somewhat easier.” As the 
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committees became more established, they were likely to refer disputes to the court or to a 
conciliation hearing.330  
At QPC, the workers’ committees did not have a formal legal status, but they were 
treated as such by the company’s management, and the workers’ committees were decided by 
election. In 1967, the elections coincided with Ramadan and the government had decided to 
postpone them until after the holiday. Suspecting this was a tactic to postpone elections 
indefinitely, there was unrest at the camps. When the elections finally took place in March 1968, 
they were well attended and orderly. The tensions seen elsewhere in the Gulf between youth and 
an older, more conservative generation were also at play in Qatar. In Qatar, the young workers 
also identified more with the cause of Palestine. At the elections at QPC, the older generation 
won the election. As a result, “the workers’ committees at both Dukhan oilfield and Umm Said 
terminal were loyal to the Al Thani family. They were very conservative in the outlook, and were 
bona fide representatives of the labour force, with real authority to negotiate with the Company 
on its behalf.” In part, the loyalty was ensured by the election style. The laborers nominated ten 
men in order of preference to be on the executive committee. The names were then given to the 
Deputy Ruler and the first three he found to be acceptable were given the position.331 Despite the 
formalization of this process, the actual ability of the Deputy Ruler to refuse the workers’ 
choices appears limited. In 1965, a person considered by the Deputy Ruler to lack respect and 
who was suspected of making “clandestine visits” to Cairo was reelected by the workers at Shell. 
When the Deputy Ruler tried to block him taking the position, the workers resisted, “confirmed 
the election,” and the Deputy Ruler acquiesced.332 After the election of the executive committee, 
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a new council was appointed. The British believed that this council’s representation and 
organization was based on tribal membership. In addition to facilitating the elections, the 
company gave the committee space to meet. During meetings, workers took their individual 
grievances to the committee. The efficiency of the system was seen in the fact that there had 
been no strikes at QPC since 1963.333 
At Shell, the management of the company understood workers’ committees to operate 
quite differently. They claimed that the committees had no influence and that there was a lot of 
dispute among the workers as to their committee. What they did agree with QPC on was that the 
leaders of the workers’ committees were traveling to Egypt where they were exposed to pan-
Arab nationalist sentiments. Shell’s management also feared that the leaders of the workers’ 
committees were in touch with workers at Kuwait Oil Company and with workers in Bahrain 
because they showed knowledge of conditions at other oil projects. Despite these beliefs, there 
was no evidence of workers coordinating with others.334  
The difference in the treatment of worker committees by the management of Shell and 
QPC reflected the differing managerial styles at each company. At Shell, conflicts often had to 
be passed along to a supervisor who worked off-site. At QPC, conflict could be solved on-site 
with a superintendent. The immediacy of conflict resolution and familiarity between workers and 
management led the British administration to suggest that QPC had implemented a model that 
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British firms in the Arab world might want to consider mimicking in order to avoid costly 
strikes.335 
During the strikes at Shell in 1968, the workers demanded four basic things. First, they 
asked for a raise of sixteen percent, backdated to August 1967 to compensate for an increased 
cost of living. Second, the workers asked for an increase in annual increments. This increase 
would bring Shell in line with QPC’s pay and had been promised by the Deputy Ruler the year 
before.336 The question of wages was, according to the Director of Labour, Mr. Khreis, the key 
issue in the strike and he narrated the history of this wage dispute in order to clarify the workers 
position to both the British administration and the oil companies’ management. Mr. Khreis said 
that in early 1967, workers made a deal where they would not receive any wage increases. 
However, in 1968, with the closing of the Suez Canal, the price of rice was increasing. The 
workers argued that this was an exceptional circumstance. Shell’s management rejected this 
argument and wages had been a source of dispute ever since. The disagreement over wages was 
further compounded because the company wanted to link a raise with the workers’ approval of a 
pension scheme.337 Without approval of the pension scheme, neither QPC nor Shell were able to 
implement their redundancy schemes and, thus, were stuck with an excess of local workers.338 
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The result was that Shell was holding out a raise as a bribe to workers. However, the workers’ 
saw through this and refused to link the two issues.339 
The third demand by workers concerned the advancement of khalījī Arabs in Shell’s 
administration. The workers were upset by the failure of the company to upgrade certain laborers 
and to promote certain workshop men who had passed the trade test earlier that year. Finally, the 
workers wanted the company to cease using contractors because contractors did not hire many 
locals and the contractors did not pay well.340 Both of these demands addressed the fact that 
Qatari workers were looking for promotion opportunities in the oil companies and they wanted 
training in order to take higher positions. 
Contract work often caused problems in the 1960s at oil companies, even though the 
policies for contract work varied between companies. The conditions for contract work were 
different at Shell and QPC. At QPC “contracting was on social amenity work of direct benefit to 
the workers (whereas contracting at Shell was still mainly operational in character).”341 At Shell, 
the drilling rig was operated on contract. Mainly Yemenis, Adenis, and Omanis were hired for 
the positions because they were willing to live on dhows and Qatari nationals were not. The 
Labour Department insisted that nationals must be hired, but Shell was reluctant to hire nationals 
as it would cause expenses to rise and they would have to hire twice as many workers. In order to 
avoid this, the company threatened to send the rig to Dubai or Abu Dhabi for maintenance.342 
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The British administration and Shell believed “the real cause” of the strike to be contract 
labor.343 Prior to this time, the Qatari government and the oil companies had signed a provision 
that limited contracting. According to this provision, contracting could only occur if a few key 
issues were satisfied: the work had to be temporary or specialized in nature; Qatari nationals had 
to be hired first if they were available and able;344 and wage rates had to be the same as for 
equivalent jobs with the company. In the summer of 1968, these conditions had been satisfied 
and Shell hired contract labor with the permission of the Qatari government. The British 
administration believed that because workers had agreed to this, they were unable to strike on the 
issue and were, therefore, merely using the issue of wages as a reason to strike. The oil workers’ 
resistance to contract labor was, according to the British and Qatari administrations, harmful to 
the country. It was believed by both governments that “non-local labor was an essential factor in 
the economic development of Qatar.”345  
At both Shell and QPC, as was the case throughout the Gulf, firing redundant workers 
and, in particular, firing workers who were nationals was problematic and fraught. In the mid to 
late 1960s, the majority of Qataris were unskilled (vis-à-vis the oil industry) and did not have 
adequate knowledge of English to work in management positions. These workers could be hired 
for construction phases of oil projects, but the companies had little use for them after 
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construction was finished. At QPC, the management wanted to dismiss a group of redundant 
workers, but the government would not let them. There were four main reasons for this. First, the 
government feared the workers would leave, with their money, to find work in Abu Dhabi. 
Second, the “workers wanted to force the Company to produce a permanent and generous 
pension scheme.” Third, the dismissal of workers had been the source of QPC labor trouble in 
1963 and neither the company nor the British administration wanted a repeat of the strike.346 
Finally, the state feared swelling the numbers of unemployed as there was a link between high 
unemployment and political instability. This was the case of the strikes in Bahrain in 1965. As a 
result, QPC retained approximately four hundred workers who management had already found to 
be redundant.347   
Oil companies were not alone in having worker redundancies. In government positions in 
Qatar, over half of the nationals employed were redundant. Similar to the “tribal capitalism” that 
Davidson posits helped secure Sheikh Zayed’s position in Abu Dhabi, the Qatari government 
relied on family connections and favors to maintain stability. Nationals qualified for social 
assistance and “fit men expect[ed] personal aid from the sheikhs connected with their families.” 
Students who had gone abroad for education also relied on the government to find them jobs that 
suited their “qualifications and prestige.”348 While both the oil companies and the Qatari 
government were forced to deal with a large number of redundant workers, not all nationals of 
Qatar received the same job protection. In 1964, QPC fired some redundant employees. These 
workers were all members of the Mohennedy tribe. This tribe had some disagreements with the 
ruling family of Qatar, al-Thanis, and migrated to Kuwait in 1963. Failing to find work there, the 
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group returned to Qatar.349 The tribe’s uncertain political standing led to the government not 
protecting all nationals equally. This standing may also have influenced the fact that other 
workers did not feel solidarity with the workers who were dismissed and, as a result, there was 
no collective action following their dismissal.  
 
The Uncertain Role of Foreigners in the Oilfields 
Non-khalījī workers were the easiest to fire when their positions became redundant. In 
particular, the oil companies’ management found that Indians and Pakistanis could be fired 
without any problems.350 Like the situation in Abu Dhabi, nationals and other khalījī workers 
with connections to the nation were potentially destabilizing. Furthermore, the authority of the 
Ruler was not always absolute and the consequences of strikes meant the loss of money for oil 
companies. Managing the population also required heavy investment in policing and armed 
forces. In contrast, workers from India were thought to be largely apolitical and, therefore, as 
posing little danger of destabilizing the state government or having the ability to create large-
scale work stoppages.351 This was particularly true because Indian workers showed no interest in 
the pan-Arab movements that the British administration, oil companies, and local governments 
suspected of influencing the khalījī and other Arab workers. 
In 1968, Jordanians and Palestinians were the largest minority groups in Qatar. Future 
industrial projects would require additional outside laborers because it would take a long time for 
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the government-training scheme to produce enough skilled workers to stop needing immigrants 
to fill the positions.352 The presence of foreign workers was problematic for many reasons. First, 
some Arab groups were believed by the British administration to undermine the political 
situation in the Gulf; Palestinian workers, for example, openly disliked the Qatari and the 
Jordanian governments. In part, Palestinian dissatisfaction was due to the discrimination they 
faced. In addition, Palestinians were upset because of deportations from Qatar. Nonetheless, as 
much as the British believed Palestinians contributed to destabilizing the Gulf, there was no 
actual evidence of organizing efforts among the Palestinians working in the Qatari oilfields.353  
In the 1960s, the British administration feared that there was discontent in the Gulf due to 
growing nationalism, the Arab League, pan-Arab movements, and the oil industry. Similar to the 
destabilizing forces that were thought to influence the 1963 strikes in Abu Dhabi, Palestinians 
and the Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers were thought to be at the heart of the strikes in 
Qatar.354 While the British understood the most destabilizing forces to come from other parts of 
the Arab world, they also feared that labor movements in England and the United States would 
influence worker committees. In particular, the British administration wanted to “discourage” 
contact between workers in Qatar and international labor organizations.355 By focusing so much 
attention on outside influences, however, the British failed to recognize and address the interest 
of workers in international labor movements or the tensions among Arab workers in Qatar. 
“Arab” workers were not a homogenous category and not all non-Qataris were viewed the same 
                                                
352 State of Qatar, “Report on Labour, Industrial and Social Developments: Record of discussions: 
Government of Qatar.” 
353 “Qatar,” 7054, [illegible] 4/05 530/66. 
354 ibid. For example, worker resistance to contract work was believed to originate from the Arab 
Federation of Petroleum Workers, an organization that was opposed to contracting on principle. However, 
the effect of workers striking against contract work was that they disliked it when it involved non- khalījī 
Arabs, but were not upset by the presence of other khalījī Arabs in the workforce. This discrepancy added 
to tensions at oil projects. 
355 “Qatar,” 7054, [illegible] 4/05 530/66. 
 
 139  
by Qatari workers. While some Arab workers were considered outsiders to Qatar and their 
presence, via contract work, was one of the worker complaints during the strike, other Arab 
workers were considered to be part of the worker movement. For example, one of the three strike 
leaders was Bahraini.356 This points to a circumstance similar to that of Abu Dhabi in 1963, in 
which workers who were local were defined more by khalījī networks that spanned the Gulf 
region than clearly demarcated, as the British believed, by recently drawn national boundaries. 
 
Qatari Labor Laws 
While the British were wary of outside influences among the workers in Qatar, the Qatari 
government wanted to join international organizations in order to improve the situation of 
workers. In Qatar in 1963, the Ruler, Sheikh Ahmed, implemented new labor laws, but by 1966, 
Shell, QPC, and the Ruler were dissatisfied with the way the laws were being interpreted.357 In 
1968, Mr. Khreis, the Director of Labour in Qatar, considered the labor situation to be 
unsatisfactory. He pointed, in particular, to the issue of workers’ committees’ legal standing – or 
lack thereof. The labor law permitted joint consultative committees, but these had not been 
implemented. This meant the workers’ committees in 1968 had no legal status and were not 
registered with the Labour Department. Instead of restricting committees’ activities, however, 
this situation gave the committees greater leeway to “meddle” in politics. The solution, 
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according to Khreis, was to legalize trade unions and specify their responsibilities and limits. In 
this way, he argued, order and discipline could be maintained in industrial relations.358  
A judge of the Labour Court in Qatar also complained that labor relations in the country 
were problematic and claimed that a major problem was the court’s inability to enforce its 
judgment. This was particularly true in cases in which defendants had influence with the ruling 
family. In 1968, for example, there were fifty cases in which the judgments were ineffective. 
According to the judge, “this was contrary to the basic conception of the rule of law and a denial 
of the elementary rights of the individual worker.” Furthermore, the judge argued that non-
nationals in Qatar were a “great disadvantage” in the court system. The Labour Code provided 
indemnities and paid holidays only for Qatari nationals. Other workers could only obtain these 
benefits if an appropriate clause was inserted in their contracts, and the majority of non-national 
workers did not have formal contracts of service. As a result, it frequently happened that Qatari 
and other workers were employed side by side on the same job, but enjoyed different conditions 
of labor. The whole situation, the judge argued, was due to the influence of the merchants of 
Doha who wanted a supply of cheap foreign labor. The judge noted that the situation would have 
to change when Qatar joined the International Labor Organization (ILO).359 Joining the ILO, he 
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argued, would pressure the government to “amend its labour laws and practices to conform to 
internationally accepted standards.”360 
In order to cement labor relations and improve labor conditions, other members of the 
Qatari government also wished to join the ILO. Joining an international organization was not 
new for Qatar and in 1964 the country had joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization.361 As a first step in 
joining the ILO, the Deputy Ruler had sent a letter to the British Political Resident in Doha 
indicating Qatar’s desire to join the organization. The British replied that they were against Qatar 
joining the ILO.362 When pressed on this issue, the British tried at first to defer the conversation. 
They told the Director of Labour that if all Qatar wanted from joining the ILO was technical 
assistance that they could receive such assistance without becoming a member and pointed to the 
example of Saudi Arabia, whose lead the British felt Qatar should follow in all matters relating 
to international labor politics.363 However, this reply did not satisfy the Director and he felt that 
the technical assistance was “irrelevant.” Instead he argued “the object of joining would be to 
take part in the widespread international activities of this United Nations organization.” To 
which the Political Resident’s office replied that if Qatar joined the ILO, it would have to follow 
the rules set by the organization. This meant Qatar would need to send a tripartite committee to 
the annual conference and include a worker representative in this committee. The British argued 
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this would be hard to do, especially considering that workers’ committees did not have legal 
status. Therefore, the British argued, “It would be unwise for Qatar to join the ILO unless it was 
prepared to give full legal recognition to labour unions in the internationally accepted sense.”364 
Despite the fact that the British were not eager for Qatar’s government to recognize trade unions, 
both the Director of Labour and the Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers were eager to 
formalize the government’s recognition of unions.365 
While the British administration did not want Qatar to join the ILO, they were more 
ambivalent with regard to the country strengthening ties with the Arab League. The British 
believed that such an association was likely to bring into question state labor policies that the 
British also found problematic – in particular, the discriminatory treatment between Qataris and 
other Arabs and the permissive attitude adopted toward Iranian immigration. While the British 
wished for a stricter view by the Qataris on Iranians in the country, they also feared that closer 
association with the Arab League would lead to increased demand for workers’ associations, 
specifically, the legal recognition of trade unions in place of the de facto recognition by the 
government of existing oil company committees. This would allow Qatari workers to organize 
themselves more effectively and would bring the union leaders into closer contact with pan-Arab 
and international labor movements.366  
The British anticipated that the labor question was likely to become very important in 
Qatar in the coming years. In particular, they believed the legalization of trade unions would 
likely be a serious issue and they contended that this issue was political, not industrial. The 
British argued that the effective mobilization of Gulf workers was a tempting target to three 
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groups. First, it was a potential target to the nationalist elements in Qatar and Bahrain who were 
frustrated by the lack of devolution of power by ruling families. Second, it could also be targeted 
by other Arabs working in the Gulf States – Arabs who suffered from discrimination and lack of 
political expression. Finally, it was a target for pan-Arab political groups as a means to exert 
pressure and support pan-Arab policies. Despite these dangers, the British cautioned that a 
negative stance regarding trade unionism was not necessarily the wisest course. They saw the 
trend in Arab countries towards the development of trade unions. While there was the danger of 
subversion, unions could also be a major factor in the gradual political revolution of the Arab 
world in terms of internal social reform and blocking international communism. Therefore, the 
British suggested that the Deputy Ruler delegate this aspect of government administration to a 
member of the ruling family; importantly, that person should have sufficient control over the 
Labour Department and be able to maintain relations with both the oil companies and with 
international labor groups.367  
 
Shifting Labor Patterns, 1969 Qatar 
While members of Qatar’s government wanted to implement stronger labor laws and 
strengthen the position of unions in the country, by the late 1960s and early 1970s fewer and 
fewer Qataris were actually working in vulnerable positions in the oil industry. By 1969, in oil 
wealthy countries like Qatar, local people no longer did the lowest level jobs—this position had 
been assumed instead by migrants. Increasingly, the majority of Qataris had shifted away from 
performing manual labor. This did not mean all Qataris were rich; indeed, a “minority of 
indigenous Qataris [were] still living in poorer circumstances” but the British administrators 
argued that this was because they were “too proud to beg assistance from the Ruler, and either 
                                                
367 ibid. 
 
 144  
too lazy, or too backward in education and training, to find themselves a better niche in society.” 
This led to a stark situation in which one could literally see the contrast between the “very large 
palaces and grandiose villas” of the native Qataris and the “shanties and sheds in which the 
mainly expatriate labour-force live.”368  
As suggested by Davidson, the discrepancies between the conditions for national and 
foreign workers were due, in part, to the reallocation of oil money. The huge amounts of oil 
revenues were beneficial in distributing wealth across Qatari families. According to one Qatari 
government official, fifty-three percent of the oil revenue went to the ruling family. Of that, ten 
million pounds went to the Ruler and his immediate family and three million pounds went to the 
Deputy Ruler.369 From the Ruler, wealth was then redistributed through tribal networks. 
However, “tribal capitalism” was not the only factor in the decreasing numbers of Qataris 
working in the oil fields. The British administration and companies’ resistance to recognizing 
unions and the increased pressure on the state to reinforce security measures meant that the 
stability of the state was best assured by hiring foreign workers – workers who could be easily 
fired and deported from the country. 
 
Labor Laws in Abu Dhabi and Colonial Narratives 
The development of labor laws in conjunction with labor unrest and oil industry growth 
occurred not only in Qatar, but throughout the Gulf. In 1966, Abu Dhabi established a labor law 
and in 1967, Sheikh Zayed, inaugurated the Labour Department. Abu Dhabi’s labor law was 
similar to the laws established in other parts of the Gulf and was studied in London before its 
implementation. This law applied not only to nationals of the Trucial Coast or Muslims, but to all 
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workers in the emirate. However, the working conditions laid out in the law were basic. So basic, 
in fact, that the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company happily viewed them as “reasonable and 
simple,” noting that “the Company’s own regulations are more advanced” and that the new law 
lacked even provisions to ensure that workers had access to shade and drinking water.370 The law 
also sided heavily with companies; it prohibited strikes and lockouts prior to the hearing of the 
case by a reconciliation committee, forbade violence to persons and property, and forbade 
workers in public utilities from striking “if such action will endanger public health, endanger life, 
or cause serious damage to property.”371 
In conjunction with writing the Labour Laws, the British administration outlined a series 
of problems that they understood Abu Dhabi to be facing as the state developed. First, there was 
a problem of wage levels. The labor law allowed the Department of Labour to regulate minimum 
wages, but a year after the law’s drafting, this still had not happened. An even larger problem 
regarding wages was that the government had recently issued a schedule of grades and salaries 
for government employment. The oil companies, in particular, feared that this would cause all 
wages in the country to rise. Instead of raising wages in the government, the British 
administrator suggested a family allowances scheme.372 Abu Dhabi government officials resisted 
this input from the British, insisting that “the worker in Abu Dhabi should benefit through 
increased wages in the growing prosperity of the town” and that, as the town developed, the 
average worker would need more money to enjoy these new amenities.373 They also objected to 
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the family allowances scheme because it would improve the working conditions of nationals, but 
would do nothing to help the large foreign workforce in the country. Second, the British 
administration worried that “attempts would be made to subvert labour,” especially because there 
was not a social security scheme currently in effect. Finally, the development of Abu Dhabi 
through oil wealth, the British administration argued, would necessitate the development of 
health and other services. A solution to these problems, according to the British administration, 
was that a United Nations expert should draw up a scheme for the development of social services 
based on Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and other Gulf sheikhdoms. The alternative, the British 
administrator argued, was sure to be similar to “the unfortunate pattern of development in 
Kuwait and Qatar, where [the] all-important oil industry has been run largely by expatriate 
labour, whilst the local nationals prefer the easier life in government services.”374 This 
suggestion moved national and khalījī labor out of the oilfields and put these workers solely 
under the management of the local government. 
Another problem facing Abu Dhabi’s newly developing oil economy was illegal 
immigration. The British feared that as wages increased, so too would illegal immigration.375 
Abu Dhabians did not want to take jobs as unskilled workers and preferred more prestigious 
jobs, such as truck driving and working on the oilrigs. Large contractors were thus forced to hire 
foreigners to take these jobs and would even send “a truck to the town with the foreman” to get 
extra laborers if needed. The Ruler drew up a law concerning foreigners, but they had to wait to 
implement it until the Political Resident in Bahrain offered his suggestions. One key issue that 
was immediately apparent was the need to better regulate work permits. The regulation of work 
permits points to the differences in how labor was being understood. The Director of Labour 
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issued permits to nationals regardless of skill (red permits) and to all foreigners working in 
skilled or executive posts (blue permits), but no permits were issued to unskilled foreigners. For 
the British administrators, not giving permits to unskilled foreigners was a potential source of 
trouble because it resulted in unskilled laborers not being properly overseen. Increased oversight 
of unskilled foreigners, according to the British, diminished the risks of internal political 
subversion. The British tried to encourage the issuing of work permits to all workers by arguing 
that doing so would be beneficial to nationals. Permits, according to the British, ensured 
nationals “benefitted as much as possible from the development at hand” by not losing jobs to 
unskilled foreigners.376 However, considering most nationals refused unskilled labor positions, 
this seems largely incongruous.  
Like the development of labor policies in Qatar, the British administrator offered 
opinions on the development of Abu Dhabi’s labor laws. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
administration had a very negative opinion of trade unions, especially in the Gulf. The Director 
of Labour, Sayyid A. Hijazi, was dissatisfied with the current condition of labor laws in Abu 
Dhabi and wanted to implement a series of reforms. These reforms included Abu Dhabi joining 
the ILO, labor education that would inform workers of their rights, the recognition of trade 
unions, the opening of more labor offices in the oil fields, and setting up a Department of Social 
Affairs.377 The British administration’s objections to these reforms were similar to the objections 
given in Qatar. In particular, the British administration worried that these reforms would open 
Abu Dhabi to disruptive outside influences, such as pan-Arab groups. 
In conversations with Sayid Hassan Jumaa, a high-ranking Abu Dhabi government 
employee, a British administrator elaborated the problems with trade unions and the reasons that 
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Arab nations “had never had the ability” to develop industrial movements. First, trade unions had 
become the only civilian institution with political significance. This was because Arab countries 
were unable to evolve adequate political institutions. Second, “in the traditional evolutionary 
Arab states, it was difficult for trade unions to develop on Western European lines because 
industry was either relatively unimportant to national security or it was all-important.” Third, 
Arab nations were “paternalist in nature,” meaning that they protected the rights of workers 
without workers themselves having to agitate for changes. Finally, given the “the lack of 
developed political institutions and the banning in many countries of political groups opposed to 
the ruling regime, the trade unions became a target for infiltration by political forces seeking 
some form of expression.” When asked if the Abu Dhabi government should try to help develop 
these unions, the administrator insisted that the change must happen slowly. The administrator 
argued, “there was certainly no case for formation of trade unions in a primitive society such as 
existed in Abu Dhabi.” A better solution, according to the British, was a system of Joint 
Consultative Committees for the oil industry, such as the ones in Qatar.378 
This narrative of Abu Dhabi and other Gulf States as primitive societies was used by 
British administrators to reinforce an understanding of sheikhly rule that relied upon the rulers 
distributing wealth amongst the population and differential treatment between national and 
foreigner workers. According to this view, the labor reforms that the Director of Labour wanted 
to implement were “quite unsuitable for a primitive society in an early stage of evolution.”379  In 
many ways, this rhetoric by British administrators mimics the discourse that oil companies 
developed at oil sites in countries as diverse as “Mexico, Iran, Venezuela, Colombia, Nigeria, 
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[and] Saudi Arabia.” In these countries, local populations asked oil companies for development 
and training. The companies responded with the nineteenth-century idea that “long, slow 
tutelage” was best for the development of native populations.380 In the Gulf, this view reinforced 
the role of the sheikh in a “tribal society” to distribute money, provide social services, and 
protect the nationals in a paternalistic fashion.381 While this view of labor relations was contested 
and debated amongst Abu Dhabi governmental employees, the British administration’s 
insistence upon tightening measures in order to ensure the stability of the sheikhs or the internal 
security of the state most often won out.  
 
Conclusion: Evacuating Politics from the Oilfields 
In 1963, local laborers working in the oilfields of Abu Dhabi went on strike to negotiate 
for better working conditions. These strikes were similar to many of the strikes of khalījī workers 
in the Gulf throughout the 1960s. While these strikes contributed to the instability of political 
regimes during this period, they also reflect khalījī networks, the desire for local governance, and 
Gulf workers’ engagement with international conversations about labor laws that were occurring 
in the 1960s. By examining these strikes and the responses they engendered among the oil 
companies, the British administration, and local rulers, we can begin to see their significance as 
cornerstones in the development of labor policies in the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf. The 
strikes reflect a key moment in the shifting demographics of workers in Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and 
other countries in the Arabian Peninsula. This shift tracks from a time when many laborers, or 
unskilled workers, were nationals of Abu Dhabi or other areas in the Arabic-speaking Gulf to the 
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present, when labor is supplied from outside of the region. This shift was not merely a 
consequence of the new wealth from oil production. Rather, labor movements in the region were 
instrumental in this transition. 
In 1972, the British formally ended their colonial relationship with the Gulf. In the 1970s, 
the relationship between oil companies and the states further shifted with the formation and rise 
to prominence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the 
subsequent decision of many countries to nationalize their oil supply. Despite these shifts 
towards state-controlled oil, the evacuation of politics that began in the 1960s continued. One 
major result is that even today, forty-five years later, there are no khalījīs working as laborers in 
the oilfields of the Gulf; instead, foreigners do the bulk of the work. 
Due to the Gulf’s labor history, foreign workers in the Gulf are structurally vulnerable. 
These workers are dependent on their employers for their visa, paycheck, and continued work. 
They are also disenfranchised and unable to unionize. The labor policies developed in the wake 
of strikes by khalījī workers in the 1960s helped alter attitudes in the Gulf towards foreign labor. 
In addition, the policies and procedures implemented in the wake of these strikes shaped an 
approach to labor relations that endures to this day. Through their prescriptive advice and 
approaches to strikes that often used military or police action to resolve conflict, the British 
government constructed and reinforced an understanding of Gulf governance that looks today 
like Davidson’s “tribal capitalism.” This form of governance had consequences for which types 
of jobs foreigners and citizens took, as well as the implementation of labor laws in the Gulf. In 
the next chapter, I look at how this understanding of the Gulf is used to define the kafala, or 
sponsorship, system, thereby occluding the ways in which oil companies and the British colonial 











Formalizing Labor Hierarchies in the Gulf: 
Colonial Administrators, Merchants, and Oil Companies 
 
During Ramadan of 2010, I took iftar, or broke the daytime fast Muslims observe during 
the month of Ramadan, with South Asian migrant workers living in Sharjah, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). These men were residents of the Emirate’s “abandoned” camps. The workers at 
the abandoned camps had the bad luck to work for companies that had gone bankrupt or were in 
financial difficulties following the global economic crisis of 2008. As a result, these companies 
closed their operations completely or laid off large numbers of workers. Often, the company 
owners fled the UAE in order to avoid debtor’s prison, while the workers – many of whom had 
not been paid their wages – were left stranded in the UAE. These migrants most often worked at 
smaller companies that provided parts and services to larger multinational corporations (MNCs). 
With the economic turmoil of 2008, many of these smaller companies were unable to pay their 
bills or their employees. The low-level employees of these defunct companies continued to live 
at the camps, but because their employers no longer paid the bills, the workers had no water and 
no electricity. The men at the iftars were Muslims from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Stuck, 
waiting in these camps, they had no plane ticket home, no paycheck, and nowhere to go.  
Daily during the month of Ramadan, a few men from a group who collected donations to 
feed workers traveled with me from Dubai to the far side of Sharjah. There, we did not visit the 
city, but instead went to an industrial area, where I drove my cheap economy-sized car through 
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rutted dirt roads to arrive at a lane full of over-priced grocers and cheap food stalls. At one of the 
food stalls, owned by a Pakistani man, the volunteer group had arranged to provide meals for the 
abandoned workers. Most often, I went to these meals with two Indian Hindu men, one from 
Gujarat and the other from Tamil Nadu. These were highly gendered affairs, and I never saw 
another woman in this area. In addition to feeding the workers, this volunteer group provided 
legal assistance and purchased tickets home for workers. 
While attending these iftars, I spoke with the men about their experiences and hopes for 
the future, as well as their anger and frustration at their situation. Unable to send money to their 
families, work another job, or return to their homes, migrant laborers expressed to me their 
feelings of powerlessness, helplessness, and disenchantment with living in the Arabic-speaking 
Persian Gulf. One abandoned worker told me, “We do not have a degree; none of us can read. 
Why do they not give us the money they owe us? They have two cars and live like sheikhs, but 
they do not pay us.” 
Unfortunately, the experiences of these abandoned workers are far from unique. Many 
workers whose employers continue to operate in the Gulf face poor working and living 
conditions. For example, in late 2013 and 2014, Qatar was under increasing scrutiny in the 
international news as it prepared to host the 2022 World Cup. News articles discussed the poor 
treatment of workers and argued that Nepalese workers were working in slave-like conditions. 
Other South Asians also faced unsafe working conditions. The Indian government went on 
record in early 2014 stating that over six hundred Indian workers had died in Qatar while 
working on the preparations for the World Cup.382 
                                                
382 Men are not the only ones to negatively experience the kafala system. Anthropologist Ahmed Kanna 
describes training for maids during which the maids are instructed to call the employer “mama” and told 
that they will be beaten if they do not properly clean kitchen utensils. Ahmed Kanna, Dubai, the City as 
Corporation, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. 64. 
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A lack of strong labor laws seems endemic to the Arabic-speaking Gulf. This impacts 
workers’ ability to agitate for better working conditions – something viewed as a positive or a 
negative depending on one’s position within the system. One Indian human resources manager at 
an oil company in Abu Dhabi told me: “The greatest thing about the UAE is the strong laws. 
Here workers cannot strike and cause problems. If there is any problem at a worksite, you just 
call the police and they come and take care of it. It saves so much stress.” When I asked whether 
there were more strikes at sites in the desert given their isolation from the city and thus from 
police action, the manager replied, “No! There are none. The police will even come to the 
desert.” The situation contrasts sharply with the history of labor unrest detailed in the previous 
chapters, in large part due to the shift beginning in the 1960s towards hiring increasing numbers 
of foreign workers to work in the Gulf – workers with more limited means and opportunities to 
contest their working conditions. 
The previous three chapters explored how historic strikes by workers in the Gulf, and the 
responses of Indian and Gulf governments, along with oil company management and the British 
administration, helped to shape the contemporary migration of workers to the Gulf, the work 
they do, and their experiences. In the last chapter, I explored strikes by khalījī workers in the 
Arabic-speaking Gulf and the reaction of Gulf governments, the British administration, and oil 
companies’ management to these strikes. One result of those strikes was the depoliticization of 
the oilfields. Khalījī workers were hired for government positions and Indians, believed to be 
apolitical, were hired increasingly to work in the oilfields. A significant factor in this process 
was the writing of labor laws in the Gulf. In this chapter, I explore the legal developments and 
changes that led to this restructuring of Gulf labor, and the role of merchants, British 
administrators, and oil companies in this process. I highlight the complex, ever-shifting 
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connections between oil, governance, and culture that have shaped the development of the labor 
system in the Gulf. In my analysis, I consider not only how Gulf rulers distributed wealth from 
rents, but also how oil companies and colonial administrators informed politics in the Gulf. I 
consider the larger context that includes strikes on the oilfields, as well as colonial fictions 
concerning the Gulf, the politics of Indian and khalījī merchants, and oil company policies. This 
analysis considers how a diverse set of actors informed the establishment of the kafala, or 
sponsorship, system. I will show that as the British administration left the Gulf in 1971, Indian 
laborers were moving to the Gulf in increasing numbers. I argue that the labor relations prevalent 
today have been shaped by the interactions of imperial governance, merchant activities, oil 
company policies, and worker actions over the course of the twentieth century.  
 
The Kafala System’s Impact on Worker Experiences 
Today, non-khalījīs, or people who are not Arabs from the region, are excluded from the 
political and cultural milieu of the Gulf States, and foreigners’ ability to access state resources 
and participate in governance is limited. Ahmed Kanna characterizes governance in Dubai, for 
example, as based on two assumptions held by both the Ruler and the citizens of the emirate. The 
first is that citizens are dependent on the ruler. The second is that only citizens are able to make 
claims on the state for protection.383 For migrants to the Gulf, this means that there are no strong 
labor laws to protect them, they are unable to appeal to the state, and there are legal structures 
that formalize their exclusion – most notably the kafala system. 
                                                
383 ibid., p. 72. 
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The kafala system currently in place in the Gulf is most often discussed as underpinning 
and enabling worker abuse.384 In this system, all workers who come to the Gulf do so under the 
oversight of a kafīl, or sponsor. These sponsors are most often employers. The conflation of 
sponsors and employers, combined with the lack of effective labor law enforcement in the Gulf, 
means workers are particularly vulnerable to abuse from their employer. Not only are workers 
dependent on employers to enter the country, they must also receive permission from their 
employer in order to change jobs.385 The system is closely associated with two types of laws: 
alien residence laws and laws of commercial companies, both of which protect the economic 
interests of citizens of the Gulf and limit foreigners’ ability to participate in the economy. In 
some Gulf countries, these laws formalize exclusion by forbidding foreigners from owning land, 
requiring all companies to be majority owned by khalījīs, and requiring all migrants to have a 
kafīl, or sponsor.386 The laws of commercial companies are closely related to the labor system. 
All non-citizens working in the Gulf must have a citizen act as a sponsor for their visas. Needing 
a sponsor for a visa does not differentiate the Gulf States from other nations and countries like 
India, the United States, and Great Britain – all of which require valid visas with a work sponsor 
in order to live and work in those nations. What differentiates the Gulf is the extent to which this 
process seems to impact the lives of migrants. Passports are held by employers and, with the lack 
of strong labor laws and enforced labor policies, the position of workers in the Gulf is 
                                                
384 Andrew Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain, (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), pp. 63-64; Anh Nga Longva, “Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: 
The Kafala System in the Gulf,” Middle East Report, no. 211 (Summer 1999): 20-22. 
385 Jane Kinninmont, “Bahrain,” in Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, ed. Christopher 
Davidson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p.5 
386 While this system remains dominant in most of the Gulf, there have been some changes. In 2003, 
Dubai began allowing foreigners to buy property and, in 2009, Bahrain began allowing workers to change 
jobs without their employer’s consent.  
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particularly precarious. This vulnerability is further strengthened by the impossibility of foreign 
workers becoming citizens of the Gulf States and thus accessing the rights granted to citizens. 
The kafala system has certain benefits and plays an important role in the production of 
the state. Because the Gulf countries are small, they delegate certain authorities to their citizens 
through the kafala system.387 Political scientist Christopher M. Davidson notes the benefits of the 
sponsorship system for the rulers of the Persian Gulf monarchies. He finds that the kafala system 
has benefits for citizens, “including a sponsorship system that allows regular citizens to build 
rent-generating business empires on the backs of foreign workers and, less tangibly, the 
maintenance of a subtle social hierarchy that invariable elevates the ‘locals’ above Arab and 
Asian immigrants.”388 The sponsorship system lends stability to monarchical rulers and helps to 
generate revenue for citizens. The latter, for example, are required by law to receive a share of 
the economic benefits from oil and gas endeavors and the subsidiary industries that are built 
around them. In these formulations, the main actors in the establishment and maintenance of the 
sponsorship system are the rulers and the citizens of their countries.  
 Many discussions of the kafala system elucidate how the system continues cultural 
practices from before the discovery of oil in the Gulf. In anthropologist Anh Nga Longva’s 
discussion of migration to Kuwait, she builds upon the seminal work of Frederik Barth and 
Abdalla S. Burja, and makes explicit what social customs and policies allow for the efficient 
running of Kuwait’s intensely multicultural and multiethnic society.389 She argues that a pre-
World War II model defining tribal membership is central to the definition of the Kuwaiti 
                                                
387 Anh Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait, (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1997), pp. 100, 103-105. 
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citizen. In addition, according to Longva, traditional understandings of labor dictate the jobs 
open to immigrants and the relationship between employer and employees is based on previous 
models of slave-slave owner relations.390 Other anthropologists have noted the significance of 
previous models of employment in defining the contemporary system. Specifically, the pearl 
trade and the role of indentured laborers or slaves in that trade was, according to Andrew 
Gardner, an “early rendition of the contemporary kafala system.”391 While these social relations 
are certainly significant, they are far from clear cut. As Neha Vora illustrates on her work in 
Dubai, while the kafala system may make integration seem impossible, the management of the 
kafala system is dependent on expatriates who run and oversee businesses in the Gulf.392 This 
system is also far from predetermined. Prior to the discovery of oil in the region and in the early 
days of oil production, foreigners held a multiplicity of positions in the Gulf. An examination of 
Indians in the Arabian Peninsula illustrates the diversity of social relations present historically in 
the Gulf, and a historical perspective illuminates the process through which foreigners were 
increasing excluded from politics in the Gulf.  
 
Trade in the Arabian Sea 
Often, Indians’ presence in the Gulf is dated to the oil boom of the 1970s. The narrative, 
told to me repeatedly by government officials, recruiting agents, and migrants, was that 
“suddenly in the 1970s” Indians began moving to the Gulf. While many examinations of 
migration from India to the Gulf begin their studies with the oil boom of the 1970s, the 
population of Indian traders and merchants living in the Gulf prior to that time was not 
                                                
390 Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. 
391 Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain, p. 37. 
392 Neha Vora, Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
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insignificant. This reading of the Gulf’s isolation mimics colonial narratives regarding the 
region. Such narratives lend greater weight to the cultural aspects of social relations, such as the 
kafala system, but obfuscate the role of oil companies and British administrators in constructing 
these laws. A historical examination of Indian merchants and traders in the Gulf, and these 
merchants’ relationship with khalījī merchants, complicates the view of the Gulf as isolated. 
While exchange between the Gulf and India dates back millennia, I focus here on the late 
nineteenth century onward in order to understand contemporary trade and labor circulations in 
the Arabian Sea.393 In Dubai, under the protection and instigation of the British, the Sheikh 
deployed an ethnically pluralist mode of governance in which mainly Persian and Indian actors 
(primarily merchants) made equally legitimate claims on the market and political protection of 
the state of Dubai. The British encouraged trade and were particularly interested in helping 
Indians establish themselves in the Gulf, as they tended to be proponents of British policy.394 
There were fifty Indian families in Dubai in 1900.395 By 1961, 1,645 Indians lived in Dubai and 
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over 3,500 were thought to live throughout the Trucial States. A British official described this 
Indian community in the Trucial States as “wealthy, influential, and long established.”396 By 
1961, the Indian Association in Bahrain had two hundred members from the prominent trade 
families based in Bahrain. From the main associations in Bahrain in the early 1960s, it appears 
that there were a large number of Indian traders from the states of Gujarat, Kerala, Karnataka, 
and Maharashtra.397  
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Britain dominated trade with all of the 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. However, most of this was trade was from British 
India. In 1913, the British Empire, including India, accounted for twenty-one percent of Persian 
trade including both imports and exports. By 1923, this had increased to fifty-seven percent and 
oil accounted for the largest portion of the trade. Imports from India and Britain to the Gulf 
played a large role in trade. The total imports into Bahrain, in 1925, were £1,621,869 and Indian 
imports accounted for £1,210,223 of this. The same year, imports into Kuwait were £496,000 
and exports were £547,000 and, of this, India accounted for £373,000 imports and £298,000 
exports. In Muscat, trade was £613,000, £674,000, and £474,000 for 1924, 1925, 1926, 
respectively, and imports were twice that of exports and almost all the trade was with India. 
Chief imports from India were cotton goods and coffee; chief exports to India were dates and dry 
sardines.398  In 1955, there was “considerable trade” between India and the port of Aden, the 
majority of which was through dhows and small steamers.399 In 1953, Indian trade with Aden 
comprised £6.66 million of Aden’s total trade, excluding petroleum, which was £42.08 million; 
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in 1954 India’s trade with Aden was £5.8 million and Aden’s total trade (excluding petroleum) 
was £41.94; and in 1955 India’s trade was £5.42 million and Aden’s total, without petroleum, 
was £41.28 million. 
 Indian traders often had offices or representatives spread from India to the Persian Gulf. 
Common places for offices included Bombay, Bahrain, Dubai, and Karachi.400 Many families 
had offices in all of these ports, with some of these family company offices enduring to the 
present. One Indian trading family worked in the pearl industry in the late 1800s, as importers of 
Indian goods to the Gulf in the 1930s, and today ships materials from India to the Gulf and the 
rest of the world.401 Throughout this time, this Indian trading family had offices in Karachi (prior 
to 1947), Bombay, and Dubai. In 1933 and today, they keep their headquarters in Bahrain.402 
This family is just one of many trading families with offices in both India and the Gulf States 
historically and today. The presence of large numbers of Indians in the Gulf prior to the oil boom 
of the 1970s elucidates the importance of the Gulf for Indian traders. The relationships between 
the Indians living and working in the Gulf and khalījīs were varied. 
 
A Snapshot of Indian Traders in the Gulf 
In 1954, an Indian delegation, including Dr. Jagdish Chand, visited Kuwait and Bahrain 
and spoke with officials regarding Indian businessmen in the Gulf. In particular, Dr. Chand 
spoke with the British Political Agent about the difficulty faced by Indian businessmen trying to 
get the “No Objection Certificates” required for Indians to travel in the Gulf. The British Agent 
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replied that he would like for Indians to cultivate more joint business with the locals. In Kuwait, 
the Ruler said it was not possible to allow more Indian businessmen, and he blamed this on the 
behavior of Indians already in Kuwait, especially while consuming alcohol. The Ruler said that 
in Kuwait alcohol is allowed to foreigners, but Indians are “misbehaving in public places when 
drunk.” Despite these complaints and difficulties, Dr. Chand found that “there [was] a large 
number of Indians living in Bahrain and Kuwait, flourishing in all walks of life. Generally their 
relations with locals are cordial.” In Bahrain, in particular, Dr. Chand thought Indian influence 
was perceptible and the people in Bahrain were pro-Indian. This was due, in part, to the large 
number of Indian films shown in Bahraini cinemas and the fact that Hindustani was understood 
by one in ten Bahrainis. At local stores, Indian goods were sold. There was interplay between 
Bahrain and Kuwait with Arab merchants visiting India. In both countries, Indian currency was 
the official currency. In Kuwait, Indian businessmen were given credit without guarantee.  
Unfortunately, however, Dr. Chand feared the situation for Indians in Kuwait was 
worsening due to economic development and the influx of Arabs from other parts of the Middle 
East. The influx of Arabs was hurting the Indian community because all Arabs “inherit a 
common culture” and were, therefore, “homogenous.” Dr. Chand believed that while orthodox 
locals sometimes disliked these new Arabs, most of the Arabs arriving from other parts of the 
Middle East were intimate with locals and were jealous of Indians. Though clearly collapsing 
differences among Arabic-speaking people, Dr. Chand was pointing to new and growing 
problems Indians in the Gulf were facing both with their own countrymen and with their 
neighbors. According to Dr. Chand, the influx of Arabs led to nationalist feelings among 
Kuwaitis. Englishmen were hiring local Arabs for jobs for which they used to employ Indians. 
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Locals, however, were not yet displacing Indians because the former did not have sufficient 
training for skilled or semi-skilled positions in oil companies. Dr. Chand described the situation: 
Indians are efficient enough to hold their jobs. Their work is appreciated – 
they have proved to be more trustworthy than other Arab outsiders. 
However, due to increasing competition, Indians have to put up with all 
conditions. And this competition is not only with Arabs, but also because 
the POE in Bombay is ever ready to send replacements. The biggest 
problem facing Indians was their own attitude. Indians were “not 
change[ing] with the times.” 
 
Mr. Chand observed the quality of Indian workers to be high, but believed problems arose 
because Indians were not socializing with locals and the Indian community was divided. For 
example, in Kuwait the Indian community was full of “bickering” amongst Indians to the point 
that the police had to get involved.403  
This tension between Indians and locals also developed in other Gulf States. In the 
Protectorate of Aden in 1955, for example, there were 15,000 Indians. Most came from the 
Bombay Province and were Gujaratis, Parsis, and Bohras. The Indians in Aden were well-off, 
owned considerable property, and worked in areas such as textile trading and general 
contracting, or were engineers, lawyers, and doctors.404 Ten thousand of the Indians in Aden 
were Muslim and there were two hundred Sindhis. The majority of the Indian Muslims were 
“called Hindis, i.e., those who have married Arab women and have settled here.” Yet, despite 
these marriages, Indians were not seen as well integrated into Adenese society and “their social 
life by and large [was] quite distinct.” The Bohras and the Khojas maintained their own 
mosques, and the Hindus in Aden remained even more distinct. They were mostly vegetarians; 
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dressed uniquely; purchased most of their food, clothing, and goods from India; and their wives 
and children lived in India. To outside observers, it appeared that neither Indian Hindus nor 
Indian Muslims wanted to integrate with Adenese society. The problem was not merely 
religious; Indians also cited the treatment of women as a reason against allowing Arabs to join 
Indian clubs. This resistance against assimilation ran both ways – Arabs, themselves, were not 
particularly eager for Indians to integrate either. Indian administrators blamed this lack of 
assimilation, by both Hindus and Muslims, as the root of hostility Indians faced. The 
administration feared that if Indians did not work harder to assimilate, “their future cannot be 
bright.”405  
In Aden, legislation was proposed to restrict immigration. It was the view of the Indian 
Consulate in Aden that this legislation was directed primarily against Indians, Italians, and other 
Europeans. This was because Indians had a “monopoly for certain types of jobs, professions etc. 
which the Arabs think would go to them but for the Indians.” But with the help of certain 
prominent Arabs in the area, the bill was sufficiently modified to lessen its impact on the Indians 
in the Protectorate. Simply put, as in other areas of the Gulf, there just were not enough qualified 
locals to fill all of the open positions. In Aden, there was “not a single arab [sic] lawyer or doctor 
or an engineer.” Those Arabs who were skilled got jobs easily but, these trained professionals 
were not present in adequate numbers to staff oil projects.406 
One of the ways the Indian community attempted to mitigate its negative image was to 
conspicuously refrain from contesting government elections. It was thought that with Indians 
comprising approximately twelve percent of the population, they could get a member elected if 
they chose. In 1955, one Indian, Mr. Mansoor, ran, but the majority of the Indian community did 
                                                




not support him. Instead, they claimed that all positions should be held for Arabs, perhaps in an 
attempt to gain the favor of their neighbors.407 This focus on positive relations with Arabs 
became increasingly important over the course of the twentieth century as moves were made to 
exclude Indians from Gulf commerce. But, as seen above, not all relationships were strained. In 
the 1950s, we see Indians occupying a diversity of positions and the relationships between 
Indians and khalījīs were at times good and at other times poor. This complexity indicates that 
there were many possible ways social relations could have been formalized in the Gulf. In order 
to understand the contemporary moment, it is important to consider the circumstances around the 
implementation of the kafala, or sponsorship, laws. 
 
Implementing the Law of Commercial Companies 
The formal restricting of economic activity by the Gulf governments began in the 
twentieth century, as conflict increased between Indian and khalījī merchants. Trade difficulties 
and larger political concerns were deeply entwined. For example, in 1963, Muscat imported large 
amounts of Sindhi cattle and other goods, equaling £219,550 that year. In return, Muscat 
exported dates to India, the largest purchaser of this economic staple. Relations between India 
and Muscat, however, were strained when the Indian government imposed a restriction on the 
import of dates.408 While not all relationships between Indians and khalījīs were fraught, 
antagonism began to build in the twentieth century and closely paralleled dissatisfaction with the 
British administration’s roles in the Gulf.  
Despite the culturally inclusive nature of the Gulf, the movement to exclude foreigners 
from economic activities and the roots of the kafala system can be detected as early as the 1930s, 
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long before oil produced large amounts of revenue for these nations. The relationship between 
Indian traders, merchants, oil companies, and state authorities has been historically complex and 
dynamic. At times, Gulf trading families, Indian merchants, politicians, and rulers worked 
together to conduct business and expand trade options. At other times, antagonism was based on 
political protests. In 1938, the British had to come to the aid of the Ruler of Dubai when 
merchants took over half of the city. These merchants asked the ruler to limit his personal 
income and do more to grow the economy.409 In 1953, Dubai merchants and young nationalists 
formed a loose organization, called the National Front. This organization “opposed the growing 
influence of Persian and Indian merchants … [and was] responsible for agitating against the 
British presence.”410 Much of this agitation against the British was in response to the anticolonial 
movements taking place in Egypt. This was because the Dubai merchants understood, as did the 
British, that Indian merchants were supportive of the British Empire and used the British 
government to help make inroads into markets in the Gulf.411 These trade relations influenced 
how Indians were treated while living in the Gulf. Foreigners working in the country became an 
easy target for reforms and an easier population to police and control than local, khalījī Arabs. 
The following two cases illustrate the connection between the British colonial administration, 
local merchants, and Indian traders. These cases represent early moments in the formalization of 
the kafala system.   
The first case looks at Qatar, where the ruling al-Thani family dominated trade in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. As a result of this family’s influence, Qatar was unique in 
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the Gulf in the early twentieth century because there was only one Indian living there.412 Even 
after the rulers of Qatar made a treaty with the British and welcomed more Indian traders, 
Indians were still disinclined to go to Qatar as they had difficulty reinforcing trade and lending 
agreements. Collusion between Gulf rulers and reluctance by the British to press certain matters 
with Gulf leaders made it difficult for Indians to conduct business. The Dharamdas Thaveradas 
Importers and Exporters, an Indian family involved in trade, was unable to collect money owed 
to them by Essa al-Thani, a member of the Qatari ruling family, in 1932. While the British 
Political Agent in the Persian Gulf had directed al-Thani to pay, the latter had ignored the 
Agent’s decisions. Furthermore, the Indian traders were unable to follow-up with their claim as 
the ruler of Dubai continuously blocked their access to the Political Resident when he visited.413 
The inability of the British to enforce their ruling is a sign of tension and of the uneven control of 
the British in India and the Arabian Peninsula. 
The second case further illustrates the increasingly unsteady situation for foreigners in the 
Gulf. In 1963, Mr. Bhatia, an Indian living in Dubai, was informed that he was no longer able to 
receive imports of Philips radios from the company. Since 1957, Mr. Bhatia had been the Philips 
radio agent in Dubai. However, Philips had written to Mr. Bhatia and told him that new 
regulations made it necessary for all agencies to be held by Dubai citizens. As a result of this 
new regulation, Philips Radio would send its next shipment of radios to a firm called the United 
Arab Agencies (UAA) – an agency owned by two very wealthy Dubai merchants. When Mr. 
Bhatia protested, the UAA told him he could have a quarter of the company and act as titular 
agent if he did the ordering. Further stipulations by the UAA included that Mr. Bhatia would not 
have access to the accounts and that the arrangement had to remain a secret. Displeased with this 
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offer, Mr. Bhatia continued to protest and the matter was referred to the British Political Agent. 
 The British intervened and the final arrangement agreed upon was that Mr. Bhatia would 
invest twenty-five percent and would receive twenty-five percent of the profits. The British 
administration found “there are several unsavory factors about the affair.” First, Mr. Bhatia had 
no other agencies and was dependent on Philips for his livelihood whereas the owners of agency 
were the richest in Dubai. Second, Mr. Bhatia had lived in Dubai for his entire life, as had his 
father and grandfather. Third, the regulation the Ruler had described in his letter to Philips did 
not exist and there were dozens of agencies held by foreigners that were not touched. Finally, it 
was widely believed the Ruler had a financial interest in United Arab Agencies.414 Mr. Bhatia’s 
experiences were only one of many instances of increasing restrictions on Indian merchants in 
the Gulf and are an example of the implementation of the sponsorship, or kafala, system. In the 
case of Mr. Bhatia, it appears that the Ruler of Dubai worked with powerful merchant families in 
order to exclude a non-khalījī resident from the economy, even though the latter’s family had 
lived in the Gulf for generations. In mediating this dispute, the British put the blame largely on 
Mr. Bhatia, whom British officials argued ought to have taken a local partner earlier. Taking a 
khalījī partner, according to the British, was the growing trend in the Gulf and one that they did 
not discourage. In fact, their decisions in this matter lent weight to the increasingly common 
practice of raising khalījī incomes by requiring partial ownership by locals – a requirement still 
in force today. 
In many discussions of the kafala system, the implementation of the system is understood 
to be a formalization of pre-Gulf oil relations. This formalization was particularly important due 
to the increasing wealth that accompanied the intensification of oil production in the region. But 
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by tracing the genealogy of the policy and considering the historical context of the region, the 
law may be analyzed as part of a complicated set of relations that involved not only traders and 
the Rulers, but also the British colonial government and oil companies.  
An immediate antecedent to the sponsorship system was a law passed in Kuwait in 1960. 
This law, known as the Law of Commercial Companies stated that foreigners could not be the 
majority owners of businesses, or, in other words, all businesses had to have at least fifty-one 
percent ownership by Kuwaitis.415 This model was becoming more and more popular in the Gulf, 
and, by the mid-1960s, the British noted that local merchants were putting pressure on the Gulf 
governments to legally restrict the share of foreigners in the economy.416 The exclusion of 
foreigners from the state in Kuwait was further formalized with a 1975 amendment to the Alien 
Residence Law that included mention of the kafala system and listed kafīls, or sponsors, as 
employers. By 1980, kafīls were required for all foreign workers.417 Laws of commercial 
companies and alien residence laws are still prevalent in the Gulf.  The result is that in the 
contemporary Gulf, all companies must be majority-owned by citizens, while non-citizens 
experience a precarious living situation.418 The precarious lives of migrants are further 
compounded by the labor policies of the Gulf. But these labor policies, and the kafala system 
specifically, did not develop in a vacuum. Rather, the politics and policies of oil companies and 
the British administration contributed to the development of the system. 
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The Problem with the Resource Curse 
In many discussions of politics and labor in the Gulf, oil plays a dominant role in 
determining social relations. Oil underpins the infrastructural development of the Gulf, and is 
often understood in terms of scarcity, consumption, and as a “resource curse.” According to the 
latter framing, oil and the wealth produced from oil rents hinder democracy and democratic 
institutions and forms. In Abdelrahman Munif’s novel, Cities of Salt, he points to the fiction that 
associates modernity, progress, and oil. He writes of the transformation that occurs in a fictional 
port on the Arabian Sea with the discovery of oil. “So Harran had been since the beginning of 
time…. The [oil] company men, who had visited many places before Harran chose it as port and 
headquarters of the company, as well as a city of finality and damnation.”419 Yet, the association 
between oil and modernity so poetically destabilized in Munif’s novel is, nonetheless, often 
uncritically assumed within many discussions of the region. Consider, for example, the following 
news report’s romantic narrative of Dubai’s “modern” transformation thanks to oil:  
While it is known today more for its fast cars and life of luxury, it was not 
that long ago that the city was as familiar with camels and dhows as it is 
now with Ferraris and indoor ski slopes…. Everything changed for Dubai 
with the discovery of oil in the Gulf in the late 1960s, bringing a soaring 
economy and an army of traders who flocked to the emirate to settle there. 
As it began to export crude oil, the petro-dollars flooded in to Dubai….420 
 
The wealth from oil rents is popularly understood to have ushered in a new period of wealth, 
connection with the rest of the world, and material modernity – a modernity that is contrasted to 
a pre-oil past that is portrayed as timeless and traditional. While this association with modernity, 
progress, and oil are repeated in many sites of oil extraction, arguments that focus on oil wealth 
                                                
419 Abdelrahman Munif, Cities of Salt, trans. Peter Theroux, (New York: Vintage, 1987 [1984]), p. 198. 
420 Kerry McQueeny, “Dubai before the Boom,” May 15, 2012. Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2144613/Pictures-Dubai-1960s-1970s-city-fishing-
settlement.html. Last accessed 4/2/15. 
 
 170 
as creating a rupture with the past are particularly popular in examinations of the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf.  
At the same time that oil is linked to modernity, however, it is also often assumed that oil 
wealth has simultaneously enabled the GCC States to maintain undemocratic processes through 
the redistribution of oil rents to citizens. Paradoxically, then, oil wealth is associated with 
ushering in material modernity, but delaying or staving off social and political modernity. 
Increasingly, scholars have critiqued this assumed automatic connection between oil rents and 
undemocratic processes. Gwenn Okruhlik’s work on rentier wealth’s impact on the state, for 
example, shows that political outcomes are not predetermined. Even though oil rents are paid 
directly to the state, such payments do not dictate the relationship between the state and citizens. 
Instead, Okruhlik argues, historical and social contexts, together with an exploration of how rents 
are deployed, offers a more fruitful method of analysis.421 Timothy Mitchell similarly questions 
the discourse of the resource curse. Noting that the leading industrialized countries are also some 
of the world’s biggest oil producers, Mitchell argues that one must consider the materiality of oil; 
the sites where oil is extracted, refined, and shipped; the international political context; and “the 
ways in which carbon energy helped manufacture forms of agency capable of effective 
intransigence.”422 Critiquing the connection between oil wealth and undemocratic practices 
opens up space to explore an expanded range of actors and associations that have shaped labor 
systems in the Gulf.423 
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Oil, Society, and Politics 
 In order to understand how oil, oil companies, and the technopolitics of oil impact 
contemporary labor in the Gulf, one must look at how actors selectively invoke larger social 
relations and the shifting nature of oil economies over time. By considering the historical context 
of labor relations in the Gulf and the actors involved, oil rents become only one aspect of a much 
larger network. In Fernando Coronil’s analysis of oil production in Venezuela, he argues that in 
societies where wealth depends on the commodification of nature, rent becomes a defining factor 
in politics and oil rents capture the organization of economic activities. Rents must be both 
productive and create profit, but also distributed in such a way as to ensure political stability.424 
Coronil’s insights are rarely extended to research in the Gulf, however, where scholars focus on 
the role of rent distribution but pay less attention to interactions between oil companies, local 
merchants, and governmental authorities. Michael Watts’ work on Nigeria provides one model to 
expand the actors at play in oil politics. He describes his work as an exploration of petro-
capitalism. Petro-capitalism, to Watts, is a dynamic set of forces that “produces, from the 
realities of forms of rule and political authority into which it is inserted, specific sorts of … 
governable space (that is a specific configuration of territory, identity and rule).”425 These 
governable spaces are scaled onto local, ethnic, national, and global levels and they are the 
products of oil complex and petro-capitalism (but can work against each other). Oil capitalism 
involves a monopoly over mineral exploitation, the security apparatuses of the state, and 
institutional mechanisms by which oil revenue is distributed. The result is that for countries that 
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receive a large percentage of their GDP from oil, oil influences development and this 
development “produced conditions which challenged and undermined the very tenets of the 
modern nation-state.”426 This is what Coronil poetically describes as the “Faustian exchange of 
oil for the illusion of progress.”427 The power of oil rents and their ability to influence forms of 
rule must be traced through the associations made by actors and the scales that emerge through 
these associations.  
 Doug Rogers and Andrew Barry take up the complicated intersections of oil and 
democratic institutions by attending to the material aspects of oil and examining how these 
material aspects impact politics.428 Rogers uses ethnography to understand how oil enters into 
“broader, and heavy politicized, fields of signification” in Russia.429 This research builds on 
work by Gabrielle Hecht, who looks at nuclearity in Africa and France “as a technopolitical 
phenomenon that emerges from political and cultural configurations of technical and scientific 
things, from the social relations where knowledge is produced.”430 Thinking about the 
implications of national imaginations and technological innovations, Rogers argues, “technical 
matters are deeply embedded in signifying practices.”431 This work also resonates with Barry’s 
examination of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline and his findings that objects are integral to 
politics and how materials become imbricated in public disputes and actors in events.432 The 
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material properties of oil influence the effectiveness of worker actions, as discussed with regard 
to Indian labor strikes. But, as seen in the work of Hecht, Rogers, and Barry, the interplay of 
politics and oil is not limited to worksites, but also impacts state policies and oil companies. In 
the Gulf, we may consider how oil impacted state policies and development by considering the 
history of oil exploration and concessions. 
 
The Gulf and Oil Development 
 Pre-oil Gulf societies had small populations, numbering between 5,000 and 25,000 
people, and leadership was defined by political loyalty rather than geographic boundaries. These 
groups were loosely structured and, like the political leadership today, sheikhly authority was 
hereditary and patrimonial.433 Beginning in the late 1800s, rulers in the Gulf began conceding 
their external affairs to the British government.434 Overseen by the British Raj based in Bombay, 
in this system rulers in the Arabic-speaking Gulf had to give up hostilities in the sea, and, in 
return, the British accepted the authority of the rulers on land. From this point onward, the 
construction of colonial fictions played a significant role in the colonial administration and 
legitimization of the British presence in the Gulf. For example, one officer in the British Indian 
Army, Lieutenant-Colonel David Lorimer, who visited the Gulf in the late 1890s, wrote of the 
region: “The general impression of Dohah [sic] is unattractive; the lanes are narrow and 
irregular, the houses dingy and small. There are no date palms or other trees, and the only garden 
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is a small one near the fort, kept up by the Turkish garrison.”435 Such views of the Gulf as 
desolate and isolated were repeated throughout the twentieth century by British colonial 
authorities, with isolation conflated again and again with lack of development and 
“backwardness.” 436 
Even as the economic activity of the region changed, similar tropes endured. By 1969, in 
the Trucial States, agricultural practices were increasing; there were water cargo jetties, a cement 
factor, a fertilizer plant and a flour mill; people had access to health and education facilities; and 
vocational training for artisans had begun. Yet, despite these changes in infrastructure with the 
commercial export of oil, the British argued the social mores of the region remained stagnant. 
The British administration in the Gulf deployed the same language the British Raj had used to 
describe an unchanging India to describe the Gulf. According to this discourse, the Gulf was 
ostensibly in the grip of unchanging religious practice and traditions frozen in time. One British 
administrator wrote, “The gaunt stronghold of medieval Islamic thought and tradition still cast its 
gloomy shadows over every aspect of social life.” Often classified as “Puritanical Wahhabism,” 
this understanding of religion was felt to be most prevalent in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, whereas 
the Trucial States were felt to have “stirrings” of liberal ideas. Another administrator suggested 
that the withdrawal of the British army from the Gulf might facilitate some minor form of 
Islamic reform, whereas others felt that the British withdrawal would lead to a greater 
entrenchment of this “puritanical” form of Islam. 437 
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These colonial fictions are central to how the history of the Gulf was written and the 
power relations inherent in this writing. One of the strengths of the interdisciplinary work in 
anthropology and history is the examination of the power of historical narratives and how certain 
fictions become fixed as “real.” Stephan Palmié points out that the writing of history is an 
exercise in power. Western modernity, in particular,  
Ultimately rests on a fortiori logic that unfolded – and continues to unfold 
– not on the basis of any transhistorical first principles, but through the 
global realities of power that it both reflects and reproduces into its own 
narrative structures or dispelling them into the realm of the irrelevant, 
mistaken, unreal, or fictitious.438  
 
One way anthropologists and historians have grappled with dominant narrative structures is 
found in the work of David William Cohen. Cohen and E. S. Atieno Odhiambo examine “the 
interstitial, intermediate, indeterminate, and unfinished frames of knowledge” that arise in an 
event.439 In doing so, they lay bare the ethics and politics of knowledge production. Importantly, 
those in power, including colonial authorities, worked and reworked certain tropes and the effect 
was a limiting of the possibilities for engaging with current and historic events.440 This 
reworking of knowledge concerning the Gulf was applied in administrative activities and oil 
company management. 
 
Drawing Borders and Oil Concessions 
 Further lending weight to the colonial fictions developed by the British administration 
was the resistance British oil companies met when they tried to search for oil. Oil companies had 
difficulty exploring and then accessing oil in the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf, and the colonial 
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administration believed that distrust by local sheikhs and people created barriers for oil 
exploration. For example, British officials observed that people living in the area viewed many 
“modern” items, such as cars, with distrust. As late as 1938, the British administration claimed, 
“Some people thought cars were animals and drank water from troughs, while [another tribe] 
believed that we had some ‘medicine’ which, if poured on to the hills, would turn them into 
silver.” The “ignorance” of the people was compounded by the “ignorance” of the sheikhs; many 
of whom the British felt did not even understand Arabic properly. The result was that the sheiks 
were “obstructive in spirit” during oil exploration. Imposing what the British perceived as 
arbitrary demands, the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast put restrictions on where oil exploration 
parties could visit and the length of time groups could stay in areas. One sheikh also asked that 
the exploration parties not use “motors” when looking for oil.441 This last point was particularly 
difficult for the surveyors, who were not willing to travel by camel and thus greatly hampered by 
the request.   
According to British colonial administers, there were five key problems in oil 
exploration. First, British administrators argued that the sheikhs disliked large-scale commercial 
penetration and were reluctant to pay off prominent local people in order to maintain control. 
Second, there was anti-Christian fanaticism. Third, Abu Dhabi was hostile to both Muscat and 
the oil company. Fourth, there were jealousies among various factions and there was fear that the 
company would enrich one group but not another. Finally, there was “mental defeatism. The 
incapacity to understand that the activities of the oil company, and the feelings that ‘no’ is the 
easiest and safest answer.”442 The colonial description of problems presented a simplistic view of 
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Gulf societies that reinforced oft-repeated colonial fictions regarding the region. These narrative 
tropes included trying to explain the Gulf through the social structure of tribes, understanding 
Islam to be a monolithic category that was in opposition to Christianity, and describing the rulers 
as petty and childlike. Furthermore, Gulf rulers were seen as lacking a progressive vision of the 
future and, thus, unable to see the benefits of the British development of the oil industry. 
The larger role of these fictions in obfuscating the relationship between the British 
administration and oil companies emerges in the following examination of the establishment of 
states’ boundaries in the Gulf. In 1938, the British administration asserted that it was “impossible 
to define boundaries between tribes. In fact, there are none.”443 The lack of clear boundaries 
meant that the British felt they had to try to draw the boundaries prior to offering oil concessions. 
Resolving boundary issues and increased oil exploration became even more important for the 
British administration after the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was nationalized by Iran 
1951. This nationalization led to the boycotting of Iranian Oil and the closure of the refinery at 
Abadan. This nationalization was also driven by worker action, including collective action by 
Indian laborers. One of the results was increased British attention on the Arabic-speaking Gulf as 
a source of oil and as a site for new refineries. 
The drawing of boundaries in the Arabic-speaking Gulf helped cement sheikhly authority 
over certain areas. The British administration also hoped that drawing boundaries would ensure 
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the sheikhs’ compliance with the policies of the British government and the oil companies. 
Disputes over boundaries caused costly delays for oil companies and, in years where some oil 
companies had record profits, other oil companies suffered due to holdups on the agreements for 
oil concession boundaries.444 Disputes over boundaries were a recurring problem for the oil 
industry. For example, in 1968, the American oil company Continental, after drilling five 
wildcats – drilling in sites previously unexplored for oil and gas –  and spending close to USD 
$15 million, found no oil in Qatar. As a result the company decided to relinquish its concession 
in Qatar. Upon hearing the news, the British Resident of Bahrain reported that the Deputy Ruler 
of Qatar was “gleeful.”445 This was because the Deputy Ruler believed that the British had been 
unwilling to “see a decision reached on the Qatari/Abu Dhabi sea-bed boundary, because it 
would give Continental a valuable area at sea, which at present belongs to BP [British 
Petroleum], thereby increasing American oil interests and reducing those of Britain.”  
What I want to emphasize here is the interconnected nature of the British administration 
in the Gulf and oil companies. The Deputy Ruler of Qatar’s response to Continental’s 
relinquishment of the concession sheds lights on the close ties of politics and industry. Because 
Continental was an American oil company and BP a British one, the Deputy Ruler believed the 
British were reluctant to settle the boundary line and that this impacted the drawing of state 
boundaries in the Gulf. The British Political Agent resisted this explanation and told the Deputy 
Ruler that the British “were more interested in seeing a just and reasonable settlement at sea 
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between the two countries than anything else, and that our financial interests were of secondary 
importance.” But the Deputy Ruler did not believe the Political Agent and told the Agent that he 
would:  
[Reply] to Continental immediately, accepting their relinquishment and 
asking them to retire from the scene as soon as possible. He would then 
have a concession on his hands, which he intended to offer to BP – at any 
rate all that area in dispute with Abu Dhabi. BP would then be able to 
develop the Dunduq field and Qatar would get her rights, which she so 
badly needed. 
 
The Deputy Ruler believed this would spur the British to settle the dispute in Qatar’s favor. 
The agent reported his response: 
I reminded the Deputy Ruler that the concession area could not be altered, 
until a satisfactory agreement had been reached with Abu Dhabi over the 
median-line. And we went over all the familiar argument of low-water 
mainland only, etc., etc., once again.446  
 
Despite the British protests regarding their disinterest in material gains from the dispute, after the 
Deputy Ruler of Qatar gave the oil concession to BP, the boundary dispute was settled in favor 
of Qatar, and therefore British Petroleum, by the Agreement of 1969.447 The history of BP and 
the companies’ connection to the British government may have influenced this agreement. 
Previously named the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the company changed its name to BP 
in 1954, following the nationalization of AIOC in Iran. Until 1979, the British government had 
controlling interest in this company.448 Boundary debates in the region also erupted into 
violence. For example, the state that is today known as Oman experienced three wars from the 
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1950s to the 1970s, all concerning the drawing of boundaries and oil concessions.449 As the state 
boundaries of the Gulf were drawn, oil concessions and operating oil wells brought previously 
large amounts of capital to the rulers of the region. 
 
Conclusion: Merchants, Oil Companies, and Shifting Politics 
Within the context of increasing wealth from oil and the exploration of boundaries, 
khalījī merchants were potentially politically disruptive to the political system as it was 
attempting to settle. Long involved in a world trade economy, for example, Bahrain had been 
situated at the crossroads of the Portuguese, Ottoman, and Saffavid Empires from the 1300s to 
the 1800s. Its merchants participated in the spice trade, pearl trade, and other trade along the Silk 
Road.450 Merchants were also influential political players. In the 1960s, sheikhdoms such as 
Qatar and Abu Dhabi saw changes in leadership as citizens sought rulers who would redistribute 
oil rents in ways that would help in the development of the states. Influential families, often 
including merchants, oil companies, and the British administration in the region, were central to 
the monarchs’ ability to rule, maintain peace within the state, enforce borders, and police the 
workforce.  
 While merchants were attempting to exert greater control over the market and participate 
in anticolonial activities, oil companies restructured the government of the Gulf States and 
contributed to changes in the political landscape. Oil companies are often the invisible 
participants in the restructuring of governments in the wake of oil discovery. The sponsorship 
system certainly allowed greater internal stability in the region as merchants were able to access 
                                                
449 Mandana Limbert, In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town, (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
450 Juan Cole, “Rival Empires of Trade and Imami Shiism in Eastern Arabia, 1300-1800,” International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 2 (May 1987): 177–203. 
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a larger percentage of oil rents. However, this system also worked to support British colonial and 
oil companies’ interests in ensuring productivity through control of the workforce. This control 
was all the more important as the British faced competition from the Americans in the region. An 
example of this is the previously discussed conflict between British Petroleum (a British 
company, formerly known as AIOC) and Continental (an American company). The result was 
that competition between oil companies also influenced the drawing of state boundaries. 
But the role of oil companies in governance was not limited to the drawing of state 
boundaries. As the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf developed as a site of oil exploration, the 
relationship between the British and the Gulf shifted. It was assumed by the British 
administration that the decision of the British to depart in 1971, conveyed to Gulf rulers in 1968, 
came as a surprise to the latter. As the departure of the British from the region drew near, some 
British administrators in the Gulf attempted to forecast the future relationship between the Gulf 
and Britain. Oil was important to the British economy. With the Americans in Saudi Arabia, 
many British administrators saw the benefits of maintaining a relationship, but cautioned that the 
relationship would be difficult to maintain without England offering the Gulf countries help. 
Many urged the government to do so, as the importance of the Gulf was not limited to its 
production of oil; with income from oil rents, the Gulf also represented an important market for 
British goods. Using newfound oil wealth, merchants imported large amounts of British 
goods.451 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, British market share in the Arabian Peninsula 
fluctuated between twenty-five percent and thirty-five percent.452 
                                                
451 Confidential dispatch No. 1/41 from Sir S. Crawford, Political Resident, Bahrain. One particularly 
important type of goods was military weapons. For example, in 1968, British exports to Qatar were 
estimated to be £7.1 million and in 1969 they were £5.5 million, excluding defense contracts. Defense 
contracts were lucrative for the British government and, in 1969, £19.5 million in British contracts – 
namely in power and gas and armed supplied – were signed. The connection between oil wealth and 
weapons purchases continues today. In 2013, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a contract in 
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The British administration assumed that the failure or success of the postcolonial Gulf 
States would impact the British, but that this fate was largely out of British hands. Still, there was 
disagreement in the British administration regarding the best path for the new Gulf States. Some 
felt the success of the Gulf States would be dependent upon their moving towards a new, 
representative form of government, with educated Gulf Arabs taking roles in government 
management. From the British perspective, the problem with moving towards a more 
representative form of government was that the families of the Gulf rulers were drawing 
considerable allowances from oil revenues and thus ruling families were loath to accept the need 
for shifting governmental forms.  
Not all British officials agreed on the need for a more representative government, 
however; indeed, some British officials argued that a sheikhly government would be most 
amicable to British interests post-1971.453 Maintaining a good environment for British economic 
interests was uncertain given the rising number of foreigners in the region and the growing 
number of foreigners staffing the government. For example, in Qatar, the bulk of the ministries 
and departments of government were staffed by expatriates from other countries of the Arab 
world, with Palestinians being the most prevalent nationality in the government. These Arab 
expatriates were seen as destabilizing to the nations and a source of subversion of the Gulf 
governments.454 Tied up with the question of government staffing and expatriates were oil 
projects. In order to manage these competing pressures and maintain stability, the British helped 
                                                                                                                                                       
which the US would sell Saudi Arabia $60 billion in advanced aircrafts and weapons. See: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/13/us-saudi-arabia-arms-deal 
452 Confidential Review of Events in Qatar in 1979, British Library [FCO8/1472], RQ (3): 570.  
453 Confidential Dispatch No. 1/41, Mr. E. F. Henderson, Political Agency, Doha, 13 July 1969, First 
Impressions of Doha, British Library [FCO8/1146]. Confidential Dispatch No. NBQ1/2 from Mr. D. J. 
McCarthy, Arabian Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, regarding the first impressions of 
the Political Agent, Qatar, 5 August 1969, British Library [FCO8/1146]. 
454 Confidential Dispatch No. 1/41, Mr. R. Boyles confidential summary and valedictory dispatch No.1/1 
from Doha, 7 April 1969, British Library [FCO8/1146]. 
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set up a system that limited foreigners to precarious roles as workers with limited rights; 
employed mainly nationals in government positions; and constricted the ability of foreigners to 
own companies and property.  
By encouraging Gulf governments to hire citizens for positions in government and hiring 
more foreign employees for oil projects, oil companies were better able to control their 
workforce. Furthermore, by encouraging the development of the kafala system, the companies 
increased workers’ dependency and disenfranchisement in terms of their ability to mobilize for 
better worker conditions. In addition, the British administration sought to keep the Gulf States 
stable by ensuring the rest of the population was content. This included making sure that 
merchants, who had much political sway, were happy and that the rulers made concessions to 
merchants in order to legitimate and secure their authority within the territory.455    
Oil companies and the British administration thus worked together to reinforce a vision 
of the Gulf that worked in their best interests. Through military force, contracts, and the setting 
of geographic boundaries, the Gulf was shaped in an image of tradition largely invented by the 
British. This shaping included acquiescing to merchant demands to enforce their market share. In 
this way, colonial fictions and oil company practices converged to shape the new economies and 
social relations that emerged. These historic moments helped to shape current practices. Locals, 
foreigners, governmental policies, and oil companies developed a system during the twentieth 
century that is still in play today.  
My goal in this chapter has been to show that, rather than see the Gulf as an isolated 
region characterized by timeless traditions, we need to evaluate how “modern” economic 
practices are made to appear traditional through powerful narratives about the region and a 
complex set of historical relationships. Oil exploration and the development of the oil industry in 
                                                
455 al-Sayegh, “Merchants’ Role in a Changing Society: the Case of Dubai, 1900–90.” 
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the Gulf illustrate the meeting of the global oil economy and local politics – a picture that is even 
more complicated when foreigners and merchants are included. The histories of migration and 
colonialism must be coupled with an examination of oil company policies in order to understand 












Of Mangoes and Men:  
Circulation in the Arabian Sea 
 
While doing fieldwork in Mumbai, India, I spent a few days most weeks at Mancom 
Recruiting Agency’s offices.456 Located in an office park, the staff of this large agency occupied 
offices throughout two buildings. Mango trees surrounded the buildings, providing shade and a 
respite from the surrounding noise and crowd of Mumbai’s northern suburb. The junior 
employees of the office and I often spent our lunchtime trying to pick mangoes without the 
building’s guards noticing and chasing us off. We ate the mangoes when they were green, or 
unripe, with salt and enjoyed their tart flavor. Later, after the mangoes had ripened, we enjoyed 
the sweet fruit as a dessert after our lunch.  
Not far from Mancom’s offices was the recruiting agency of Mr. Hussain, a recruiting 
agent I had been introduced to at a meeting between recruiting agents and the Indian 
government’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). Mr. Hussain was a young man who 
had studied in London and spent half of his year in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the 
other half in Mumbai. Articulate, outgoing, and engaging, when I met Mr. Hussain, he 
immediately invited me to visit his office. At Mr. Hussain’s office, there were no mango trees; it 
was located on the third floor of an anonymous office building in Mumbai. Much smaller than 
Mancom, Mr. Hussain’s company needed only a few rooms to hold its entire staff. While small, 
                                                
456 The names of companies and individuals, with the exception of politicians acting in their official 
capacity, have been changed throughout this dissertation. 
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this office had a long-standing connection with the Gulf, and Mr. Hussain’s work as a recruiting 
agent followed in the footsteps of his father and grandfather. When describing his family history 
to me, Mr. Hussain made a slippage between mangoes and migrants that illustrated to me how 
the conceptual and material apparatuses that used to facilitate trade are now used to structure 
labor migration to the Gulf.  
Mr. Hussain’s family began shipping goods to the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf in the 
late British colonial period. His grandfather was a customs agent in Mumbai and he went on hajj 
in the early 1940s. While he was in Mecca, Mr. Hussain’s grandfather stayed at a guesthouse 
where he met people from Oman. During their conversations, a family from Oman asked him if 
he could supply “textiles, construction material, steel pipes, carpets, mangoes, basically 
everything,” and Mr. Hussain’s grandfather agreed. This meeting proved to be the beginning of a 
lucrative trading company that focused on exporting materials and fruit from India to the Trucial 
States (later the UAE) and Oman. Mr. Hussain’s father continued this business and spent his 
time moving between India and the Gulf. In the late 1970s, the family “started exporting people,” 
but still focused on exporting goods, especially mangoes. However, in the 1990s, the family 
found that exporting goods had become less lucrative and they began to “export more and more” 
workers to the Gulf. When I met Mr. Hussain, his company focused primarily on recruiting 
hospitality workers for projects in Oman and the UAE. Due to the recruiting practices of the 
company, many of the hospitality workers the company sent were from districts near the family’s 
ancestral home in Gujarat.   
How is one to understand this commodification of workers? The move from mangoes to 
migrants may be too easily understood or interpreted as a sign of a villainous recruiting agent. 
Recruiting agents, like Mr. Hussain, are usually discussed in literature on migration as predatory 
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figures.457 My neighbors and acquaintances in India were surprised that I would spend time with 
such undesirable people. A common way of referring to recruiting agents was as “racketeers” 
who were “sending unskilled workers abroad for a life of misery.”458 How can one understand 
the commodification of migrants not to be a sign of recruiting agents’ morally questionable 
activity? In this chapter, I argue that both the history of recruiting agents and the contemporary 
process of migration rely upon the commodification of workers and the restructuring of export 
processes to accommodate not only mangoes but also men. I show that recruiting agents’ desire 
for profits, the Indian government’s rhetoric of protection, and workers’ aspirations all legitimate 
this restructuring and create a network in which all three actors’ histories and actions become 
entangled. In these entangled histories of circulation in the Arabian Sea, different understandings 
of historic migration in the Indian Ocean, locality, and the role of government emerge. 
Circulation in the Arabian Sea depends on actors’ diverse social associations and their multiple 
paths as they regulate, facilitate, or experience migration. The associations of migrants, 
government bureaucrats, and recruiting agents are not identical and the different routes migrants 
travel illustrate how migration is constantly being negotiated and reshaped.  
In this chapter, I examine multiple, overlapping networks in order to understand relations 
between the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf and India and, in particular, labor migration from 
India to the Gulf States. I explore how government bureaucrats, through attempts to regulate the 
                                                
457 For example, Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar argue corruption arises in the migration process from a 
“nexus formed between erring government officials and recruiting agents. In addition, Shah finds that 
workers who migrate without recruiting agents earn higher salaries and state they are happier in their jobs 
in the Gulf. S Irudaya Rajan, V J Varghese, and M S Jayakumar, “Looking Beyond the Emigration Act 
1983: Revisiting the Recruitment Practices in India,” in Governance and Labour Migration, (Routledge 
India, 2010), pp. 251-252; Nasra Shah, "Relative Success of Male Workers in the Host Country, Kuwait: 
Does the Channel of Migration Matter?" International Migration Review 34, no.  1 (Spring 2000): 59-78. 
458 Chandrani Banerjee, “The Clay Pigeons,” Outlook India, September 21, 2010. 
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boundaries of the state and format citizens,459 shape circulations in the Gulf that are deeply 
imbricated with their understandings of history and their relationship with business. At tension 
with these government policies are trade relationships and the circuits recruiting agents use to 
move goods. I look at how recruiting agents and government officials meet and attempt to 
standardize and regulate the process through which migrants move. Difficulties arise due to the 
differing social associations of the participants and the diverse understandings of the history and 
contemporary role of migration held by the actors. These differences are overcome through the 
use of business language and, in particular, the idea of “brand.” By agreeing on “brand” as a 
central element of Indian migration, recruiting agents and bureaucrats are able to work together 
to design and implement bureaucratic apparatuses, including the steps migrants are supposed to 
follow before migrating. I argue that juxtaposing the social associations of government 
bureaucrats and recruiting agents not only shows how Indian labor migration to the Gulf 
reshapes existing practices to allow for migration, but also lends insight to the commodification 
of workers and their treatment as products of trade. Finally, I explore the social associations of 
migrants in order to understand the limits of the bureaucratic apparatuses and the multiplicity of 
ways migration may be shaped. I do this by examining how the networks laborers use to migrate 
impact the conceptual and material apparatuses of migration.  
 
Recruiting Agents and Indian Migration 
At independence, the Government of India adopted the British colonial laws that oversaw 
migration. In the implementation of these laws, the government also reinforced the roles of 
                                                
459 The idea of “formatting” presented here comes from the work of Andrew Shyrock. Formatting refers 
to the idea of how “identity” and “community” are “self-consciously displayed” and the disciplinary work 
done to maintain this display. Andrew Shryock, “In the Double Remoteness of Detroit: Reflections on 
Ethnography, Culture Work, and the Intimate Disciplines of Americanization,” in Off Stage/on Display, 
ed. Andrew Shryock, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 309. 
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recruiting agents. Recruiting agents were central to staffing oil projects during the British 
colonial era and they continue to be central to labor migration from India to the Gulf.460 
Recruiting agencies are businesses registered with the Indian government that work as 
intermediaries between prospective migrant workers and companies that wish to hire them. From 
the 1830s to the 1920s, recruiting agents facilitated the emigration of Indians as indentured 
laborers throughout the British colonial empire. These agents were often British businessmen 
based in port cities who worked with Indian subagents based in the interior of India. The 
recruiters were overseen by “protectors” who were responsible to the British colonial authorities 
for the welfare of migrants. Protectors ensured migrants were not coerced, but were healthy and 
treated fairly in their destination country.461 This structure of migration continues today, but the 
social associations of recruiters and government bureaucrats have changed.  
The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was created in 2004 in order to provide services 
to Indians abroad and to supervise the Protector of Emigrants (POE) offices. Prior to 2004, the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of External Affairs had overseen emigration. In a 
conversation with Dr. Didar Singh, the Secretary of the MOIA from December 2009 until 
November 2011, he stressed that the Indian government does not wish to interfere with migration 
and “only wants to protect the most vulnerable of workers.” With the goal of protecting these 
workers, the MOIA regulates both emigration and recruiting agent activities. In order for men 
and women who are considered vulnerable to migrate legally, they must go through a local 
Protector of Emigrants office. The policy is that, at the POE offices, the officers are to check the 
documents of the migrants who have “Emigration Check Required” (ECR) in their passports. 
The offices ensure that the worker has a valid job offer with a company that is not blacklisted by 
                                                
460 See, for example: Thomas’s letters, NAI, External Affairs, ME, 1946. 10-(91)-ME/46. 
461 Thomas R Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2008), pp. 136-137, 144. 
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the government. The stated purpose behind this form of checking is to reduce the instances of 
workers stuck at “abandoned camps,” ensure that workers are being paid a fair wage, and avoid 
sending workers to companies that have abused workers in the past. When unskilled or semi-
skilled workers migrate legally, it is the job of the recruiting agent to ensure that the government 
guidelines are followed and that the jobs they are going to meet the government’s standards. 
Recruiting agents play a central role in the migration of Indians to work in the oilfields of 
the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf, and, as such, serve as organizers of labor circulation. In 
general, it is difficult for an unskilled or semi-skilled Indian with ECR stamped in his passport to 
legally migrate to the Gulf States without working through a recruiting agency, especially the 
first time he goes abroad. How these agencies recruit migrants and the areas from which they 
recruit impacts the flow of migration to the Gulf. In 2008, the average daily number of migrants 
receiving permission from the Indian government to migrate was 3,430 people. Of these people, 
recruiting agents facilitated 3,275 clearances, or over ninety-five percent of the necessary 
clearances.462 This predominance of recruiting agent clearances reflects the central role most 
recruiting agents play in the migration of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers. The way in which 
workers come into contact with agents varies, but these agents help migrants negotiate the 
governmental policies that restrict the movement of unskilled or semi-skilled workers to the Gulf 
and provide links between multinational companies and Indian labor.  
Recruiting agents are necessary actors in overseas labor migration because very few 
companies are able to recruit directly in India.463 Often, recruiting agents work through local sub-
agents or agents that are not registered with the government. Subagents are usually local men 
                                                
462 S Irudaya Rajan, V J Varghese, and M S Jayakumar, “Looking Beyond the Emigration Act 1983: 
Revisiting the Recruitment Practices in India,” p. 280. 
463 In order to recruit in India, companies must complete large amounts of paperwork and negotiate 
multiple government offices. This amount of paperwork and the uneven application of policies at 
different offices is enough to discourage almost all companies from attempting to do so. 
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who have some experience working in the Gulf. They are unregulated and charge fees to 
prospective migrants to help find them work in the Gulf. Many subagents have connections with 
agents who are registered with the government and these subagents act as middlemen between 
recruiting agents and workers. Registered agents, usually referred to simply as recruiting agents 
or RAs, have legal standing that allows them to take “orders” from companies for available jobs, 
advertise these jobs, hold interviews with prospective workers, facilitate the paperwork needed 
for migration, and send the worker to the Gulf. Recruiting agents often described to me their 
work as “catching” a man and then “exporting” him.  
The language of “exporting” people is reinforced through the historic trade connections 
between the Gulf and India. For recruiting agents like Mr. Hussain, migration in the Arabian Sea 
has long been based on trade and the movement of goods. In the colonial and early national 
periods, traders often worked as recruiting agents. Some of these traders worked independently 
of oil companies by bringing Indians to the Gulf whom they then hired out to the oil 
companies.464 At other times, Indian traders were contracted through oil company management 
to hire workers through their offices in Bombay.465 In their dealings with oil companies, Indian 
traders have played a key role in the recruitment of workers for the oilfields since the industry’s 
inception in the Gulf. 
 
Circulating Mangoes and Men 
From the late colonial period to the present moment, as traders moved through the 
Arabian Sea, they were moving goods, including mangoes. An examination of the history of the 
                                                
464 I J Seccombe and R I Lawless, “Foreign Worker Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil 
Companies: 1910-50,” International Migration Review 20, no. 3 (August 1986): 560. 
465 Annual Report on the Working of the Indian Emigration Act VII of 1922 and the Rules Issued 
Thereunder During the Year Ending 31st December, 1952, of the Ports of Bombay, Porandar, Bedi 
Bunder and Port Okha. NAI, MEA, Emigration, 1952. File No. F.20-8/52-EMI.  
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mango and the mechanisms for its export provide insights regarding the ease with which 
recruiting agents today are able to redeploy the apparatuses used to export mangoes to export 
people. The mango is the national fruit of India, and its history is detailed on the Government of 
India’s website. Thought to have originated in Burma or Assam, India, the mango has since 
spread to the rest of the world. According to popular stories, the Mughal emperor Akbar planted 
the first large orchard in India in the sixteenth century. This orchard was located in Darbhango, 
Bihar, and was called Lakhi Bagh because Akbar planted one lakh, or one hundred thousand, 
mango trees there.466 From the very beginning, the mango’s movement was caught up with that 
of men and broader webs of meaning. Buddhist missionaries spread the mango throughout 
Southeast Asia, and Portuguese Christian missionaries introduced the mango to the Americas, 
via Brazil. Like Mr. Hussain’s grandfather, who began his work as a trader through connections 
made on hajj, religion, goods, and people are often entangled as they circulate on currents that 
move through the Indian Ocean.  
The value of world trade in mangoes today is second only to that of pineapples. India 
produces over fifty percent of the world’s mangoes and is highly reliant on this trade for local 
employment. In 2001, the four highest producing Indian states for mangoes were Andhra 
Pradesh (AP, now Telangana and Seemandhra), Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Bihar. The crop 
accounts for thirty-nine percent of India’s area of fruit crops. In 2007, agriculture, forestry, 
logging, and fishing accounted for just over sixteen percent of India’s GDP and employed sixty 
percent of the population. Excess labor, especially in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, 
allowed for the high percentage of worker input into this export crop. The states that are the most 
agriculture heavy also send the most laborers to the Gulf. One reason for this is because 
                                                
466 One place this story is found is on the Government of India’s website on India’s national fruit, the 




migration of one or more sons is often a strategy used by farming families to support the family 
and maintain their small plots of farmland. 
The impoverishment and underemployment of India’s farmers and their connection with 
the export of mangoes are not the only features that tie the movement of mangoes and workers. 
There are also strikingly similar procedures to the processes of exporting mangoes and people 
from India. Indian mangoes are harvested at a pre-mature stage to capture the early market and 
are then ripened by dipping them into ethrel, a plant growth regulator. Ripe fruits can be stored 
for four to ten days; picking pre-mature fruits and holding off the ripening process extends this 
period. Next, mangoes are packed into wooden, bamboo, or cardboard boxes and sent by rail or 
truck to large ports where they are shipped by sea. In 2010, the largest importers of Indian 
mangoes, outside of South Asia, were the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The value of trade with the UAE alone consists of over one-third 
of the complete value of Indian mango export. These countries – with the exception of the 
United Kingdom, where the data is not available – are also the largest recipients of Indian 
unskilled and semi-skilled laborers. In 2010, ninety-five percent of unskilled and semi-skilled 
Indian labor migrants, for whom data is collected, traveled to the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).467 
Mr. Shah, a recruiting agent based in Mumbai, explained to me the ideal way that an 
agent recruits. Here, I outline his steps with additional insights I gleaned from watching this 
process at multiple companies. First, a recruiting agent receives an order from a client detailing 
the “requirements,” or number of workers and desired skill sets. After the agent receives these 
requirements, he gets from the company the following documents: power of attorney, the letter 
of demand, the specific contracts, visa copies (or a block visa for Saudi Arabia), and a contract 
                                                
467 Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Annual Report 2012-13, (Government of India, 2013), p. 53. 
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regarding placement fees. This paperwork provides the agent with the authority to recruit 
workers for the company. After the paperwork is in place, an agent mobilizes possible recruits. 
This may be done through working with a database maintained by the company or advertising in 
local papers; for skilled or professional positions, online websites like monsterindia.com may be 
used. The agent then screens CVs and makes a shortlist of possible workers who match the 
company’s requirements. At large offices like Mancom, pre-interviews are conducted in order to 
screen candidates. Once the candidates have been screened, the agent draws up an interview 
schedule. If there are many possible candidates in Mumbai, then interviews may be held there. 
This is not always the case, however, and sometimes it is necessary to travel to other parts of 
India in order to recruit workers. Most often, the company will send a representative to be 
present at the interviews. On occasion, however, the recruiting agent will conduct interviews for 
the client. Once workers have been hired, all workers, including skilled and professional 
workers, need to have their degrees and certificates verified, go through medical screening, and 
obtain a visa. After this, passports are put forward for visa endorsement with the country to 
which the migrant is traveling. Some countries, like Kuwait, require that round trip airline tickets 
be included. Once the visa has been endorsed, those migrants with ECR in their passport must 
receive clearance from the local POE office.  
The process of exporting mangoes requires much of the same paperwork as that needed 
to “export” people. Indian emigration has unique features that are largely due to the restrictive 
nature of the emigration process for “vulnerable” Indians. In order for a mango to be exported 
from India, the following documents are required. First, the order for the goods must be present, 
including the invoice, packing list, and certificate of origin. For migrants requiring an emigration 
check (i.e., ECR passport holders), before a recruiter can even begin recruiting, they must get 
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approval from the POE to recruit workers for each position and the company must also be 
approved. This is similar to a mango’s invoice. Then, the workers who are selected must provide 
a “No Objection Certificate,” which is given by the police in their natal village, and may be 
considered similar to a mango’s certificate of origin. Next, in order for mangoes to ship, shipping 
bills and bills of handling are necessary and, for payment, letters of credit and bills of exchange. 
Likewise, in order for workers to travel, they must have valid contracts with payment that is 
deemed acceptable by the Indian government, as well as plane tickets.468 Worker quality is also 
checked through medical examinations and through skill tests administered by recruiting agents. 
This quality control is similar to the photosanitary certificate, GLOBAL GAP certificate, and 
health certificate required of mangoes.469  
The similar documentary requirements and screening processes for migrants and 
mangoes formats both as commodities, regulating their movement in analogous ways. In 
addition, emigration processes often deploy the same structures used to move goods, reinforcing 
the strong sense of commensurability of the two seemingly disparate objects. The importance of 
quality control is repeatedly stressed to farmers and exporters by the Indian government, which 
seeks to increase export numbers and maintain the positive image of Indian mangoes around the 
world. In many government pamphlets for farmers, it is stressed that good-looking, high quality 
mangoes must be sent abroad. This concern for quality control is also apparent in the MOIA’s 
attempts to protect “India’s brand image” through regulating the migration of vulnerable 
workers. Like fruit, laborers must meet certain conditions to go abroad. Similar language 
commodifies migrants and imagines them circulating, like mangos, as both exported objects and 
                                                
468 The minimum pay required by the Indian government is much less than almost every other country 
that sends laborers to work in the Gulf. Recruiting agents in India often attribute this to the lack of 
strength of the Indian Government when it comes to the Gulf. 
469 For a complete list of documents needed in order to ship mangoes, see: 
http://agriexchange.apeda.gov.in/Market%20Profile/one/MANGO.aspx. Last accessed January 1, 2012. 
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symbolic representatives of the nation. This language of quality or brand allows recruiting agents 
and government officials to overcome differing understandings of locality, history, and the role 
of the government, and shape together the apparatuses that oversee and structure the process of 
migration.  
 
The Process of Migration 
Migration is complicated and time-consuming. As a result, at many recruiting agencies, 
registered recruiting agents did not personally handle the recruiting of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. Registered recruiting agents tended to be more skilled, more educated, and have more 
financial resources than their employees or subagents. It is difficult to become a registered 
recruiting agent and, in order to register with the Government of India, agents have to fill out 
lengthy paperwork and deposit twenty lakh rupees (over $31,000 USD in 2015) with the Indian 
government. These policies encouraged family legacies, like Mr. Hussain’s company. Other 
agents came to the business through government ties. For example, Mr. Shah had been in the 
recruiting agency business since 1975. Before this time, he had worked as a secretary for a Gulf 
consulate in Mumbai. He made many contacts with Gulf-based companies during that time. He 
told me, “It came natural to deal with Middle East countries and I got the idea that I should be an 
exporter [of goods] and manpower.” For Mr. Shah, government employment provided an entry 
into business in the Arabian Sea.  
The contacts, personality, and status of recruiting agents often influenced the number of 
workers each company sent abroad and, therefore, the size of the staff at each office. For 
example, at Mr. Shah’s and Mr. Hussain’s smaller recruiting agencies, they each developed 
relationships with companies in the Gulf and handled the recruiting of skilled workers. At 
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Mancom, a larger agency, the actual recruiting agent or business owner was not involved in the 
recruiting process at all. Instead, the owner worked to develop relationships with oil companies 
in the Gulf.  
At Mancom, two senior workers, both women, handled the recruitment of skilled workers 
and professionals. At Mr. Shah’s office, his daughter was being groomed to take over the 
business, as Mr. Shah was ready to retire. Mr. Shah’s daughter was unique as she was the only 
woman I met who was going to be a registered recruiting agent. However, in the upper 
management of recruiting agencies, women were often present, but not in the same large 
numbers as their male colleagues. As at Mancom, women in all the offices I visited worked 
exclusively with skilled or professional workers or as secretaries. Recruiting agents explained to 
me that subagents and unskilled or semi-skilled laborers were inappropriate for women to work 
with because they were “rough” or “uneducated” and, in the case of unskilled or semi-skilled 
laborers, often lower class and lower caste. 
For the recruitment of unskilled workers at Mancom, one manager oversaw three junior 
employees who handled the bulk of the unskilled recruitment. Employees at recruiting agencies 
and, in particular, the office workers who specialized in recruiting unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers, often had special relationships with subagents. These subagents were not employed 
within a recruiting agency. Instead, one subagent would have a group of men from his home state 
that he took to different recruiting agents for jobs. He usually helped the applicants to create 
résumés and prepare for interviews. Employees at recruiting agencies typically had a few 
subagents with whom they preferred to work, and at interviews they would put the workers from 
these subagents first for interviews. These relationships were very important, as interviews were 
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often overcrowded and so overbooked that most applicants were not able to meet with the 
employer for an interview.  
Subagents’ charge to workers for these services ranged anywhere from INR 20,000 to 
INR 100,000; workers told me that the average amount they paid was INR 70,000, or about 
$1,880 USD in 2009 and 2010. The amount charged by subagents was much higher than the 
amount charged by registered recruiting agents. According to the Emigration Act of 1983, 
registered recruiting agents may only charge forty-five days of the laborer’s wages and this 
amount could not exceed INR 20,000. If a worker was brought to an RA by a subagent, usually 
the subagent paid the RA’s fees from the money the subagent collected from the worker. In the 
many cases I observed, this practice enabled subagents to charge in excess of this legal limit, 
while simultaneously absolving the recruiting agent from charging illegal fees. In addition, some 
employees of recruiting agents at times took gifts from subagents in order to put their workers 
first through interviews or “push” the employer to hire certain workers.  
The gifts given by subagents to employees of recruiting agencies were objects of much 
speculation and gossip in the recruiting agencies I visited. At most recruiting agencies, 
employees told me that they did take gifts, and they assumed that their colleagues did as well. 
When gifts were given or taken, workers concealed their actions from colleagues, for fear of 
being found out and fired. Yet, the frequency of gift giving and its illicit nature was such that 
workers often accused one another or even their bosses of taking gifts. The gifts often took the 
form of money, but could also be jewelry, mobile phones, or other electronics. One junior office 
worker, Ram, was particularly concerned because he heard from his friends that his boss was 
going with him on his next set of job interviews and Ram suspected this was because his boss 
thought he was taking gifts from subagents. Taking “bribes” from prospective employees was 
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expressly forbidden by the owner of Mancom. Mancom’s owner told his staff, “applicants are 
willing to pay money to get a job,” but he repeatedly warned that taking such money was 
grounds for termination. He further elaborated to his employees that, in the past, workers at 
Mancom had “accepted bribes to ensure jobs, make documents, vouch for candidate to client and 
Mancom has terminated on such grounds.”  Despite these warnings, the staff at Mancom still 
speculated regularly about other staff taking “bribes.” Ram, for example, pointed to his 
manager’s nice car and house and expressed disbelief that either would be affordable without the 
gifts given by subagents. Furthermore, such gift-giving was practiced not only by subagents, but 
also by returned migrants, who often brought gifts to recruiting agency employees. These gifts 
usually took the form of watches, cologne, and alcohol. In return for the gifts, workers hoped 
recruiting agency employees would assist with finding new positions in the Gulf. 
Some workers arrived at recruiting agencies without a subagent. If hired, these workers 
were able to save quite a bit of money in terms of the fees normally paid to agents and/or 
subagents. Some workers sought to develop a relationship with an employee at a recruiting 
agency in order to have the employees help them at job interviews—for example, by giving gifts, 
as noted above. For their part, some multinational oil companies would not hire workers who 
came with a subagent and only worked through registered recruiting agents. These companies 
specifically asked the registered recruiting agents with whom they worked not to work with 
subagents. In enforcing this preference, some companies were even known to have stopped 
working with an agency once it was discovered that they were working with subagents. This 
policy by some oil companies led to either workers arriving on their own or subagents being 
more furtive in their role. However, only a small number of companies adopted such a policy; 
not coincidentally, the ones that did were also the companies that had higher standards in their 
 
 200 
employment criteria. For veteran workers in the Gulf who could meet these criteria, they were 
able to get these better jobs and, by avoiding subagents, paid less money to do so.  
Recruiting agents thus mediated between migrants and companies, and between migrants 
and the government. Their connections with the Gulf were based on historic and contemporary 
trade relations. These connections and the current process of migration led to the refashioning of 
the apparatuses used to move mangoes to move men instead. Though located in India, recruiting 
agents had relationships that spanned not only India, but also the Indian Ocean and, in particular, 
the trade that traversed the Arabian Sea. In the next section, I explore how these relationships 
reconciled themselves with representatives of the Indian nation-state. 
 
The Government and Labor Migration 
During my research, tensions arose between government officials and recruiting agents 
concerning the former’s role in promoting and overseeing migration. Many of these tensions 
were rooted in the differing perspectives on the histories of migration held by RAs and 
bureaucrats. Both government officials and businessmen understood a long history of connection 
between India and the Gulf. However, each of these groups offered a different narrative of that 
history, its dynamics, and its geographic scope. Their narratives reflected the multiple 
relationships each actor relied upon to shape their role in the migration process. Despite these 
differences, government officials and recruiting agents did work together to create the 
bureaucratic apparatuses that structured migration. These apparatuses were built on historic trade 
policies and procedures, and, in the contemporary moment, were also informed by the differing 
business models held by recruiting agents and the government.  
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The oversight of migration, through Indian POE offices, passports, and visas, is one way 
in which the government attempts to regulate the ethnic, spatial, and temporal borders of India. 
These border-controlling techniques are reinforced by narratives that imagine strong national 
boundaries and homogenous populations. However, migration and trade move through national 
boundaries and have the potential to disrupt the boundedness of nations.470 Migration and trade 
influence the negotiation and restructuring of boundaries and histories of circulation between the 
Gulf States and India. 
One way to understand this negotiation of boundaries is to investigate how histories of 
trade and state histories of connection meet, overlap, and differ. In recruiting agents’ accounts, 
such as Mr. Hussain’s story, the history of these circulations began prior to the independence of 
India and the nation does not figure as an actor per se, but rather as a bureaucratic space through 
which goods and workers pass. The workers in the narrative are portrayed not as laborers, 
remitters, or citizens, but as items that can be exported like mangoes. In addition, according to 
RAs, migrants’ primary role is to circulate through and reinforce networks informed by 
commerce, religious ties, and regional identities. National boundaries and ideas of locality are 
imagined differently in these narratives, in ways that challenge the supposed boundedness and 
primacy of nation-states. As boundaries are disrupted, they are replaced by associations and 
relationships. These networked associations shape how participants together rework apparatuses 
to facilitate the migration of workers. 
 
 
                                                
470 Werbner notes that transnational movements, such as migration, trade, and religious connections, 
disrupt “neat notions of boundedness.” 5Pnina Werbner, “Global Pathways: Working Class 
Cosmopolitans and the Creation of Transnational Ethnic Worlds,” Social Anthropology 7, no. 1 (February 
1, 1999), pp. 33-34. 
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A Bureaucratic History of Emigration 
From the perspective of the Indian government, the historic and contemporary migration 
of workers has been one continuous practice. For the government bureaucrats with whom I 
spoke, this understanding of migration’s long history was encouraged by the endurance of 
institutions from the colonial period to the present. At a meeting between representatives of 
recruiting agents and of the MOIA, Dr. Singh, the Secretary of the MOIA at the time, explained 
to recruiting agents how he understood the historical role of agents and the governmental 
oversight of emigration: 
The POE is the oldest industry in India, except the spice trade. Since the 
slave trade was banned in 1824, the British set up the system of Protector 
General of Emigrants and there were registered agents based in the 
presidencies. They offered employment abroad. This was called 
indentured labor, but it is the same as today and it is a replacement to the 
slave trade. The experience you [recruiting agents] have no one else has 
and we expect this industry to be number one. 
 
At this meeting and in subsequent discussions I had with Dr. Singh, he indicated that he saw a 
continuation from slavery to indentured labor during the colonial period to contemporary “free” 
labor migration. Dr. Singh’s narrative exemplified the Indian government’s perspective and thus 
warrants further unpacking here.  
The narrative relies upon certain assumptions regarding India and the nation-state’s 
history. In this narrative, India is an historic space, predating independence, with boundaries that 
have existed through multiple political eras. The international labor migration of Indian workers 
is understood as having passed through three stages, representing different phases of economic 
development and mapping onto different geographic areas. The first stage Dr. Singh discussed 
was slavery. Slavery was one of the ways Indians moved throughout the Indian Ocean prior to 
the British Slavery Abolition Act of 1833. This form of emigration is largely conceptualized by 
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the Indian government as part of the pre-colonial period of India. For example, Indians first 
began arriving in South Africa in 1653 when the Dutch sold Indians into slavery there. Gyan 
Prakash discusses the history of labor and slavery in India during the early colonial period. He 
finds that the British used their understanding of India’s hierarchical social system to argue that 
slavery had existed in India prior to British rule and was, in fact, sanctioned by Islam and 
Hinduism. After the abolishment of slavery in England in 1807, the British then used this 
understanding of slavery in India in order to legitimate colonial rule. Through colonialism, the 
British argued that they were helping Indians break free of such practices.471 With the banning of 
slavery, Dr. Singh’s second stage of Indian emigration, indentured labor, began. Indians traveled 
to such places as Mauritius, where over seventy percent of the population fits into the category of 
“Person of Indian Origin” (PIO – an official category of the Indian government for passport and 
visa purposes).472 From the 1830s onward, India was one of the largest sources of indentured 
labor in the world.473 
  For Dr. Singh, the narratives of Indian slavery, indentured labor, and contemporary 
migration mapped onto political structures and geographic places. Slavery was a pre-British 
colonial phenomena and indentured labor was related to the British presence in India. These 
                                                
471 Gyan Prakash, Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). This idea of breaking free of practices repeats a story of development and 
modernization that was often used to legitimate colonial rule. Other examples of practices (real or 
imagined) that were used to legitimate colonialism include sati, child marriage, and health initiatives. See, 
for example David Arnold, “Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague,” in Selected 
Subaltern Studies, ed. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (New York, 1988); Uma 
Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, Nationalism, and a Script for the 
Past,” in Recasting Women, ed. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1999), 27–87. 
472 The case of Mauritius is interesting for two reasons. First, most indentured laborers were from 
Bhojpur, Bihar. Second, most of the indentured laborers who left India returned later. Ministry of 
External Affairs, Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, (Government of India, 
December 2001).  
473 Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 75. 
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labor circulations followed the contours of the colonial world, but were mostly contained within 
the Indian Ocean. In contrast, labor migration in the contemporary, national period is global in 
scope. According to Dr. Singh, “The contours of globalization will be determined by migration.” 
Migration must be managed because migration is global and migrants are representatives of 
India. What remains constant throughout these three periods is the idea of “India” and her 
inhabitants as culturally homogenous and clearly defined by strong national borders, even as 
Indian migrant traverse those boundaries.  
According to Dr. Singh, it is the right of citizens in the national era to decide whether to 
migrate or not, without interference from the government. However, this is not always true for 
workers that the government classifies as “vulnerable.” “Vulnerable” migrants, according to the 
Indian government, are those men who have not matriculated and wish to work in the oilfields of 
the Arabic-speaking Gulf; women face even 
greater restrictions and, if they have not 
matriculated and are under the age of thirty, 
they have difficulty traveling to the Gulf. 
Annually, almost one million “vulnerable” 
men travel from India to the Gulf for work. 
The category of “vulnerable” used to be 
formalized by a stamp received in passports  
that read “Emigration Check Required” 
[Image 2: ECR Stamp, 2010]. Today, “Emigration Check Required” is printed at the top of the 
biographic section of the passport [Image 3: ECR Stamp, 2015]. As these “Emigration Check 
Required” (ECR) or “vulnerable” workers attempt to travel to the countries for which this check 
Image 2: ECR Stamp 2010 
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is required, airport passport control officials 
check to ensure that approval has been given 
by a Protector of Emigrants (POE) office.474 
Historically, those who did not require an 
emigration check were given a stamp of 
“ECNR” or “Emigration Check Not 
Required,” but today the policy is to leave 
this blank for ECNR, making ECR the 
marked category.  
Government regulation of migration and national borders is effected through the issuing 
of passports, visas, and documents related to travel. With the independence of India and Pakistan 
in 1947, the fluidity of the boundaries between India and the Gulf were partially restricted. One 
sign of this was the administration of visas to persons wishing to visit India. After India’s 
independence, visas continued to be administered by British Agents in the Gulf. In the 1960s, the 
Indian government attempted to shift control of the visa administration in the Gulf from local 
British Political Agents to the Indian Consulate General in Muscat, Oman. From 1960 to 1961, 
the government reformulated policies regarding the distribution of visas a number of times. 
There were concerns that British administrators in the Gulf were providing visas to India to 
persons who had been blacklisted from India for smuggling; while, at the same time, the Indian 
administration did not want to share its list of blacklisted persons with the British administration 
because some British citizens appeared on the list. As the Indian government attempted to shift 
                                                
474 From 2008 to 2012, male migrants who had not matriculated and who traveling to the following 
countries required emigration clearance: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
From 2003-2010, the Indian government had a ban on travel to Iraq. This ban was lifted in 2010, and 
from 2010-2012, travel to Iraq required emigration clearance. 
Image 3: ECR Stamp, 2015 
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the administration of visas, merchant communities in the Gulf pressured the British 
administration, Gulf rulers, and the Indian government to reverse this policy. Once visa 
responsibilities were shifted to the Indian Consulate in Muscat, visa applicants faced delays in 
receiving their visas. The British Resident in Qatar wrote to the Indian Consul General,  
The Ruler’s last words to me before entering the plane to take him to 
Dubai was on the subject of visas for Indian [sic] which is still very much 
on the forefront of his mind. He is evidently under considerable pressure 
from members of the merchant community to try to effect some change in 
the present arrangement.475 
 
This pressure by the Qatari merchant community points to the importance of India for their 
business dealings.  
Complaints against the new visa granting policies were that they were slow and 
inconsistent. While the goal of shifting the visa system was to regulate smuggling and avoid 
giving visas to known smugglers, it was largely ineffective in achieving this goal. No sooner had 
the shift been made than the blacklisted smuggler, the “Arab Ibrahim” – the original impetus for 
the changed system – was granted another visa from the Indian Consulate in Muscat.476 
Boundaries were being transgressed in unwanted ways, but, in order to maintain good relations 
with the Gulf States, the Indian government attempted to demonstrate its willingness to modify 
its visa policies. In letters, the British Political Agent in Doha warned that delays in the granting 
of visas could have adverse effects on the “substantial” community of Indian traders in Qatar. 
This was especially the case as the Qatari ruler believed that Qatari visas for India were being 
purposefully “held up” by the ruler of Muscat.477 In response to the Political Agent’s concerns, 
                                                
475 Letter to the Consulate General of India, Muscat, from the British Political Agent in Doha. December 
10, 1960. NAI, MEA, 1960. A. File no. c.1317/60. 
476 Letter to the Maharashtra Government from the Ministry of External Affairs. March 16, 1961.NAI, 
MEA, 1961. File no. SUB-11-A.  
477 Letter to the Consulate General of India, Muscat, from the British Political Agent in Doha. November 
19, 1960. NAI, MEA, 1960. A. File no. c.1317/60. 
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the Consulate General of India repeatedly downplayed these complaints, and the Consul wrote 
dismissively that he “had no doubt” that the Indians living in Qatar “could look after 
themselves.”478  
In contrast to the Consulate’s response, the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi 
took these complaints seriously. The Ministry reworked the system so that visas did not have to 
be sent to Oman. Instead, the British Political Agents in the Gulf were once again given the 
power to grant Indian visas, with the caveat that they should check the names with the Indian 
Consulate. The reasoning behind this was that because oil had been discovered in Qatar, the 
country was “likely to become of increasing importance to India as an export market.”479 This 
importance of the Gulf as an export market and the Indian government’s attempts to be involved 
in trade are also apparent in the Indian establishment of trade missions. In 1949, Indian officials 
traveled to Kuwait and Bahrain to speak with Indian laborers there and to examine their labor 
contracts.480 In 1961, India made arrangements to open an Indian Trade Mission in Kuwait.481  
In these historic moments, the Indian government conditionally supported Indian traders 
in the Gulf and encouraged emigration while simultaneously delineating the boundaries of the 
nation. These moments of interaction helped shaped the complex relations between trade and the 
nation. Both historically and today, agents, traders, and government officials try to reconcile 
                                                
478 Letter to British Political Agent in Doha from Consulate General of India, Muscat. January 7, 1961. 
NAI, MEA, 1961. File No. N60-25/MST/61. 
479 Comment by R. Azel Khan on Confidential Memo, 18 March, 1961. NAI, MEA, WANAR Division, 
1961.  
480 Report of the Goodwill Mission to the Persian Gulf. NAI, MEA, Emi, 1948. 
481 Lok Sabha starred Question no. 6058. NAI, MEA, WANA, 1961. F. 38-13(8) WANA/61. Other areas 
in which the Indian Government attempted to influence trade within the Persian Gulf and slow smuggling 
are apparent in the actions taken to control the flow of money out of India. Despite the unpopularity of the 
policy with merchants, it was required for importers to receive their payments for merchandise through 
banking channels – often British banks located in Muscat. This, along with insisting that export and 
import are separately financed, allowed for regulation of exchange control. Request from Mr. N. P. 
Torprani to Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1955. NAI, MEA, WANA, 1955. F 8(11)-WANA/55. 
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differing perspectives to facilitate and shape circulation in the Arabian Sea. Today, recruiting 
agents continue to petition the government to help facilitate their role in labor migration to the 
Gulf. 
 
A Meeting between  
The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs and Recruiting Agents 
In February of 2010, the two largest associations of recruiting agents in India met with 
the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in Mumbai, India. The meeting took place in 
Mumbai because of the large number of recruiting agents in the city. Of the 591 active registered 
recruiting agents in India in 2005, three hundred were based in Mumbai.482 One agent told me 
this was because “Bombay is a place where people from all parts of India will end up.” Mumbai 
is a dense geographic transfer point; migrants from the rest of the country travel there in search 
of work, while laborers already going to and returning from the Gulf circulate through the city. 
Mumbai is also a central node in terms of sending workers overseas; it is close to the Persian 
Gulf and an ideal place for recruiting agents to open their offices. The centrality of the city is 
further reinforced by its long history as a port city in the Indian Ocean and a hub for trade. In the 
first half of the twentieth century, Bombay was a home base for Indian traders and a destination 
for Arab merchants not only to conduct commerce, but also to meet and discuss events occurring 
throughout the Arab world.483 
I was invited to the meeting between the recruiting agent associations and the MOIA by 
the presidents of the two associations. Given the relatively insular world of recruiting agents, I 
had met many of the members of both associations. While some recruiting agents belonged to 
                                                
482 Rajan, Varghese, and Jayakumar, “Looking Beyond the Emigration Act 1983,” p. 278. 
483 Fatma al-Sayegh, “Merchants’ Role in a Changing Society: the Case of Dubai, 1900–90,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 34, no. 1 (January 1998), p. 92. 
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only one association, the membership of the associations overlapped considerably. Recruiting 
agents often told me that the two associations treated their members quite differently, but to my 
eyes, at least at this meeting, the associations’ views and initiatives seemed quite similar. Their 
positions were so similar, in fact, that watching the presentations by the associations’ respective 
presidents was like watching the same PowerPoint presentation twice.  
Both associations delivered presentations that encouraged the Ministry to implement 
more programs to train Indians, and discouraged the government from implementing further 
oversight of recruiting agents. The initiatives presented at the meeting continued to push for 
changes that these associations had been advocating for over the last decade. Worried that Indian 
workers would not be competitive with workers of other nationalities, the associations hoped that 
the government would adjust policies to be friendlier towards their business. In the meeting, 
policies and approaches to migration were articulated, debated, and translated by both the 
associations and government officials. As I observed these discussions, it became increasingly 
clear that business and government enactments of policies were based on differing conceptions 
of history, geographic frames, and economics. 
 The recruiting agents present argued that the Government of India should be attentive to 
their needs and learn from their hands-on experience. In the presentation by one association, they 
urged Dr. Singh, the then Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, to change the 
current emigration policies based on the experiences of recruiting agents. One slide read: 
The [Recruiting Agent] Council has been able to create awareness to the 
Government of India (MOIA) towards flaws inherent in the 
implementation of provisions of Emigration Act 1983 by giving 
suggestions to amend act and rules towards this object. In this course the 
Council representatives have been interacting with the Government 
authorities viz-a-viz the honourable Minister, the Secretary and other 
senior Government officials. For example, Emigration Rules 1983 have 
been amended and notified on 9th July 2009, incorporating the suggestions 
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given by the Council. However, there are many other suggestions that 
have not yet been accepted by the Government but those are most 
necessary to be done [sic].  
 
The achievements mentioned by the Council in the above quote include the government allowing 
recruiting agents to charge migrants more money for emigration; changes in the processing of 
paperwork by the Ministry; and allowing the transfer of recruiting agent registration.  
 The changes that the recruiting agents hoped to enact fell into three general categories. 
The first involved improving the skills of potential migrants; recruiting agents wanted the 
government to open more trade schools and to teach English to potential migrants. The second 
change was reduced oversight of recruiting agents and a lessening of punishment for agents’ 
procedural lapses. In addition, agents wanted the security deposit they had to pay reduced from 
twenty lakhs rupees to ten lakhs rupees, and they wanted to get rid of the requirement that agents 
needed to have a high school degree. Thirdly, recruiting agents hoped the government would 
make it easier for agents to attract foreign companies and not have those companies go to 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, or the Philippines instead. In order to make Indian laborers more 
attractive and thus create more business for recruiting agents, the RAs hoped that the MOIA 
would stop implementing a minimum wage for Indian employees abroad, change visa policies, 
and simplify the emigration process.  
The RAs presented these suggestions in a didactic manner; they wished to inform and 
instruct the government of the “realities” of emigration rules and how the government could best 
fix “flaws” in the emigration of Indians. The presentations emphasized that the government 
ought to limit its restrictions on the migration of workers and instead focus on giving workers 
skills that would make them competitive for a greater number of jobs. Underlying these 
objectives were contradictory impulses. On the one hand, RAs were arguing that the government 
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ought to be hands-off with business; but, on the other hand, agents were simultaneously asking 
for a larger government role in the education of laborers. Underlying this seemingly 
contradictory argument was a self-understanding by which the recruiting agents recognized 
themselves as rational economic actors requiring only laissez-faire regulation, but conceptualized 
potential labor migrants as not properly rational and thus needing increased government 
intervention and oversight. 
The government’s position did not map neatly onto the recruiting agents’ position. Dr. 
Singh, explained that he saw the government’s role as fostering a business environment while 
only protecting the bare minimum of rights for workers. Dr. Singh said that the Indian 
government oversees migration in order to protect workers from agents that would charge too 
much money to facilitate the workers’ migration, and from companies that would not treat the 
workers fairly. Possible problems with companies included not paying agreed wages, forcing 
workers to work too many hours, or otherwise abusing workers. The orientations and 
motivations of the two parties thus differed: whereas recruiting agents sought to improve the 
skills of workers (thereby promoting the agents’ own business interests), the government saw 
itself as needing to protect workers from both recruiting agents and oil companies.  
 
India’s Brand Abroad 
While the impulses of business and the government did not overlap completely, the 
government and RAs agreed that Indian migrants shaped India’s brand image abroad. This 
concept of “brand” allowed for coordination of meanings, mediation, and translation that helped 
overcome the threat of incommensurability between the government’s and agents’ 
understandings of migration, its history, and their roles within it. Following in the footsteps of 
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Annemarie Mol, who examines how outcomes in medical diagnosis and treatment are 
coordinated, I look here at how recruiting agents and the Indian government draw together 
diverse sets of practices and bureaucratic apparatuses in order to bring together a “coherence-in-
tension.”484 It is this coherence, in turn, that makes possible the coordination and circulation of 
huge numbers of papers, emigrants, and bureaucrats within and through the system connecting 
India and the Gulf. And, as I have noted above, this circuit looks strikingly similar to that used to 
move mangoes and other goods. 
The new Indian nation implemented laws and policies similar to colonial ones that 
required all people who wished to migrate to receive clearance from the government. Over time, 
these laws have become more relaxed, so that now only those persons whom the Indian 
Government considers “most vulnerable” must receive clearance before emigrating for work. 
Vulnerable workers are men who are traveling to seventeen specific countries, including all of 
the Gulf countries, and who have less than tenth class education. As a result of being classified 
as “vulnerable,” these men must receive clearance prior to migrating. Women who are under 
thirty years of age and are unskilled are not able to migrate for work, and women over the age of 
thirty and who are unskilled are classified as vulnerable workers and must receive clearance prior 
to migrating. One official described these changing policies as follows: “We have liberalized the 
migration regime because we wanted only people who are really vulnerable, less educated, and 
unable to take care of themselves [to have to receive clearance]. Those who are reasonably 
educated can take care of themselves, so why restrict?”  
When I spoke with officials from the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, they explained 
the need to control migration by pointing to the need to protect vulnerable workers. In part, 
                                                




officials argued, the government has to ensure that workers are traveling to legitimate jobs in the 
Gulf States, with employers that have not abandoned workers previously. This was not the only 
reasons officials cited however. They also told me that such policies work to protect India’s 
image abroad and stressed that India must maintain its “brand image” internationally. It would 
not look good, they explained, if the wrong types of Indians traveled abroad: “We do not want 
people to think we are a nation of beggars.” Poor Indians must be assured of jobs prior to 
emigrating so they would not end up begging on the streets, thereby reflecting negatively upon 
India. According to these officials, migrants to the Gulf are the most likely to end up beggars, as 
there is no strong oversight of companies and large numbers of uneducated Indians from rural 
areas migrate, only to find themselves stranded, uncared for, or unemployed. In contrast, 
government officials described the ideal Indian abroad as the Indian who migrates to America 
and is “rich, skilled, and educated.” 
The MOIA’s interest in the “brand image” of India meant that government officials used 
the language of business and marketing to inform migration policies and practices. This same 
concern with brand was reflected by small business owners and recruiting agents. One agent 
reflected on the close connection between the brand of India and his company: “When people 
show up [for interviews], they come so scrubby, but I want them to look professional and the 
minute the client sees them, I want him to want those guys. Brand. It’s all about creating a brand 
as the best.” Another recruiting agent told me, “People are saying India is being degraded by 
sending illegal workers and therefore losing its [India’s] reputation.” For these agents, the 




Consequently, RAs argued that they were not the ones in need of greater regulation. 
Rather, they felt the government must focus on improving the skills of migrants. One recruiting 
agent told me the government should “create a school to train [school] dropouts in their 
understanding of cleanliness, language, and how to be office boys…. We need to groom them in 
working in the corporate sector. Grooming in all aspects and we want to give skilled people 
instead of rough people.” Another agent also reflected on the connection between disciplining 
the mind and bodies of Indian workers. He told me the government should “teach morning 
exercises and yoga” in order to “teach discipline” to potential migrants. The underlying 
assumption was that workers were not disciplined and that only through the regimentation of 
(government imposed) routine would they become proper representatives of the Indian brand.  
What both recruiting agents and the government agree on is that the body of the worker is 
a representation of “India.” And here again the parallel trajectories and relations of mangoes and 
migrants become apparent. The government understands both mangoes and people as fiscally 
important to India: laborers’ become valuable remitters and mangoes help to level trade deficits. 
They are both lucrative sources of income: an exporter of mangoes may expect to double his/her 
money and an exporter of people, or licensed recruiting agent, charges up to INR 20,000 per 
person. However, poor quality mangoes and uneducated, ungroomed migrants threaten India’s 
image. Quality control and areas of exchange are immediate corollaries for both laborers and 
mangoes. 
In conversations with recruiting agents and government officials, migrants and mangoes 
alike were conceptualized as objects moving through markets. Like the mango, the migrant 
represents Indian businesses, the Indian nation, and Indian character. This shift between migrant 
and mango was made possible, in part, by the fact that both the government and RAs tended to 
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view potential Indian migrants as relatively passive, yet malleable objects – a view made 
possible by the socio-economic status of most migrants. For the government, migrants were in 
need of protection, therefore, regulating recruiting agents and companies was necessary to shift 
how Indians were viewed abroad. In contrast, recruiting agents wanted the government to take 
greater responsibility for training the poor to be better workers. Central to this notion of training 
was a disciplining of the body, which RAs argued would also serve to discipline the mind. 
Through “uplifting” and disciplining the worker, they reasoned, India and recruiting agents 
themselves would rise in international opinion. Agents also argued that such education and 
improvement would diffuse out to other potential migrants. One agent said, “If one guy goes to 
Saudi [Arabia] as a laborer, his neighbors will be inspired and go. But if one guy goes to the 
West then slowly others will get inspired to get trained so that they can go.” In this narrative, the 
government training of potential migrants allows for an expansion of the places a farmer’s son 
can travel. No longer confined to the Gulf, recruiting agents dreamt of a world where training 
would allow workers to go to the West for better jobs and higher salaries. 
 Recruiting agents and government officials were able to agree upon the threat of the 
migrant to India’s brand because of their socio-economic class. This understanding of the worker 
was also close to a neo-liberal understanding of how labor should be approached. Michel 
Foucault notes that migrant labor, from the neo-liberal perspective is “an investment, the migrant 
is the investor. He is an entrepreneur of himself who incurs expenses by investing to obtain some 
kind of improvement.”485 According to government officials and recruiting agents, this neo-
liberal migrant is embodied in the well-educated migrants who travel to the United States or 
Western Europe. These neo-liberal migrants are the India that ought to be seen abroad. In 
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contrast, the “vulnerable” laborers in the Gulf do not fit the neo-liberal model and do not seek 
education as a means of improving their possible income from migration. This irrationality and 
the “scrubby” worker threaten India’s image abroad.  
The policies of the government and the actions of recruiting agents are not immediately 
commensurate. Both groups have differing understandings of what the government’s role ought 
to be in the migration process. In the moments of interaction discussed in this chapter, the agents 
and the government push against each other, develop hierarchies, and also translate concepts so 
that processes can be developed. Brand became an agreed upon concern for both the government 
and the recruiting agent. Examining these factors, in conjunction with worker techniques to 
negotiate government and recruiting practices (as detailed in the following section), allows me to 
highlight and critically engage with the production of commensurabilities between migrants and 
commodities and the similarities in the process of circulation and management of migrants and 
mangoes. These similarities reveal how bureaucratic structures and business interests converge to 
attach an apparatus of power and a logic of movement to both mangoes and migrants.  
How does this affect the migration patterns of workers? What role do the social 
associations of laborers play in the production of a migrant system?  I use the poetics of migrants 
and mangoes as an entry point for my discussion of the production of labor and migration. 
Critical to this examination is how bureaucratic visions are enmeshed in other processes. 
Through this examination, we can see how bureaucratic practices, such as the Emigration Check 
for vulnerable workers become “enacted” in practice.486 In contrast to the government’s view of 
migration, which centers upon the Indian nation, or the recruiting agents’ view, which focuses on 
trade, migrants themselves have a networked understanding of migration that is rooted in their 
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localized understanding of the migration process. Potential migrants developed this sense of 
what is local as they forged relationships to help facilitate their migration. 
 
Workers’ Networks and the Process of Migration 
Examining the perspectives of recruiting agents and the government sheds light on some 
of the structures and expectations that laborers must negotiate as they move through the process 
of migration. When migrants told me about their experiences, they revealed practices rooted in 
differing senses of space and travel. For the migrant, the move was a deeply historical one that 
was constantly in flux as they interacted with various actors in the networks connecting the Gulf 
and India. These networks were not stable, but constantly recreated as the social associations of 
workers inform the production and management of labor.  
A few districts located near the city of Hyderabad, India, send large numbers of migrants 
to the Gulf. Many of these migrants are Muslims who travel to work in unskilled laborer 
positions. The covariance between religion and poverty is not unique to the districts around 
Hyderabad, and many Indian Muslims seek to travel to the Gulf in order to improve their 
economic standing. South Asian Muslims, in particular, migrate in disproportionately high 
numbers to the Gulf. Roughly thirteen percent of India’s population is Muslim. Yet, over forty 
percent of my interviews with Indians abroad were with Muslims, even though I made no 
selection for religion. At one construction site run by a Western European-based multi-national 
corporation in Abu Dhabi, UAE, for example, interviews I conducted revealed that over fifty 
percent of the workers from India were Muslim. My data correlates with other survey data; in a 
study conducted in 2001, it was found that approximately ninety percent of the people going to 
the Gulf from two districts in Bihar were Muslim. However, Muslims were only fifteen percent, 
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on average, of the population in rural areas of these districts and were nineteen percent and 
twenty-eight percent of the population in urban areas of the districts.487 
Indian Muslims face social and economic inequalities that influence their decision to 
migrate to the Gulf. In 2006, the Sachar Committee Report, known formally as the Prime 
Minister’s High Level Committee Report on the Social, Economic and Educational Status of the 
Muslim Community of India, found that Muslim populations are concentrated in areas with poor 
infrastructure and that Indian Muslims experience discrimination in the public sphere. The 
disadvantages faced by Muslims in India include lower literacy rates, unequal access to 
educational and governmental institutions, and problematic representation in the media.488 These 
disadvantages often converge with regional discrimination and economic disparities to heighten 
the inequalities that Muslims face. Due to these inequalities, Muslims often see migration to the 
Gulf as the best solution to address their economic and social inequalities.  
Syed Ali traces the connection between Islam, the Gulf, and migration in his discussion 
of migration from Andhra Pradesh to Dubai.489 Ali studies the connection between migration and 
social practice. He finds a “culture of migration” in Andhra Pradesh that creates an “atmosphere 
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that leads people to migrate.”490 Ali argues that migration is a “learned social behavior” and that 
this learned behavior, in conjunction with a celebration of migration in Hyderabad, influences 
people to migrate.491 This celebration of migration leads to a spread of the influence of migration 
throughout Hyderabadi society; additional people begin to migrate and institutions in society 
begin to change, even for those who do not migrate.  
Here, I extend Ali’s insights by examining the social aspect of migration and its impact, 
not on institutions, but on the process of migration itself. While visiting villages in Andhra 
Pradesh, I met with former, current, and aspiring migrants to the Gulf – including some who had 
migrated legally and some who had done so without formal documentation. Groups of young 
men told me they all wanted to travel to the Gulf. Indeed, the social aspect of migration was so 
strong that an activist who works for the welfare of migrant workers told me “people are crazy to 
go abroad. There is a competition in this.” One of these young men was Mohammed. 
Mohammed lived with his mother and paternal uncle’s family in Andhra Pradesh. He worked on 
the family farm, a small plot of land that did not produce enough to support his family. In order 
to help provide a greater income, Mohammed wanted to travel to the Gulf. In order to understand 
Mohammed’s migration, I trace his associations and attend to how he created and utilized 
networks. These relationships had a profound impact on his experience, often mediating the 
ways in which the bureaucratic apparatuses used to regulate migration were mobilized. 
Mohammed had traveled “irregularly” to the Gulf before. Irregular migration means 
migration that does not follow the proper processes and/or does not have valid documents. In 
Mohammed’s case, he had gone to Dubai on a visit visa that was only valid for two months. In 
                                                
490 W Kandel and D S Massey, “The Culture of Mexican Migration: a Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis,” Social Forces 80, no. 3 (2002): 981–1004; Ali, “‘Go West Young Man’: The Culture of 
Migration Among Muslims in Hyderabad, India,” p. 38. 
491 ibid., p. 39. 
 
 220 
order to get this visa he had paid one lakh rupees (INR 100,000 or $2,000 USD in 2009) to a man 
who had an office in a nearby town. In return for this money, this man was supposed to provide a 
work visa and get the necessary clearance from the government that would allow Mohammed to 
travel. The money Mohammed paid was a huge amount for him. To contextualize this amount, in 
India in 2003, the average monthly income of farmers was INR 2,115.492 Part of that amount 
went to the cost of getting the visit visa. Another portion of the fee Mohammed paid was given 
for government approval that would allow Mohammed to travel. One recruiting agency 
employee told me, “It costs INR 200 for the POE [Protector of Emigrants office] to process a 
legit visa and they charge INR 2,000 or more, usually INR 7,000, to process illegal ones.” Some 
POE offices, unfortunately, have a history of abusing power and applying the rules related to 
migration unevenly. This history is well publicized in Indian newspapers and the subject of much 
gossip by migrants and recruiting agencies. An investigation by the Indian Criminal Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) estimated that workers in POE offices illegally collect INR 64 crore, or over 
twelve million US dollars, every year.493 One result of the uneven application of power and the 
burdensome nature of document verification was that many workers chose to migrate 
“irregularly,” thereby bypassing official channels. The irregular path could be equally 
problematic, however, as lower level government officials helping to develop an alternative 
network for migration kept driving up the costs workers must pay. My point in this section is less 
about the structural violence caused by normal bureaucratic structures, but, rather, how the 
potential migrants learn to navigate and negotiate bureaucratic structures.494 
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In Mohammed’s case, when he received the visa, he was told it was a work visa and he 
assumed he would go to Dubai and immediately find work. He went to Dubai and stayed with 
friends from his village. Unfortunately for Mohammed, the city of Dubai was suffering from the 
2008 financial crisis and no one was hiring; in fact, most companies were sending workers home. 
In this climate, Mohammed was unable to find work or a more permanent living situation. After 
three months, he was arrested for overstaying his visa. Through some timely intervention by the 
Indian government, Mohammed only spent only a short period of time in jail and was then sent 
back to India. The man to whom Mohammed paid money for the visa was from a district near his 
home. While he did not know the man personally, Mohammed felt that the man’s nice office and 
the fact that the man said he was from a nearby village made him trustworthy. When Mohammed 
came back from Dubai and tried to find the man he had paid, he was told that the man had “run 
away in the night with crores of rupees.” I asked Mohammed if he would now go to Mumbai or 
Hyderabad in order to meet with a recruiting agent approved by the government and he told me 
“No. I only trust the ones I know.” For Mohammed, the people that he knows did not mean the 
people that he had already met; it meant people from near his home and with whom he could 
relate based on language, place of origin, religion, or the spatial proximity of daily lives. 
Mohammed had a deep engagement with what he considered local, and local connections were 
central to his attempts to migrate. 
When I met Mohammed, he was being harassed daily by the man from whom he 
borrowed the money to get the original visa. In order to repay this money, Mohammed was again 
trying to travel to the Gulf. However, repayment of the loan was not the only reason he wanted to 
return to the Gulf. When I asked Mohammed why he was attempting to go to the Gulf again, 
especially after going to jail, he told me, “My friends have gone. I also must go.” He wanted to 
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join his friends and he also felt pressure to earn money to increase his “chances” and support his 
family. In order to travel, he had borrowed more money, becoming increasingly caught up in a 
cycle of debt. As Mohammed tried to travel again to the Gulf, he told me he did not care if he 
had to travel irregularly, he only wanted to go. He hoped that once he was in the Gulf he would 
find work as a driver or a cook and begin to repay his rising debts. For Mohammed, the 
regulations of the government – such as procuring a visa or getting permission to travel – acted 
as restrictions to his movement and produced barriers that he needed to negotiate, but these 
restrictions did not curtail his aspirations or plans. In part this was because he knew many other 
workers who had migrated without formal documentation and without clearance from the Indian 
government. The key to his travel, he felt, was finding the right man to facilitate it. Ideally, he 
would like to have a work contract before traveling to the Gulf, but he was willing to take risks 
again in order travel. 
Another district in India from which many migrants travel is Siwan, Bihar. Wafadar, like 
Mohammed, was also the son of a farmer who hoped to work in the Gulf. I met Wafadar as he 
was interviewing at Mancom in Mumbai for work as an electrician (a semi-skilled position) in 
Oman at an oil project. Wafadar had worked in the Gulf before – in Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman – 
for a total of seven years. He was married and had two daughters and a son. Like Mohammed, 
Wafadar was a Muslim. His family had a small farm and his wife and children lived with his 
father. Also like Mohammed, Wafadar had borrowed large sums of money to pay agents in order 
to travel. Wafadar had returned to India four months before I met him from a one-year job he 
held in Bahrain. The last time he went to Bahrain, he paid an unregistered agent INR 70,000, or 
approximately $1,400 USD in 2009. Unlike Mohammed, however, Wafadar’s agent had taken 
him to a registered agent who found him work in an oil company. Wafadar was now using the 
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resources and money he made while working in the Gulf to find another job. He told me that he 
had returned home when his contract ended and then came to Mumbai after three months in 
order to look for work again in the Gulf. He planned to look for work until a company hired him. 
Then he would “rest in Bihar” until it was time to leave for that job. While he was in Bihar, he 
would get the requisite forms filled out, such as a “No Objection Certificate,” from the police in 
his village. The rest of the paperwork he trusted would be completed by a recruiting agency so 
that he could simply arrive, pick up his passport with visa and plane ticket, and travel.  
While Mohammed and his friends did not care if they travelled irregularly, other 
migrants, such as Wafadar, wished to travel legally. For workers like Wafadar, the legal process 
of migration was seen as involving less parīshānī, a term that could mean worry, stress, or 
harassment. Wafadar was able to rely on friends from his native village to host him in Mumbai 
while he looked for work. Additionally, Wafadar knew his brothers in Bihar would help support 
his wife and children until he began sending money from the Gulf again. These migrants’ 
differing networks led to differing negotiations with the state and differing processes of 
migration. These processes were highly dependent on local connections. Workers often began by 
meeting first with a local, unregistered recruiting agent, who would then introduce them to a 
recruiting agent registered with the Indian government. A man had brought Wafadar from his 
village to Mancom Recruiting Agency using contacts in Mumbai. According to the migrants with 
whom I spoke, there was wide variety in the quality of subagents. Some differences related to the 
experiences and ethics of the agent, but language and place of origin were also important factors 
for migrants.  
The first subagent with whom Wafadar worked was Goopal, who, like Wafadar, was also 
from Siwan, Bihar. Goopal had worked as a subagent for three years, before which he had 
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worked in Oman as a laborer for six years. Now, Goopal told me, he was using the knowledge, 
experience, and connections he gained while working in the Gulf to help others from his district 
to migrate. Goopal told me he had “sent three hundred to four hundred men” to the Gulf and “all 
[the men] are happy.” He stressed that this was because he “sends them transparently.” To 
Goopal, transparency meant that he told the workers about every stage of the recruiting process 
and helped them find real jobs. Nonetheless, Goopal’s activities as a subagent were illegal 
because he was not registered with the Indian government. This illegality caused problems and 
drove up the fees he charged migrants. Goopal told me, “There is trouble, lots of pressure from 
police and they ask ‘where is your license?’ and so I have to give them money and they go – 
usually rupees 5,000 to 10,000 is given. And I drink, eat with the [policeman] and he is happy.” 
In these encounters low-level government employees and subagents interact in ways similar to 
the interactions between subagents and employees of the POE offices. The encounters serve as 
key moments in the migration process, during which workers, subagents, and low-ranking 
government employees interpret, translate, and work around policies that were (and continue to 
be) negotiated by recruiting agents and higher-ranking government officials. 
After Goopal began helping Wafadar to find work, he introduced Wafadar to another 
subagent from Bihar named Jagdish. Jagdish had more experience than Goopal and had lived for 
thirteen years in the Gulf, working in offices in Muscat, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai. Jagdish had 
many subagents, such as Goopal, working for him to “collect” workers from Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh. These subagents would send potential migrants to Mumbai. Once in Mumbai, the 
potential migrants, such as Wafadar, would be directed to meet with Jagdish, who would then 
take them to the larger recruiting agencies where he had contacts. Jagdish explained to me, 
“Once I get the requirement [from a recruiting agent] I call the [sub]agents and they start 
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arranging people. I must follow-up with this everyday ten times.” Jagdish then takes the workers 
to interviews. Once a worker is hired, the worker returns home to wait. Jagdish also waits and 
“when I get the visas [from the recruiting agent], I send copies to local agents and local agents go 
to locals and tell the people to be ready and then inform them when they are coming to Mumbai. 
Then they come, collect papers, and fly to the Middle East.” Jagdish’s role is that of “collecting” 
groups of workers together for interviews; he thus works as an intermediary between subagents 
located in villages and recruiting agents.  
From the moment they decide to migrate to the moment they start work in the Gulf, 
migrants must develop and then effectively navigate a complex set of relationships – 
relationships that will often decide the success or failure of their efforts. Throughout the 
migration process, migrants encounter and engage with various bureaucratic apparatuses. Often 
migrants’ own understandings of the process are grounded in their home or natal village and 
shaped by local connections. Once away from their homes, however, migrants soon face 
different potential paths of migration, as well as various bureaucratic structures and processes – 
all of which employ and reinforce differing methods of scale-making. Through these processes 
of migration, Indians traveling to work in the oilfields helped give oil production in the Arabian 
Sea its specificity. 
 
Conclusion: Bureaucratic Apparatuses and Migration 
Growing mangoes can be so lucrative that farmers have referred to it as “growing gold on 
trees.”  High unemployment and reliance on agriculture means migration to the Gulf has become 
another way to procure gold, so to speak, one that develops and shapes kinship relations, and can 
improve one’s social standing. However, in this chapter I have tried to complicate an 
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understanding of migration that relies solely on economic factors. Discussing the migration of 
workers from India to the Gulf in financial or social terms is common in much of the 
literature.495 These discussions tend to focus on the migrants’ immediate community and the 
consequences of migration for the “sending” community. My analysis here differs in that I am 
attending to the circuits and structures through which migrants move. Attention to these actors 
and processes reveals which bureaucratic apparatuses attach themselves to workers, how, and 
with what consequences. Through an examination of the bureaucratic apparatuses, their 
historical depth, and the imbrication of processes and practices of migration, the production of 
labor for Gulf countries may be critiqued. Attention to how workers engage with these 
bureaucratic apparatuses then illuminates how workers’ own logic influences businesses and 
government practices. Migrants often work in the spaces between government and business 
policies, mining the moments of disjuncture for opportunities to elude or expedite formal 
channels. In these spaces, low-level workers and migrants both inform and negotiate the 
processes that are meant to structure their movement. 
The process of migration and circulation in the Arabian Sea is shaped by local social 
connections and hierarchies. As Wafadar’s and Mohammed’s experiences show, migration exists 
within overlapping networks of connections between South Asia and the Gulf. These 
connections inform how workers move. In addition, the deployment of structures used to move 
goods, such as mangoes, also shapes how workers move. The success or failure of a worker to 
migrate and how workers move are imbricated in a much larger network that includes oil 
companies, government, agents, migrants, and local communities. This chapter has considered 
how all of these actors interact with and inform the circulation of workers to the Gulf. In this 
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circulation, actors were motivated by differing understandings of history, locality, and the role of 
the government. These positions are constantly mediated and translated, with concepts such as 
brand and local. I traced the relationships between recruiters, bureaucrats, and workers and 
explore how the circuits that used to move mangoes now move migrants. This illustrates how the 
processes, connections, and negotiations give shape to the migration. In the next chapter, I look 













The Role of Expertise and Networks in Hiring Decisions 
 
 
 Thirty kilometers outside of Abu Dhabi, on the way to Tarif, where the worker strikes 
occurred in the 1960s, is the large industrial town of Mussafah [Map 5: Mussafah, UAE]. This 
industrial area is home to large amounts of infrastructure related to the oil industry. The forty-
kilometer-long, deep water port and the infrastructure available there – from workers’ living 
accommodations to roads – make the town a prime location for building large infrastructure 
projects related to the oil industry. People from all over the world work in Mussafah and what is 
built there is used by the oil industry in Abu Dhabi, the rest of the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf, 




Map 5: Mussafah, UAE 
 
 While conducting research in the United Arab Emirates, I went to Mussafah in order to 
conduct participant observation at a work site where multiple companies were working to build a 
dynamically-positioned, semi-submersible rig [Image 4: An Operational Semi-Submergible Rig]. 
This rig, when finished, would be sent to South America for deep-water oil extraction. This type 
of drilling rig is used for oil collection in places where the water is deeper than 520 meters, as 
fixed structures are untenable in water that deep. Four sets of thrusters are used to dynamically 
keep the rig in position as it drills for oil. This rig is the same type as the Deepwater Horizon, the 
faulty or poorly maintained equipment of which led to the spilling of five million barrels of oil in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. My first visit to the rig construction project was only a few months 





Image 4: Operational Semi-Submergible Rig496 
 
 I was invited to visit the construction of the oilrig by management at Connex, a privately-
owned energy services provider. A larger oil company had subcontracted out a portion of the rig 
construction to Connex. Over five thousand people worked on the construction of the rig, and 
approximately five hundred of these people worked for Connex. While speaking with Connex’s 
managers working at Mussafah, two topics came up repeatedly. The first was the importance of 
“delivering on their end of the contract,” or finishing their work on the rig, within the timeframe 
stipulated in the contract. Managers told me that a central part of finishing this work was 
ensuring that the quality of the work was high. With the debacle of the Deepwater Horizon spill 
very much in the front of everyone’s minds, the quality of the work at Mussafah took on new, 
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more pressing significance for management. The second recurring topic was safety, specifically 
that of the workers and equipment on the rig. Though the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that 
high quality work was finished safely and on time was theirs, managers saw and described 
workers as integral to this process.  
 On one of my first visits to Connex’s worksite, Alex, a project manager, was upset due to 
a “near accident” that had recently unfolded. Safety was very important, he explained, but not all 
of his employees understood this. He told me, “because of ignorance of safety rules, lack of 
knowledge, or miscommunication we had a near accident.” Alex was really upset about this near 
accident because he was worried about the safety of “his” men, and concerned that an accident 
would “ruin Connex’s clean safety record.” In order to ensure safe working conditions after this 
almost accident, he planned to have daily safety checks and begin sending memos to the worker 
supervisors who spent time on the rig overseeing the men. He told me he was going to “put 
pressure” on his staff, the same pressure he felt from his boss, so that there would be no safety 
violations.  
 Unfortunately, not all managers were as proactive as Alex and not all workers were as 
knowledgeable as the workers at Connex. Later that year, during one of my visits to Mussafah, a 
worker fell from the rig and died. Another subcontractor working on the rig had employed the 
man. When the worker fell, all work on the drilling rig immediately stopped and everyone waited 
for an investigation. I sat in the Connex trailer occupied by the project managers as reports 
trickled in. Staff came and told Alex that the man had been wearing his safety harness 
improperly. Another person later relayed that the man was employed by one of the companies 
that supplied laborers to projects on a daily contract basis. As gossip circulated through the 
various trailers management used as offices, the importance of both safety and knowledgeable 
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staff were reinforced repeatedly. Even though no one had met the man and he did not work for 
Connex, an air of sadness filled the office as the management reflected on the tragic and 
unnecessary loss of life.  
 This chapter considers how workers are hired and how their knowledge is evaluated. I 
focus in particular on the work of semi-skilled workers, such as pipefitters or electricians, and I 
consider their knowledge regarding their jobs and the relevant safety standards and practices. In 
order to supervise the construction of oil infrastructure, oil companies and their subsidiaries have 
developed managerial apparatuses. These apparatuses attempt to homogenize the work done to 
circulate oil so that it obtains a global form.  However, much like James Ferguson finds in the oil 
industry in Africa, attempts at standardization are often territorialized instead of creating 
homogenization.497 As seen in the first half of this dissertation, the managerial apparatuses of oil 
companies emerged in sites of conflict over working conditions, but were also informed by the 
materiality of oil, neoliberal philosophies regarding development and management of markets, 
and the economics of oil rents. These managerial apparatuses were also developed in conjunction 
with bureaucratic practices that were used to manage migration by states and companies. These 
practices and apparatuses are not fixed but rather, by their very nature, are continually in 
formation. A central site of engagement in which these materials and ideas come together is the 
area of safety standards. 
 I examine the managerial apparatuses developed by the oil industry in the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf in order to manage and evaluate workers. I argue these managerial 
apparatuses are key components in the spread of oil technologies and markets. Such apparatuses 
attempt to create a standardization of worker practices in order to allow for increased contracting 
                                                
497 James Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal 
Africa,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2008), p. 378. 
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and subcontracting by companies. In this chapter, I look not only at management techniques, but 
also at the ways in which workers and recruiting agents shape the processes of standardization 
and diversification. Furthermore, the development of managerial apparatuses is not limited to the 
companies and workers, but is also imbricated with the materials that shape the international oil 
economy. As discussed in the first half of this dissertation, the materiality of oil influences the 
political possibilities that emerge in sites of oil extraction. In this chapter, I look at how workers 
find jobs on oil projects and what tools are used to evaluate worker knowledge. In particular, I 
find that social networks are integral in hiring workers. I also find that in negotiating these 
networks and in spaces such as job interviews, managerial apparatuses and business techniques 
attempt to maximize regularization and standardization, even though these are often incomplete 
and uneven processes. 
 
Building an Oilrig 
 Building an offshore oilrig takes time—three to four years, specifically—and money—at 
least USD $600 million. The actual construction of an oilrig is contracted and subcontracted out 
to various companies that oversee different parts of the work. Connex specializes in electrical 
work and many of the Indian workers I met who worked for Connex pulled electrical wiring 
through the vast structure. In addition to electrical work, Connex also specializes in pipework 
and other workers I met at Connex worked as pipe fitters. Connex and the other companies 
working at the rig were working on a contract basis with one of the companies commonly 
referred to within the industry as “supermajors.” The supermajors are the six largest publicly 
traded companies that are not state-owned. While they trade globally under different names, they 
are commonly known as ExxonMobile, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and 
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Total S.A.498 The companies are the descendants of the “seven sisters:” Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
Standard Oil of New York, and Texaco. The seven sisters controlled the oil industry in the mid-
twentieth century and, in particular, controlled Middle Eastern oil production. Today, their 
descendants, the supermajors, control six percent of the world’s oil, in contrast to OPEC 
countries, which control 88% of the proven oil reserves. In addition to their substantial control of 
non-state owned oil, the supermajors are vertically integrated, controlling both upstream and 
downstream aspects of oil production. However, upstream segments, including exploration and 
crude development, are often their largest revenue generators. Service and supply, such as the 
building of refineries or drills, are usually contracted and, often, subcontracted out. 
 When hiring Indians for the building of the rig, Connex wanted to hire people who had 
experience working on oil construction projects. Managers valued previous experience in the 
Gulf more highly than certificates from previous jobs or technical school degrees. Given the 
need to quickly evaluate large numbers of job candidates, managers used candidates’ past 
experience as a metric to evaluate their future work potential. In order to find the necessary 
workers for their projects, managers traveled to India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. In India, 
Connex contracted with local recruiting agents. These local recruiting agents gathered large 
numbers of job candidates for interviews. After recruiting agents had arranged for interviews, a 
project manager and human resource staff from Connex traveled to the sites, interviewed and 
tested interviewees, and hired candidates. Once the company decided which workers to hire, 
recruiting agents and human resources worked together to provide the necessary documents 
workers needed to travel abroad. 
                                                
498 For a detailed discussion of the supermajors and the mergers that helped form them, see Daniel Yergin, 
The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World, (New York: Penguin Group, 2011). 
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 In Mumbai, India, I attended interviews held by Connex’s project manager, Alex, as he 
searched for workers to fill positions as pipefitters or electricians on the oilrig being built in 
Mussafah, UAE. Connex, the recruiting agent, and the Indian government considered the jobs of 
pipefitter and electrician to be semi-skilled labor. Unlike an electrician in the United States who 
might troubleshoot problems or design solutions, the type of electrician being hired by Connex 
would primarily pull wires through the skeletal rig. One recruiting agent who had worked in the 
North America before joining his father’s recruiting agency in India described the difference to 
me. He said, “Workers hear that electricians make $30 an hour in Canada and they want to go 
there, but the bar is set very high [in Canada]. An electrician in Canada is at a different level. The 
Middle East has no exam requirement.” The difference meant that most workers interviewing for 
positions as electricians had little or no high school and had learnt their trade informally, on the 
job, often in India.  
 In the Gulf, an electrician’s work was highly repetitive and similar to jobs performed on 
other construction sites in the Gulf. By hiring people with previous experience as electricians and 
pipefitters, Connex, and companies like Connex, were able to avoid on-the-job training or the 
expensive hassle of firing workers and hiring new ones. For the construction of the oilrig, 
previous experience also meant that the job could be completed more quickly. Time was of the 
essence for Connex’s supervisors. Their bonuses depended on finishing their portion of the 
project on time, but Connex was behind because the subcontractor in charge of welding was 
behind on their portion. In order to meet the demand, by the time I visited them in the UAE, 
workers were working overtime seven days a week. The workers’ past experience and job skills 




Expertise in the Oil Industry 
 In Timothy Mitchell's discussion of the oil industry, he describes how the materiality of 
oil frames its extraction and processing. He argues that, unlike coal, oil production locates 
expertise in the hands of managers and engineers: “Large firms depend on an extensive body of 
technical, political and economic expertise to support the discovery of new deposits.”499 
Crucially, oil requires expertise to make it useable. “Compared with coal companies, oil 
companies developed much larger and more extended networks for the production of expertise, 
which became increasingly involved in making of the wider world a place where its products 
could thrive.”500 This understanding relies on the analysis of expertise that Mitchell developed in 
his previous work, Rule of Experts. There, he shows how experts delineate and define their areas 
of knowledge, and he points to the constitutive and violent nature of this knowledge production. 
He also demonstrates that nonhuman actors are not simply passive elements in the construction 
of an object over which expertise is developed.501 Other scholars examine expertise in the oil 
industry in similar ways. Andrew Barry, for example, focuses on expertise by examining the 
production of political and social knowledge by oil companies.502 This work on how expertise is 
developed by managers and companies elucidates how political and social knowledge are 
developed in oil and gas.  
 Expertise involves the ability to know a topic, solve problems based on this knowledge, 
and convey this expertise to others.503 Within the oil industry, expertise is most often 
                                                
499 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, (New York: Verso, 2011), 
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501 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, (Berkeley: University of 
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502 Andrew Barry, Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline, (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), p. 6. 
503 This knowledge, or what Michael Polanyi called ‘tacit knowledge,’ usually is confined to scientific 
knowledge. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 2nd ed., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
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conceptualized and sought after in relation to upper-level engineers or geologists. I argue, 
however, that in addition to this form of expertise another form of knowledge is central to the oil 
industry. In particular, I focus on semi-skilled workers’ knowledge and skills, and how potential 
employers evaluate job candidates on this basis.504 Here, I broaden the types of knowledge 
studied in the oil and gas industry to include safety, wire pulling, and pipefitting. I look at the 
ways in which managers and workers draw upon and negotiate personal connections in their 
declarations and evaluations of knowledge. In addition to these localized relationships, I also 
consider the implications of the increasing fragmentation of the oil industry as roles on oil 
projects are contracted out and as laborers are increasingly contracted from one company to 
another. I find that key elements of contemporary oil production include the fragmentation of 
worksites and the desire to standardize work so that employees may easily move between 
companies in the oil industry. Such trends highlight the restructuring of the oil industry in the era 
of decolonization, the increased logic of neoliberalism that pervades the oil economy, and the 
key role of networks, composed of workers, managers, oil, and electric wiring, in shaping the oil 
industry. 
 Workers’ skill and knowledge are central to the proper functioning of worksites. At 
Connex’s construction project in Mussafah, for example, workers from all over the world 
converged on the project for a short period of time, most with, on average, two-year contracts. Of 
the Connex employees at the project, approximately fifty percent were from India, ten percent 
were from Bangladesh, ten percent from Nepal, thirty percent were from the Philippines, and one 
                                                
504 Sociologists, Kjeld Schmidt, in his discussion of the knowledge held employees at a company that 
manufactures large engines, suggests that instead of focusing on kinds of knowledge, we focus on the 
dialogical logics of workers. Here, I agree with Schmidt’s move to take seriously the labor of worker. 
However, I continue to use the term “knowledge” in reference to semi-skilled workers as I think the 
specialization of these workers pertains. Kjeld Schmidt, “The Trouble with ‘Tacit Knowledge’,” 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) 21, no. 2 (March 13, 2012): 163–225. 
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man was from Pakistan. On oil projects throughout the Gulf, issues of safety constitute a key 
arena in which workers and managers must all agree on the terms of work. The large numbers of 
workers for this project and other projects in the Gulf was one reason for the emigration of large 
numbers of Indians to the Gulf, and a factor that only highlighted the need for standardized work 
practices. Given the uneven quality of educational institutions and technical training centers in 
different countries and states, human resource managers at oil companies were often suspicious 
of accreditation. Instead, managers relied on social networks and testing in order to assess and 
choose employees. This process began long before managers even arrived in a given country for 
interviews; in the case of India, recruiting agents were often the first to evaluate workers. 
 
Oil Networks: Materials and Relationships 
 During my visits to Mussafah, I met many workers who I had earlier met in Mumbai, 
India, when the men were looking for work. Mumbai is a dense transfer point on the Arabian 
Sea. Annually, millions of men arrive from all over India to find work in the city. Almost a 
million of these men will travel to work on oil projects or oil support industries in the Arabic-
speaking Gulf. Because of Mumbai’s close proximity to the Gulf and the large number of 
recruiting agents located in the city, most interviews for jobs in the Gulf are located in Mumbai. 
Other popular places for interviews in India included the city of Hyderabad and the states of 
Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat. Oil companies relied heavily on Indian recruiting agencies to 
find workers. One of the main agencies with which I spent time was Mancom. Mancom, a large 
recruiting agency located in Mumbai, had contracts with various oil companies and subsidiary 
companies based in the Arabic-speaking Gulf. When Mancom received a contract with a 
company, they would advertise the position in the paper, have preliminary interviews with 
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candidates, and then organize well-attended interviews between clients and the candidates who 
passed the pre-screening interviews. 
In order to provide higher quality applicants, Mancom pre-interviewed workers in the 
week leading up to oil company interviews. These pre-interviews were held at the Mancom 
offices. At these interviews, two upper-level employees of Mancom, Mr. Anthony and Mr. 
Pandeya, asked workers basic questions regarding the type of work for which they were 
applying. Mr. Pandeya and Mr. Anthony had each been managers at oil and gas projects in the 
Gulf for over twenty years. While they had little experience with the work of recruiting agents, 
they knew, by far, more about the running of oil and gas projects than any other people at 
Mancom. For lesser-skilled positions, Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya conducted their interviews 
mostly in Hindustani or, occasionally, Malayalam. If workers only spoke Tamil, another member 
of the staff would translate. During these interviews, Mr. Pandeya and Mr. Anthony asked 
candidates about their knowledge of basic tools, their ability to read technical drawings, and 
checked to see if the candidate knew common acronyms. For more skilled positions, these pre-
interviews were conducted in English and involved more complicated questions related 
specifically to the job in question. Candidates who passed these pre-interviews would be short-
listed and were supposed to be seen by the client prior to candidates who did not show up for 
pre-interviews at all. Candidates who did not pass these pre-interviews were ineligible to attend 
the client interviews. Despite the chance of not passing, some job seekers told me they thought it 
was better to attend pre-interviews because it meant they would most likely interview with the 
client. This was hardly guaranteed, however, even for pre-interviewed and passed candidates, 
given the large crowds and chaotic atmosphere of the interviews. 
 
 240 
Sitting in on the pre-interviews was a surprising experience for me. I expected the 
questions to be tough and that Mancom would want to pass along only the highest caliber of 
candidate. In contrast, Mancom’s management seemed to emphasize instead the need to pass as 
many applicants as possible in the pre-interview stage. Mr. Anthony was particularly successful 
in this respect, giving the green light to a large majority of applicants. Indeed, pre-interviews 
with Mr. Anthony often had a lecture-like quality, in which he anticipated what questions the 
client would ask the job seeker. Mr. Anthony would then tell the interviewee the correct answer 
to these questions. One afternoon I sat with Mr. Anthony as he conducted pre-interviews for a 
project in Kuwait. That day, he interviewed a man who had previous experience as a pipefitter. 
As they spoke, the man immediately confused inches and centimeters. Mr. Anthony stopped him, 
pointed out the error, and explained the difference. He passed the interviewee and told him to 
study for the interviews with the oil company managers. After the interview Mr. Anthony told 
me that the interviewee “didn’t seem qualified,” but he put him through to be interviewed by the 
client because he thought it best to “cast a wide net.” Mr. Anthony said he would send many 
people to be interviewed with the oil company manager and then “see if anyone got picked up.” 
Mr. Pandeya and Mr. Anthony interviewed people in a very different style and, as a result, a 
candidate’s success in the pre-interview stage depended largely on which of the two men 
performed the pre-interview.    
Mr. Pandeya’s approach to interviews stood in stark contrast to that of Mr. Anthony. For 
example, Mr. Pandeya looked over one candidate’s CV and asked him, “What kinds of things did 
you do in Qatar?” The candidate replied by listing the types of tools he used on the job site. 
Satisfied with the answer, Mr. Pandeya showed the candidate a blueprint and asked him what it 
was. The candidate faltered and said he did not know how to read it, but could follow directions. 
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Unsatisfied with this answer, Mr. Pandeya asked the candidate additional questions about the 
blueprint. At the end of the interview, Mr. Pandeya rejected the candidate and told him he could 
not attend the interviews with the oil company representative. This rejection was despite the fact 
that the potential interviewee had the requisite experience. After the interview, Mr. Pandeya told 
me, “The candidate’s knowledge was not great. While [the candidate] had the skills, he did not 
have knowledge. The problem was [the candidate] showed no initiative to learn in his past 
experience. This means that he is not suitable for [this job].” Mr. Pandeya suggested to the 
candidate that he try to find a job at a company with lower standards and named some upcoming 
possibilities at Mancom. Overall, Mr. Pandeya passed very few people on to be interviewed by 
the company. One day, later in the year, Mr. Pandeya told me he had passed only three or four 
candidates and said he should “only send candidates that he believes will be selected.” He 
believed that if the worker did not answer immediately and with the correct information, then 
they did not have the necessary experience to work for a company overseas. But while Mr. 
Pandeya saw himself as acting in a responsible manner for both Mancom and future employers, 
the upper management of Mancom understood Mr. Pandeya to be “unconfident,” and this lack of 
confidence ultimately resulted in Mr. Pandeya’s termination.  
 Neither Mr. Anthony nor Mr. Pandeya received bonuses for passing workers, but, as 
demonstrated by Mr. Pandeya’s dismissal, assessments of their job performance were clearly tied 
to the number of workers they passed through to the next stage. Religion and region of origin 
were important additional factors in Mr. Anthony’s and Mr. Pandeya’s evaluations of potential 
candidates. An assumption commonly held by both recruiters and government bureaucrats 
working in the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was that certain types of workers came from 
certain states of India. The mapping of skills according to state was surprisingly consistent and I 
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often heard, for example, that plumbers come from Orissa, carpenters come from Rajasthan, 
laborers come from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and engineers and doctors come from Kerala. The 
result was that a politics of locality became paired with a notion of state specialization that was 
reinforced by recruiting agent practices. For example, if a recruiting agent needed to find 
plumbers for a project, he would go to Orissa, thereby reinforcing the stereotype.  
 In addition to hiring certain types of laborers primarily from certain states, agents also 
tended to recruit preferentially from the state or district that they, or their family, came from. For 
example, one agent from Gujarat who was based in Mumbai told me he preferred to hire workers 
from near his natal village. He told me this was easier and he would call up friends in his village 
and they would send workers to him in Mumbai. At a different recruiting agency, one employee, 
Rajendra, told me that when a client needed to hire laborers he liked to look first in Bihar. This 
was because Rajendra was from Bihar and he wanted to “help his state people. They don’t have 
jobs, families are dying.” Rajendra went on to tell me that helping Biharis find jobs in the Gulf 
“is a type of social work, because they are jobs with good salaries.” This preference for hiring 
workers from one’s state or district occurred even in hiring for skilled positions.  
 Yet, even with this preference for workers from certain states, recruiters were careful not 
to hire too many from the same area. Both recruiting agents and oil company managers told me 
that if a company hired too many people from the same place, the employees would cause a 
problem. One recruiter said, “They will make a strike and demand the management do 
impossible things. This is why company does not want one area people.” Indeed, some oil 
companies kept data about their workers’ region of origin to ensure that their workforce was 
diverse. As one manager in the Gulf told me, this data would be used to determine housing and 
work crews. I was told, “If too many people come from one area, then they will cause problems.” 
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Management’s goal, then, was to split up the workers so that they did not have strikes or other 
problems on the worksite. 
 In the same vein, state of origin could also just as easily be a disadvantage when 
candidates were looking for work, and this depended on recruiters’ attitudes or beliefs regarding 
a state of India and its workers. Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya, for example, both thought poorly 
of Muslims and also workers from northeastern India, in particular Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and 
Jharkhand. Stereotypes abounded and these assumptions informed hiring practices.505  
 
Best Business Practices and the Surveillance of Safety 
 Of course, stereotypes were not the only model that recruiting agents relied upon in 
choosing candidates; formalized evaluations were also employed. These formalized metrics were 
often referred to as “best business practices.” “Best business practices” or simply “best practices” 
is a phrase that globally circulates in business management circles and is used for anything that is 
seen to streamline processes and maximize profits. For recruiting agents, best practices were 
being hashed out in two key contexts. First, there was a question of how best to manage the 
relationship between the job seeker, the recruiting agency, and the oil company. While company 
management, especially European and American management, did not care about the candidate’s 
state of origin or religion, Mancom’s staff assumed that having too many Muslims and/or too 
many candidates from poor areas of India would reflect poorly on Mancom. This was because 
they assumed the negative stereotypes about Biharis or Jharkhandis or Muslim men as less 
desirable workers had international weight. Given the predominance of Indian human resource 
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managers at interviews, the assumption that companies cared about this may have been 
reinforced. 
The second key area in which best business practices were determined during the 
interviews themselves was the testing and imparting of knowledge regarding safety. The pre-
interviews were seen as a time to train the applicants and prepare them to respond to 
interviewers’ questions correctly, thereby helping to normalize best business practices into a 
single strategy. Mancom managers attempted to improve the quality of the company’s applicants 
by hosting classes on the day prior to the client interviews. At these classes, Mr. Pandeya and 
Mr. Anthony would explain about basic safety equipment. This included showing the candidates 
work boots, helmets, and gloves; demonstrating the use of the equipment; and prepping the 
candidates on what to tell the interviewer when asked about safety equipment. By conducting 
pre-interviews and holding lectures on safety, Mancom was hoping that they could offer the best 
quality applicant to the client and, therefore, reach their goal of more accepted applicants. 
Furthermore, because Mancom charged each successful candidate to go abroad, the performance 
of individual candidates was something in which the company was invested.  
One set of lectures concerning safety that I attended occurred immediately prior to an oil 
company manager arriving to interview workers for jobs as scaffold riggers. Scaffold rigging is a 
semi-skilled occupation and many of the people who interviewed for the jobs did not have high 
school diplomas.506 The candidates in attendance had passed the pre-interviews a week earlier. 
While the lectures were primarily supposed to cover safety equipment, Mr. Anthony and Mr. 
Pandeya also discussed the job requirements and the importance of how candidates presented 
themselves. Presentation was so important, in fact, that a discussion about personal protective 
                                                
506 The lack of high school diploma meant that these men were considered vulnerable by the Indian 
Government and required additional documents to travel abroad. 
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equipment began with Mr. Anthony telling the candidates, in a mixture of English and Hindi, 
“sab’ se ba’re bāt is confidence,” or “the biggest thing is confidence.” From there, Mr. Anthony 
and Mr. Pandeya told candidates to speak correctly and with confidence to the interviewers. 
After stressing the importance of proper language, Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya brought in 
helmets, goggles, facemasks, boots, gloves, and breathing operators. They showed the candidates 
how to wear the equipment and told them the names of the various parts of the safety equipment. 
Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya also told candidates what to do in an emergency. As they spoke, 
they underlined the importance of the equipment and the lecture itself by telling the candidates 
that international law “says that human safety is first.” 
Throughout the lecture, Mr. Pandeya and Mr. Anthony firmly placed the responsibility 
for safety with the candidates. “Make no mistakes,” Mr. Anthony said, and Mr. Pandeya agreed, 
“accidents don’t just happen, they are caused.” Communication, they told candidates, was the 
key to avoiding these accidents. Communication, they further added, was also key to finding a 
job abroad. This means, they told candidates, that you must go and “present your knowledge” at 
your job interview. 
Safety training was directly related to the homogenization of labor within the oil industry. 
Through standardization of safety practices, workers were rendered both hirable and able to work 
for other companies once hired. Overall, the emphasis on safety has some positive effects for 
workers as companies take steps to ensure that there are safer worksites and compliance with 
international standards. After all, safety performance indicators are the standard by which 
companies’ safety records are evaluated. Fatalities and lost workday cases are all carefully 
recorded. These are then measured against the total number of hours worked in a company. The 
scale of this metric is huge and the fatal incident rate is measured against every one hundred 
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million man hours worked in a company, while lost time injury is measured against every one 
million hours worked. This generalized surveillance of labor is punctuated by fatalities or lost 
days. In these cases, blame is usually decided to be due to one of six causes: 
1. Process (conditions): Organisational: Inadequate training or competence  
2. People (acts): Inattention/Lack of Awareness: Improper decision 
making or lack of judgment  
3. Process (conditions): Organisational: Inadequate work 
standards/procedures  
4. Process (conditions): Organisational: Inadequate supervision  
5. Process (conditions): Organisational: Inadequate hazard identification 
or risk assessment  
6. People (acts): Following procedures: Improper position (line of fire)507 
The importance of safety indicators were explained to me by a manager at Connex. He told me 
that every company had a clock that started counting and would restart as soon as an accident or 
fatality was recorded. How high a company could get the clock before it reset was a matter of 
pride for the management and this metric was one way companies were ranked and awarded 
contracts. The importance of hours without incident impacted managers’ bonuses and their 
ability to negotiate additional work with their company. Finally, this clock also had an emotional 
aspect, reflecting to a certain extent the feelings of the managers in relation to their employees, 
those towards whom the managers felt a personal responsibility.  
By giving job seekers a class on safety equipment, Mancom was trying to differentiate its 
job candidates from those of its competitors in India. The classes tried to convey to candidates 
the language of safety so that candidates could respond correctly to interviewers. In this process, 
Mr. Pandeya and Mr. Anthony were normalizing the language of best business practices in order 
to optimize profits. The use of best business practice here is twofold. First, it involves the best 
practice of training workers in safety issues. Second, it is best practice for Mancom because it 
helps differentiate the recruiting agency from competitors and increase profits. 
                                                




Interviews for Pipefitters and Electricians 
Once workers passed pre-screening and attended a safety lecture (if one was offered), 
next up were the interviews with oil company representatives. These were always crowded 
affairs. There was some variation in who came to interview job candidates, but most often 
Indians working in the Gulf as human resource managers held these interviews. The presence of 
Indian human resource managers allowed for direct communication and avoided many problems 
with language. However, South Asian managers were also usually the most skeptical of 
applicants’ credentials and degrees. In addition to South Asian human resource managers, 
occasionally Arab-speaking managers came for interviews. Usually these managers worked for 
smaller, Arab-owned oil companies. Often, these managers spoke only Arabic and English, 
making it hard for candidates not fluent in English to be successful in their interviews. 
In order to staff the construction of the oilrig at Mussafah, Connex held three days of 
interviews in Mumbai. I arrived early for the interviews, which were held at a technical academy 
in a suburb of Mumbai, but not earlier than the hopeful job candidates who came from all over 
the city and state. The large campus of the academy usually offered a quiet respite from the 
crowded streets of Bombay. But instead of the usually empty paths connecting buildings, that 
day the walkways were lined with men waiting eagerly for a chance—a chance to be hired, to 
work abroad, to repay loans, to acquire dowry for sisters’ weddings, and to save family farms. 
The cool and quiet of the office was a shock after the heat, the commute, and the crowds. Inside 
the office, there were workers from Mancom, but even more surprising, there was also Alex. I 
had never met Alex before and Mr. Anthony, quickly introduced us. Alex was a project head at 
Connex and originally from Ireland. He had worked previously in Norway and in most of the 
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countries of the Arabic-speaking Gulf. This was his first visit to India and he was there in order 
to hire hundreds of workers for the construction of the offshore drill in Mussafah, Abu Dhabi. In 
addition to hiring workers to build the rig, Alex was also hiring workers to be subcontracted out 
to other projects in Saudi Arabia and Oman. With Alex was the head of Connex’s human 
resources (HR) in the Gulf, the head of HR’s assistant, and one of Alex’s site managers. All of 
these men were Indian nationals.  
The participation of a European and a project head like Alex in the interview process was 
not completely new, but it was a rarity. I was apprehensive as I explained my research. Usually, 
expatriate Indians from oil companies came to interview workers and these managers allowed 
me to observe their interviews. However, there was one multinational oil company that sent 
either Americans or British to oversee all of their hiring and that company had expressly 
forbidden my presence at their interviews or any stage of their hiring process. Due to my 
experience with that company, I was worried that the secrecy of Alex’s company would be 
similar and that Connex would have the same confidentiality concerns. Fortunately, my 
apprehension was for naught, and Alex was happy to have me shadow him for during his time in 
Mumbai.  
 There were three main reasons that Alex had come, in addition to the men from HR, to 
conduct interviews in Mumbai. First, and most simply, Alex had never been to Mumbai and 
wanted to see the city. The other two reasons involved expertise. Both the urgency of the need 
for additional workers on his project and the subcontracting of workers for other companies 
meant that there was little time for on the job training, so workers needed to be trained already in 
the jobs for which they were being hired. In the case of the subcontracted workers, this was even 
more important as workers who did not meet the contracting company’s expectations would be 
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sent home. Sending undesirable applicants home usually cost the hiring company quite a bit, as 
they would lose all the money spent to “bring the applicant over” in the first place. These costs 
included the cost of plane tickets, visas, and fees paid to Indian recruiters. In addition, the hiring 
company would lose the money they were paid for the workers they subcontracted out. 
 In order to mitigate against this, Connex withheld a portion of the workers’ salaries for 
the first year of their employment. If the worker broke the contract or was unable to perform the 
duties outlined in his contract, then the worker was sent home and this fee was kept by Connex. 
This requirement for workers to pay a fee was a movement away from the worker rights the 
nascent Indian government had tried to gain for Indians in the Gulf in the 1950s. During that 
period, the Indian government had actively worked against companies charging fees to workers 
when the workers wanted to return to India before the end of their contract.508 
Companies requiring workers to pay a deposit did not usually deter unskilled workers 
from applying for jobs, but the deposit did deter workers from leaving their contracts early once 
they were in the Gulf. An owner of a company that supplied parts to oil company construction 
projects in Ajman, UAE, told me, “If we don’t charge [employees] for a visa, then we lose 
money. They also come and don’t want to work hard. They have the idea that Dubai is the easy 
life and don’t want to work. Also [the employees’] homesickness increases and [employees] miss 
babies, mom, wife.” This, he told me, was why they needed to charge fees. Sometimes this fee 
was not charged up front, but was a fee the worker had to pay to leave a contract early. One oil 
company contractor included in their employee contract that workers needed to pay 
approximately $900 USD if they wished to go home before their contract ended. As most 
workers were being paid approximately $245 USD per month, this termination fee equaled 
                                                
508 For example, see Letter to the Commission from the Ministry of External Affairs, 11 August 1953. 
NAI, MEA, Emigration. F. 23-9/52-Emi. 
 
 250 
almost four months wages. Other companies, such as Connex, withheld a small portion of the 
paychecks that they repaid to workers when they completed the first year of their contract. One 
company owner told me these fees encouraged employees to work hard. Many workers told me 
that they had borrowed large sums to pay agents to help them find jobs in the Gulf. In addition, 
their families were in precarious financial circumstances. Fear of losing this money prevented 
workers from leaving their jobs early and safeguarded the money the company paid for visas, 
plane tickets, and training. Managers would sometimes “hide” or ignore a worker who was not as 
productive as others, but keeping this fee ensured that workers unhappy working in the Gulf 
would not leave the company. In this way, the costs of visas and airfare were a risk that the 
company placed firmly on the worker — the person least able to negotiate the contract or afford 
the lost money. 
 
Contracting in the Oil Industry 
 The dual urgency of Connex contractually needing to finish its work on the oilrig on time 
and the need to hire workers to be contracted out set the tone of the interviews. Contracting and 
subcontracting are integral to the history of the oil industry. With the exploration of oil in the 
Gulf in the first half of the twentieth century, contracts were characterized by traditional 
concessions in which the company had exclusive rights to search for and develop oil and gas in 
the countries in question. This model of contracting between the state that owned the land rents 
and the oil companies that contracted out the ability to exploit these rents did not survive the 
decolonization process intact. In particular, the New International Economic Order and the 
advent of the Organization of the Petroleum and Exporting Companies (OPEC) greatly shifted 
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relations to a more partner-based system.509 OPEC was formed by the five founding members of 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, in 1960. Qatar joined in 1961 and the United 
Arab Emirates joined in 1967. In the 1970s, OPEC became increasingly significant as it raised 
oil prices in 1973 in protest of the United State’s involvement with the Yom Kippur War. 
Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the war between Iran and Iraq that began in 1980, 
oil prices began a steady decline until the late 1990s. Despite this decline, the sudden increase of 
oil prices in the 1970s “transformed a comparatively stagnant business into one of the major 
international growth industries of that decade.”510  
 Contracting and subcontracting have increasingly become the norm in oil projects and 
serve to inform in many ways the development of the industry. One indicator of the increasing 
prevalence of contracting is the number of hours worked in oil and gas. Out of companies that 
participate in the International Association of Oil and Gas Producer’s safety indicators annual 
report, total man hours working on projects has been increasing for at least the last thirty years. 
Of the increasing hours, contractors are supplying more and more labor on these projects [Graph 
3: Hours Worked at Companies and Contractors].  
                                                
509 Michael Likosky, “Contracting and Regulatory Issues in the Oil and Gas and Metallic Minerals 
Industries,” Transnational Corporations 18, no. 1 (April 2009), pp. 3-4. 
510 Owen L Anderson, “The Anatomy of an Oil and Gas Drilling Contract,” Tulsa Law Review 25, no. 3 




Graph 3: Hours Worked at Companies and Contractors511 
 
In 1986, 544 million hours of work were performed. Of these hours, workers employed directly 
by oil companies performed 306 million hours of the hours worked, or over fifty-six percent. The 
remaining time was done by contracted labor. In contrast, in 2013, 3.771 billion hours of labor 
were performed on oil and gas projects. Of these hours, oil company workers performed 821 
million hours of work, or slightly more than twenty-one percent. Again, the remaining work was 
done by contracted labor.512 While some of the supermajors, for example British Petroleum [BP], 
only contracted out fifty-four percent of their work hours in 2013, the trend is definitely towards 
                                                




greater fragmentation of the work performed in the industry.513 Regarding these contracted hours, 
BP writes that it expects its contractors to comply with “legal and regulatory requirements” as 
well as BP’s own code of conduct.514 However, the general trend among contractors is that they 
have higher fatality rates and higher rates of lost hours due to injury than do companies.515  
  Subcontracting creates crowded worksites, and in the case of the rig in Mussafah, 
multiple companies each built a part of the oil derrick. In the 1960s, subcontracting led to strikes 
and general unrest throughout the Gulf. The British colonial authorities argued this was because 
subcontractors did not understand the culture of the workers and, therefore, committed cultural 
faux pas that upset workers. In contrast, British authorities believed that established oil 
companies understood the workers and experienced fewer disruptions due to worker 
unhappiness. Over the course of the twentieth century and despite worker resistance, 
subcontracting increasingly became the norm in the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf.516 After the 
initial upsets, the result of increased subcontracting was no longer increased worker unrest, but, 
in many ways, precisely the opposite: a greatly fragmented workplace with less power for 
collective action.  
 Many companies use subcontracting as a technique to be less responsible for their own 
workforce. The most drastic manifestation of this can be seen with companies that simply hire 
men out for day work. These men earn the least of all workers in the Gulf and lack many of the 
benefits that workers employed by larger multinational companies receive. The companies that 
specialize in temporary day laborers are often locally owned and do not have the standardization 
of holidays and overtime that large multinational companies observe. They also pay their 
                                                
513 http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/bp-and-sustainability/how-we-operate/working-
with-contractors-and-partners.html Last accessed 1/2/15 
514 OGP Data Series, p. B-19. 
515 ibid., pp. 1-5, 2-2. 
516 J.E.H. Boustead, Memo to H.M. Political Residency, Bahrain, 28 May 1963. RE (1963), 568. 
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workers less and it is widely perceived that they attract only the most desperate (or unlucky) 
laborers. Alex told me that workers with such companies often showed up hungry and with holes 
in their boots. The hierarchy of exploitation is perpetuated by a seemingly bottomless pit of 
exploited South Asians. Those that work as temporary day laborers may be contrasted with 
laborers hired by one multinational company (MNC) but working at another MNC. Those latter 
workers are often protected by the norms that regulate international labor for large companies 
based in Western Europe or the United States.  
 For Alex, the process of hiring workers that were to be subcontracted out was more 
stressful than hiring workers for his company’s projects. He called the subcontracting of workers 
“selling” them. This commodification of labor has a slightly different history and articulation 
than the commodification of the laborer seen in the discussion of migrants and mangoes. As seen 
in the last chapter, for recruiting agents and government officials overseeing migration, workers 
could be easily slotted into the processes and forms that previously moved goods from India to 
the Gulf. The logic of subcontracting has a different genesis. As discussed by political scientist 
Christina Ewig in regards to the decentralization of government administrations in South 
America, subcontracting, in neoliberal thought, is a way to create mini-markets that are more 
efficient and better able to address their specific niche.517  
In the case of oil companies, subcontracting had complicated, often negative, effects on 
workers. These negative effects are found throughout the oil and gas industry. In Elana Shever’s 
discussion of the privatization of Argentina’s oil, she argues that subcontracting is a neoliberal 
governing technique that uses “regulatory, disciplinary, and affective techniques” to manage 
                                                
517 Christina Ewig, Second-Wave Neoliberalism: Gender, Race, and Health Sector Reform in Peru, 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), p.102. 
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worker and to encourage workers to manage themselves.518 In the Gulf, hiring subcontracted 
employees allows large companies to avoid responsibility for workers. The restructuring of work 
relationships means that companies are neither directly responsible for workers when they are 
hurt, or worse, killed, on the job nor are they responsible for negotiating or enforcing contracts. 
This process, begun in the 1960s, has worked in conjunction with the ban on union formation to 
ensure that subcontracted workers are intensely vulnerable to exploitation by their employer and 
lack the means to address this exploitation.  
Worker vulnerability was not the only effect of subcontracting; as a result of the practice 
of “selling” workers to other companies, workers were also able to develop collegial networks 
that helped them acquire future jobs. Alex told me workers were regularly “sold” to other 
companies. In this instance, Alex was hiring pipe fitters that would be Connex employees, but 
would be “sold” to a Middle Eastern energy services provider. Hiring these workers was more 
stressful, Alex told me, than hiring the workers for his own project or other Connex projects. 
This was because he felt these workers had to be a “better quality” than the workers for Connex 
projects. He told me there would be no “hiding” of the workers, as could be done on a Connex 
site. However, because this job was with an energy services provider and not one of the 
supermajors, the standards were slightly more relaxed. When I was with Alex at a later date and 
he was hiring workers for one of the supermajors, he was notably more stressed. This was 
because he felt the supermajors had unrealistic demands when it came to employees and were, in 
Alex’s terms, “too picky.” The reason I was given for selling workers was that some companies, 
and the supermajors, in particular, did not like maintaining their own workforce. Many I spoke 
with seemed to think it was obvious that subcontracting would be preferred. Some explained to 
                                                
518 Elana Shever, Resources for Reform: Oil and Neoliberalism in Argentina, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 58, 68. [original emphasis] 
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me that subcontracting allowed supermajors to avoid the cost of employee benefits. Others 
argued that, without subcontracting, the size of the workforce would be unwieldy. Currently, 
supermajors hire hundreds of thousands of people; without subcontracting, my interviewees 
conjectured, company payrolls would have to include millions of people. 
 In many cases of worker subcontracting, the practice allows companies to have workers 
without being concerned about their pay levels and, to a large extent, without risking a decrease 
in “accident-free” hours. The language of “selling” labor was not limited to referring to the work 
of semi-skilled laborers, as Alex, himself, had been “sold” to other companies to work on various 
projects during his tenure at Connex. For Alex, being “sold” to work at other companies on 
short-term projects was beneficial when hiring in Mumbai. This is because when he was working 
at other companies, he developed a greater familiarity across companies. This rooted him in a 
network of management and employees, most from the United States and Europe, that moved 
through oil sites in the Arabic-speaking Gulf. There, management came into contact with 
workers from South Asia, the Philippines, and other areas of the Middle East. These actors, along 
with oil and the machinery used to extract oil, formed networks that shape the apparatuses 
developed to manage these networks. 
 
Interviews and the Role of Emotional Appeals 
 Looming deadlines and other subcontractors waiting on Connex’s work contributed to an 
urgent need to fill jobs, but in doing so, Alex and the other members of his team needed to 
interview hundreds, if not thousands, of candidates. Despite the pre-interview process and the 
desire to show the client the best of candidates, Mancom also wanted to have a large crowd turn 
out for the interviews. For this reason, the project lead at Mancom would put advertisements in 
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the paper prior to the client interviews and draw candidates from all over the greater Mumbai 
area. This, in part, was the reason for the mobs of men that appeared on the day of the 
interviews; no matter how quickly the men from Connex interviewed, there was simply no way 
they could see all of the applicants who showed up. Nonetheless, the workers waited, hoping for 
an interview.  
 One Mancom employee ran each set of client interviews. Each employee had a slightly 
different format for how they presented applicants to clients, but regardless of the format, it was 
a well-thought-out strategy that included trying to sway the client so that he would choose many 
candidates from Mancom. For example, Ram, an employee at Mancom, described his strategy as 
follows: “I like to mix up the interviews – mix up the applicants so that the client gets confused. 
Also, I have the good candidates go first so that he [the client] thinks Mancom has good 
applicants. Then, later, the bad candidates [come] and he can reject these.” Such attempts at 
manipulation were common in the relationship between agents and oil companies and most 
agents relied upon “emotional blackmail” as a tactic to get his (or, rarely, her) liaison at the 
company to comply with his (or her) requests. This emotional blackmail, as agents themselves 
called it, included techniques such as making the client believe that the representative of the 
recruiting agency would lose his job if not enough of his candidates were accepted. Another 
recruiting agent employee, Jimmy, told me he would “push the candidate into a position by 
talking to the client, even if the candidate wasn’t skilled.” To clients, Jimmy would say that his 
boss would fire him if he did not have enough people hired; Jimmy would then push the 
candidates he wanted the client to take. Often, these candidates were friends of mutual friends. In 
this type of appeal, the recruiting agency employee was hoping the client would do what the 
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representative wanted because the client would not want to be responsible for the representative 
losing his job. 
 Emotional techniques were also employed by workers at interviews and seemed most 
successful with European managers. In the case of the interviews Alex oversaw, workers would 
plead with Alex to give them jobs and for him to “take a chance” on them. Alex was moved by 
these pleas and told me he would like to hire everyone. In order to hire as many as possible, he 
gave interviewees many chances to answer questions. These emotional requests were less 
effective with Indian human resource managers who worked in the Gulf. For example, the 
assistant to the human resources manager, Ahmed, was from India and he was much more harsh 
in his tone and demeanor, usually judging candidates with a standard rubric regardless of what 
the employees at Mancom said about the candidate. 
During the time I spent doing ethnographic observation at Mancom their policy regarding 
bonuses for recruiting agents changed; instead of receiving RS 500 (roughly USD $11 at the 
time) for every worker that was chosen, employees no longer received any bonus. The express 
reason for this change was the poor economy and its effects on Mancom’s business. This policy 
shift, however, also reinforced the bonds between subagents and the recruiting agents at 
Mancom, as employees inclined to pad their incomes without management knowledge needed to 
work with the subagents. The implication was that the applicants who arrived with subagents 
with a working relationship with the Mancom employees were likely to be seen before other 
applicants, regardless of how early they arrived or how long they waited. By working with 
subagents with whom they already had relations, employees of recruiting agencies were able to 





While representatives of the recruiting agency would push certain workers and some 
candidates would be hired even though they were not as skilled as others, for most candidates 
conveying knowledge of the job and the relevant safety standards was a key factor in the 
interviews. In the interviews conducted by Alex in Mumbai, relationships were a central factor in 
establishing this expertise. Similar to the importance of localized networks of affiliation that 
informed worker action historically in the Gulf, localized networks also structured the actions 
and evaluations of people working in the oil industry. Alex favored hiring workers who had 
worked in the GCC before. Workers who had been previously “sold,” or subcontracted, were 
immediately approved by Alex for employment with his company. He told me these workers 
“were probably ok, or else the company wouldn’t keep paying for them.” In addition to 
prioritizing previously contracted workers, Alex was particularly eager to hire workers who had 
worked for Connex or for his friends at other companies. Workers who could demonstrate having 
worked for a project manager personally known to Alex did not even have to go to the testing 
center but were immediately hired. If candidates claimed that they had worked for Connex or 
another company in the past, Alex tested this assertion by asking what project they had worked 
at, who the boss was, and if the worker could describe any of the managers on the site. Alex was 
familiar with many of the project managers currently working in the Arabic-speaking Persian 
Gulf, except in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, when candidates could demonstrate knowledge of the 
right people and networks, Alex viewed this as more important than the length of time they 




The HR managers from Connex and Alex’s assistant repeatedly warned Alex that 
candidates were lying on their CVs and to his face and that the credentials were faked. 
Frequently, candidates’ documentation of training was forged or made-up, as was their past work 
experience and biographical information. I attended one set of interviews for welders in Kuwait, 
during which one subagent brought in a group of men from Jharkhand, all of whom had the same 
exact CV with only the name, age, and passport number changed. The result of subagents 
creating CVs and documents for workers was a proliferation of paper forms that did not 
correspond to actual skill levels.  
Mr. Anthony, as a staff member at Mancom, took a different approach. As Alex 
conducted interviews, Mr. Anthony sat with him and stressed the quality of each candidate. Mr. 
Anthony was there as a translator of both words and ideas. As in the pre-interviews, Mr. Anthony 
would often help candidates by translating in ways that either embellished their answers to be 
more correct, or simply supplied the answer for them. For example, he would sometimes 
interrupt a candidate in Hindi — a language Alex did not speak — to inform the candidate how 
to answer the question. As a result of this, Alex likely passed candidates that might not have 
passed had Mr. Anthony not been present. As I sat in interviews, I worried that once Anthony’s 
creative translations were revealed, workers would already be in the Gulf and Mancom’s 
reputation would be hurt. However, as demonstrated by Mr. Anthony’s continued and successful 
work with the company, in contrast to Mr. Pandeya’s firing, Mancom was apparently happy with 
Mr. Anthony’s performance and the quantity (and, presumably, the quality) of the workers hired. 




Despite Mr. Anthony’s creative translations and embellishments, the interviews were 
largely formulaic and repetitive and this was consistent across the interviews by all the 
companies that I observed. When personal networks were not present – in other words, if the 
men had not previously worked for Connex, a sister company of Connex, or a subcontractor 
already familiar to Alex – then the candidates were given tests. First, they would be asked to read 
technical drawings. Workers who could not demonstrate a personal knowledge of the sites but 
who could read the drawings were taken to a technical testing area. In this area, Mr. Anthony or 
Alex showed the candidates a task and asked them to perform it. For example, people applying to 
work as electricians were asked to pull and connect wires. The candidates were then evaluated 
based on their ability to complete the task correctly, as well as the speed with which they could 
complete the task. At this stage, roughly one-quarter of the candidates who were asked to take 
the technical test passed. 
Usually only a small number of candidates were actually accepted by the client. It was 
not uncommon for a client to work with multiple recruiters. Most of these recruiters were in 
Mumbai, but there were also a number of recruiters in Kerala, Gujarat, and near the city of 
Hyderabad. In this way, Mancom was in competition with fellow recruiters. Mancom, and other 
recruiters, also felt they were in competition with other countries. In particular, the Philippines 
was a country that also sent many workers to the Gulf. Accordingly, Connex also conducted 
interviews in the Philippines, but Alex did not attend those interviews. Once workers were 
selected, Mancom went about arranging the candidates’ paperwork and waited for Connex to 
send visas. At this stage, some selected candidates would not receive visas and they would be 




Conclusion: Managing Manpower and Fragmented Worksites 
 In hiring workers, managerial apparatuses were used to manage the circulation of carbon 
and these apparatuses were influenced by personal networks. Through deploying these 
apparatuses, managers at oil projects attempted to homogenize the skills of the workforce in 
response to the increasing fragmentation of the worksite. Industry standards, such as safety 
standards, were key in enforcing expectations and concern regarding safety permeated all levels 
— from the highest managers to the laborers. Especially in the wake of the Deep Horizon spill 
and the subsequent news coverage, safety standards were on everyone’s mind as they built the 
oilrig. These standards were also significant to the daily operations of oil companies and 
contractors. 
 The migration of semi- and unskilled laborers to the Gulf often occurred as workers 
developed and negotiated multiple, overlapping networks. Workers used these networks in order 
to secure jobs. Workers often privileged local contacts in forming and maintaining these 
networks, but these contacts often took greater advantage of workers than did professional 
contacts. Managers, including human resources staff and technical experts, also relied on 
networks in order to evaluate workers. This evaluation of workers was important, as there were 
often inconsistencies between workers’ stated knowledge and their actual skill levels. In the 
process of developing and negotiating networks, workers and employers came into contact with 
differing concepts of best business practices, expertise, hierarchy, and knowledge. These 
differing concepts converged at certain moments and spaces, such as job interviews for oil 
projects. The logic of the networks shaping oil production were not (solely) dependent on the 
requirements of the industry or of the participating nations, but also dependent on localized 










Traffic in Migrants: 
The Dreams and Obligations of Migrants 
 
 During my time in Mumbai, I spent a few days most weeks at Mancom Recruiting 
Agency. Mancom supplies manpower to oil companies in the Gulf and was one of my main sites 
of ethnographic research in India. On days that I visited Mancom, I usually ate lunch with two 
employees – Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya. Both Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya are Indians 
who have spent the majority of their adult lives working in the Gulf. They were in their 60s 
during my time in India and many of their friends had retired. Mr. Anthony is a Christian and 
was born in Karnataka. His son and daughter are both married and have careers in Canada. Mr. 
Pandeya is a Hindu and was born in Uttar Pradesh, but his family is from Bihar. Though he is the 
same age as Mr. Anthony, Mr. Pandeya’s two sons were only in college. The difference was that 
Mr. Pandeya had to delay his marriage until later in life in order to help finance his sisters’ 
weddings. Both Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya were working at Mancom in order to provide 
extra income to pad the savings they had accumulated as project managers in the Gulf and to 
stave off the boredom of retirement. At Mancom, Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya interviewed 
applicants to evaluate their technical expertise and then decided if the applicant ought to be 
passed on to the client.519 
                                                
519 The reason for the need for this is because of the high levels of fake documentation used by applicants. 
Thus, it was necessary for Mancom to evaluate if applicants really did have the technical knowledge they 
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Most of our lunches were friendly, lively affairs; we ate rice and sambar (vegetable stew) 
that Mr. Anthony had delivered daily through Mumbai’s vast tiffin system, as well as rotī (flat 
bread) and sabzī (vegetables) that had been prepared by Mr. Pandeya’s wife. We discussed 
everything from current events to work, holidays, and our families. During one of our lunches, a 
group of young men who had recently returned from working in the Gulf arrived at the office to 
have pre-interviews with Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya. These young men clearly stood out 
from the other men who appeared for interviews, men who had not yet been to the Gulf. The 
young, returned Gulf workers were distinguished by their large, fake gold watches; button-up 
shirts made of shiny, iridescent material; and flashy new sports shoes. They displayed wealth and 
exuded a level of confidence unmatched by applicants yet to work in the Gulf or by many older, 
more conservative, returning workers. Both Mr. Anthony and Mr. Pandeya felt as though these 
young men had not spent their money wisely and worried that they had been “seduced by the 
glitter of Dubai.”520  
The seduction of the Gulf and the poor money management of workers was a common 
trope among recruiters and migrant worker advocates in India and the Gulf. After Mr. Anthony 
and Mr. Pandeya shared with me their disapproval of how these returned migrants had spent their 
money, I asked another employee at Mancom about this. Ram was a recruiter at Mancom and 
had worked in the Gulf before. As a young, seemingly carefree young man, I expected Ram to 
disagree with Mr. Pandeya and Mr. Anthony, but instead he echoed their sentiments. Ram told 
me about often feeling the need “to lecture ‘newbies’ going to the Gulf about how they are going 
to earn and save – not to spend.” When I asked him whether this was really a big problem, he 
                                                                                                                                                       
espoused prior to presenting the candidate to the client for interview or work in some cases. This process 
and Mr. Pandeya’s and Mr. Anthony’s methods for doing this work are detailed Chapter 6.  




explained, “People think they are in the Gulf and they can spend” but then the workers return to 
India with nothing. I pushed him further, asking if the “newbie” who worked in an oilfield was 
as likely to spend money as the “newbie” working in a city like Dubai. Ram replied, “People 
have certain habits that they need to support.” I was confused by what he meant by “habits.” He 
clarified, “They also want to buy good clothes because they think ‘I am in the Gulf so I can 
spend money and I need nice clothes and to ‘get fat’ to show that they were in the Gulf.” 
According to Ram and the other Mancom employees, when young migrants returned from the 
Gulf flashing new clothes and other ostentatious displays of wealth, what they were displaying 
was their failure to spend their money wisely.  
 
The Impact of Migration on Families 
Every year, over a million men travel from India to work in the Arabic-speaking 
countries of the Persian Gulf. The vast majority of these men are semi-skilled and unskilled 
laborers who work in the Gulf’s oil industry.521 In interviews I conducted in India and the United 
Arab Emirates, workers told me they traveled to the Gulf to support their families and to fulfill 
their dreams. Sometimes these two reasons were synonymous and, at other times, these reasons 
diverged radically. The migration of workers to the Gulf is a complex process that involves not 
only workers and the professional networks formed by workers, but also family ties, community 
networks, and gendered obligations. Often, anthropologists who study migration argue that 
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transnational migration destabilizes families and gender roles. Yet, during the course of my 
research, many migrants told me they migrated with the support of family and in order to fulfill 
their familial duties. This chapter examines the complicated relations between money, family, 
and gender. Specifically, it investigates how family relationships are formed by workers through 
their consumption of gold and the gendered nature of this consumption. It also explores how 
these familial obligations are often in tension with workers’ dreams of modernity. This 
examination of obligations and dreams reveals how kinship practices in India and the forms of 
masculinity implied in these obligations also shape the oil industry in the Arabian Sea. 
 In anthropologist Michele Gamburd’s discussion of migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf, 
she explores how kinship and gender roles impact and are impacted by migration. One major 
effect of migration in Sri Lanka, she finds, is the destabilization of families and the gender roles 
therein.522 This conclusion is also found in Janine Dahinden’s discussion of Albanian migration 
from Kosovo and Cati Coe’s examination of migration from Ghana.523 Studies examining 
migration’s effect on families and gender roles often focus on women’s roles specifically. The 
work men do to conform to and reconstruct gender roles as they migrate is relatively 
understudied in comparison. An exception to this is Filippo Osella and Caroline Osella’s work 
on masculinity and migration in Kerala, India. They explore four styles of masculinity in Kerala 
and consider migration’s potential to help men move along “culturally idealized trajectories,” as 
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well as how practices associated with migration interact with masculine identity projects.524 In 
this chapter, I do not focus on the relationship between masculinity and identity. Instead, I look 
at the practices enmeshed with labor migration, how these are influenced by ideas of masculinity 
and family, and how these migratory practices shape families in India and oil companies in the 
Gulf.  
 In the course of my research, I found joint family structures allowed unskilled and semi-
skilled male workers to travel to the Gulf and to direct money gained through migration. 
Through these men’s transnational migration to the Gulf, gendered norms and kinship practices 
often considered “traditional” in India – in particular, dowry and joint families – were reinforced. 
Central to this entrenching and shaping of social practices and the expression of gendered norms 
are engagements with commodities and capital. Labor migration from India to the Arabic-
speaking Persian Gulf is one of the ways Indian men procure goods for their sisters’ and 
daughters’ dowries. As a result, this transnational migration reinforces gender roles within 
families and allows for greater numbers of people to participate in the giving of dowry. Men 
make sense of their migration through the consumption of gold for dowries. In doing so, men 
construct and reinforce an idealized masculinity and family structure that is deeply imbricated in 
neoliberal policies, but also not reducible to these policies. Exploring these practices illuminates 
how kinship practices in India shape the oil industry. 
 
Migration and Family Obligations 
One person working in the Gulf at the behest of his family is Yogesh. I met Yogesh, a 
young man from Tamil Nadu, India, when he was living in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates 
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Royal Anthropological Institute 6, no. 1 (March 2000): 117–33. 
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(UAE), and working as a technician at a factory that builds parts for oilrigs. His experiences 
offer one example of the kinship obligations that inform migration and the expectations of 
migrants and their families. Prior to living in the Gulf, Yogesh lived in an ashram, or monastic 
community, in Maharashtra, India. When Yogesh asked formal permission from his parents to 
become a monk, they refused. Instead, they insisted that he take a job through a cousin in Dubai 
in order to help his sister marry and allow for his father to retire. When I met Yogesh, he had 
been working in the Gulf for about three years and had no plans of moving permanently back to 
India, although that was what he wished to do.  
During the week of Eid al-Adha, Yogesh, a few other Indian workers, and I were running 
around Dubai, doing errands, enjoying the time everyone had off from work, and helping Yogesh 
prepare for his trip home to his village. As we traveled around Dubai, our group went to the 
outlet malls and everyone, with the exception of Yogesh, took advantage of the sales and bought 
clothing, shoes, trinkets, and snacks.525 Yogesh did not shop with us because he was saving his 
money for the gold suq, or the large bazaar in the old city of Dubai that houses over 300 gold 
retailers. He told me repeatedly that his “primary obligation” was his sister’s marriage and he 
had to buy gold to meet this obligation. This gold was to be a part of his sister’s dowry, or gifts 
given by the bride’s family to the groom’s family at the time of marriage. 
Even though it was November, on the day Yogesh and I went to the gold suq it was hot 
and humid. Despite the heat, Yogesh shunned the gold suq in the air-conditioned mall. The shop 
stalls in the mall were largely empty due to the global downturn in 2008 and they were 
advertising sales on the local television, but the mall was uncomfortable for Yogesh. This was 
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because the nicer malls in Dubai often refused entry to foreigners who appear to be working 
class. Instead, Yogesh and I ventured into the gold suq inside Deira, the historic commercial 
center of Dubai. As we walked through a shopping area that was being increasingly marginalized 
by the malls along Shaikh Zayed Road, Yogesh looked for a shop where the prices were the 
lowest. Finally, he decided on a little stall with some design pieces, but mostly ropes of gold. 
Yogesh did not want to spend money on design, as he felt unsure about what styles his sister and 
mother liked. Inside the little stall, one could hear Tamil, Malayalam, and Hindi being spoken by 
other workers buying gold to take home to their wives, sisters, and mothers. After much 
deliberation, Yogesh chose a plain chain, the price of which was determined by its weight. 
Yogesh, like many people with whom I spoke, stressed to me that it was important to buy the 
gold in Dubai, as the quality was purer than the quality of gold in India.  
Yogesh was worried but also resentful about the amount of gold that his family asked 
him to bring home. On his annual trips home to India, he spent over three-quarters of his salary 
on gold for his sister’s dowry. He said that he wanted to buy his mother some gold, but his 
mother had instructed him to focus only on getting gold for his sister’s wedding. He also said 
that he disliked speaking to his sister on the phone, as she was always asking him to buy more 
gold and making demands regarding the quantity of gold that were impossible for him to meet. 
In order to try to meet these requests from his family, Yogesh lived frugally and shared a one-
bedroom apartment with eight men. He felt “stuck” working in the United Arab Emirates and 
forced to spend all of his money on his sister’s dowry. An especially large amount of gold was 
needed because his sister wanted to marry a man who worked in information technology (IT) and 
lived in Australia. This marriage would allow an upward mobility for his family that would be 




Dowry in India 
 Most people in India practice patrilocal social organization and joint families are 
considered by many to be the ideal family structure. This family structure is found among 
Christians, Muslims, and Hindus in the country. Joint families are “a group of adult male 
coparceners [joint heirs] and their dependents … wives and children.”526 For many poorer Indian 
migrants, the joint family is both an aspiration and a tool that allows workers to migrate.527 There 
is a mutually reinforcing relationship between joint families and migration to the Gulf: families 
borrow money so that sons may work abroad and the money earned abroad supports the family.  
 Migration is also a tool to help marry daughters and sisters. Money is needed for 
marriage because of the predominance of dowry in India – when a woman marries, her family 
gives the groom’s family gifts, or a dowry, of goods and money; often, these gifts take the form 
of gold. In Tom Trautmann’s analysis of kinship in India, he finds that this gift giving is a pan-
Indian tradition with ancient Indo-Aryan roots. Even though the giving of dowry was outlawed 
in 1961, it is still a common practice today. Ideally, in most of India the bride’s family gives 
dowry and the groom’s family gives no return gifts. This is because the bride’s family receiving 
gifts would be “regarded as the sale of a daughter.”528 Instead, the cultural ideal is for families to 
give dowries when their daughters or sisters marry, and migration is one tactic families use to 
acquire the money needed for these marriages.  
                                                
526 Jayati Lal, “(Un)Becoming Women: Indian Factory Women’s Counternarratives of Gender,” The 
Sociological Review 59, no. 3 (2011): p. 574; D Chawla, “I Will Speak Out: Narratives of Resistance in 
Contemporary Indian Women's Discourses in Hindu Arranged Marriages,” Women and Language 30 
(2007): p. 8. 
527 For a longer discussion of the class aspects of joint families, see Lawrence Cohen, No Aging in India, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
528 Trautmann goes on to explain the religious nature of the gift and differentiates this gift from the gift 
described by Mauss in order to explain the particularity of the gift in the Indian context Thomas R 
Trautmann, Dravidian Kinship, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 26-27, 277-285. 
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 Almost all the workers with whom I spoke expressed to me the importance of gold and 
the necessity of buying gold for their sisters’ or daughters’ dowries. These workers also told me 
that they delayed their marriages and, even after marriage, lived most of their lives apart from 
their wives so that they could first help their sisters to marry and then support their extended 
families. Due to claims made upon them by their sisters, these men circulated to the Gulf in order 
to allow their sisters to move to other families in India.  
 While regional variations exist, the claims made on men to secure dowries cut across 
many class lines, caste groups, and regional distinctions. For example, Mr. Pandeya, my lunch 
companion at Mancom, had been a supervisor at an oil project. Because he was abroad so much 
and had extensive obligations to his natal family, Mr. Pandeya married later in life. He told me 
he had originally gone to the Gulf to help support his large family; Mr. Pandeya had seven sisters 
and needed to help them marry since his own father’s health was poor. Like many of the men I 
interviewed, Mr. Pandeya saw it as his obligation to help his sisters marry before he, himself, 
married. Another worker, Mr. Ramchandra, was a farmer’s son and worked as an unskilled 
worker at an oil project. He had studied in school, but only for a few years before he dropped out 
in order to help support his family. Mr. Ramchandra told me he decided to work in the Gulf 
because he had “two sisters and no money in India” and he believed he would “find” more 
money working in the Gulf. This money was especially needed to marry his sisters. When he 
first took the job he sent his entire paycheck home. His first “responsibility” was to assist his 
sisters to marry. Now that his sisters are married, he sends only “according to needs” and some 
extra money to his father to build a pakkā house, or a house made of concrete and bricks.  
 One day when he was on a break from work, I asked Mr. Ramchandra what was needed 
to marry his sisters and he looked at me as though I were a child and slowly said, “gold.” Mr. 
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Pandeya also stressed gold when I asked what things needed to be given for his sisters’ 
weddings. Mr. Pandeya, who is from Bihar in northern India and learnt English while working in 
the Gulf, told me that household goods were important, but, “in north Indian style of marriage, of 
course, THE GOLD is an important item for the marriage.” As I wrote, Mr. Pandeya looked over 
my shoulder and offered corrections, insisting that I capitalize “the gold” in order to indicate its 
importance. He then continued, “but it is not as important as it's emphasized in South India. Say 
if it is 50 grams in North then it would be 500 grams in South Indian marriage. South Indians are 
more fascinated towards Gold. However, one thing is true in all Indians marriage, i.e., DOWRY, 
which a girl has to carry to [her] in-laws place.” 
 In her seminal essay “The Traffic in Women” Gayle Rubin provides an analytic lens that 
can be used to understand dowry. Rubin examines how exchange establishes relations between 
people, and argues that men exchange female relatives in order to form a bond that includes both 
reciprocity and kinship. “If it is women who are being transacted, then it is the men who give and 
take them who are linked, the women being the conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to 
it.”529 Things and women circulate. In the case of India, the practice of dowry is built upon the 
giving of gifts – gifts that move with the bride from her natal family to her husband’s family. 
Using Rubin’s analysis, we can see that “kinship is a system of categories” given form by sex 
and gender relations.530 In order to help their sisters or daughters to marry, families in India go to 
great lengths, in some cases so far as to sell a kidney.531 Nonetheless, less attention has been paid 
to how men acquire dowry or support joint families. In my research, I found that with the 
                                                
529 Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in Toward an 
Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayner R Reiter, (New York, 1975), p. 174. 
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increase in workers traveling to the Gulf to work on oil projects or their subsidiaries, oil money 
is used to lend greater stability to joint families and purchase gold for dowries. In the case of 
transnational migration, joint families often work together to send a son abroad; then, once he is 
working there, they make claims on his labor and the products of his labor. 
 Transnational labor migration both provides dowries for daughters and drives a shift 
towards increasingly large dowries. In anthropologist Xiang Biao’s study of the migration of IT 
workers from Andhra Pradesh (AP, now Telangana and Seemandhra) to Australia he finds that 
giving dowry is increasingly the norm.532 Based on Srinivas’s work in South India, Xiang argues 
that dowry was not historically found in southern India and is actually a relatively recent 
practice. He further observes that giving and receiving of dowry are linked and “cente[r] on the 
concept of kutumba gowravan (family status), and the anxiety to protect, or more often to uplift, 
the family’s status motivated young IT sons to contribute as much as possible to their sisters’ 
dowries.”533 The centrality of dowry helps explain the sense of pressure experienced by Yogesh, 
Mr. Pandeya, and Mr. Ramchandra. The giving of dowry is a middle-class practice that is 
becoming increasingly entrenched among both middle and lower classes as a method of securing 
family relations and improving family status. 
 The continuing popularity and increasing frequency of giving dowry in both northern and 
southern India is counterintuitive for many scholars of Indian transnational migration. The 
assumption would be that because Yogesh’s sister was going to marry a well-educated young 
man who lived in Australia, then the fiancé’s family would not ask for a dowry from her. My 
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assumptions on the matter had been influenced by my conversations with women who work for 
women’s rights in India. These women had explained to me that dowry is a social evil. Women’s 
rights workers argue that demands for dowry often escalate into mistreatment of women and this 
is so common that many anti-dowry advocates feel that dowry is a “euphemism for wife-
battering.”534 Additionally, it is argued, dowry contributes to and reinforces Indian preferences 
for sons and the higher value placed on male children.  
 Contrary to expectations, however, migration and increased participation in transnational, 
neoliberal economies does not seem to decrease the practice of dowry, but rather, has precisely 
the opposite effect. In Anisur Rahman’s study of Bihari migration to the Gulf, he asks whether 
migration changes migrants’ attitudes towards dowry and, in particular, whether migration helps 
workers to “leave behind” the institution of dowry. He finds that this was not the case: 
respondents in his study indicated that they felt they must give a dowry in order to allow their 
sisters and daughters to marry sons from “decent families.” Contrary to his expectations, 
Rahman found that migration “increased dowry on account of inflow of remittances. Many 
families have become prosperous and are willing to give dowry.”535 Thus, in both northern and 
southern India, dowry increases in frequency and size with transnational migration. 
 In his analysis, Rahman assumes that migration is a modern phenomena and that 
participating in this modern practice will change a traditional aspect of Indian culture. He 
presents modernization as linear and developmental and contrasts modernization with fixed 
traditions. Veena Talwar Oldenburg offers an alternative view on dowry. She finds that dowry 
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and gold are linked with changes brought about during the British colonial period. Under the 
British Raj, property rights were altered:  
The concept of property stood altered in the most radical way in that 
universe of swift changes brought about by the British, and on this central 
concept were predicated the new equations of rights of women and men. 
The fact that dowries gradually incorporated ‘movable’ liquid assets such 
as cash and gold made them exceptionally useful in acquiring productive 
and ‘immovable’ assets, and that this possibility of conversion was 
instrumental in changing the contents of a dowry and in shifting its control 
from a woman to either her husband or his father.536 
 
 The implication is that stridhan, or a woman’s property, no longer remained with the woman 
and was made accessible instead to both men and the government through taxes.537 Oldenburg 
demonstrates that giving gold in marriages has its roots in the colonial period, that the shift from 
land to gold coincided with women having less control over property, and that the meaning and 
consequences of dowry have changed over time. This shifting meaning of dowry coincides with 
new ways in which the gold for dowries is procured. 
 
Gold Circulation in the Arabian Sea 
 Today, gold is the second largest import to India after oil. India’s high gold consumption is 
attributed to the prevalence of dowry in the form of gold and because people purchase gold as a 
way of saving money instead of putting it into banks. As Yogesh bought gold and we wandered 
through the gold suq, he was participating in an exchange of oil, gold, and labor that has 
historically traversed the Arabian Sea. The migration of workers to the Gulf to work in the oil 
fields began in the 1920s under the British. However, the relationship between India and the Gulf 
predates these efforts to extract oil, and gold has long played a role in this relationship. In the 
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nineteenth century, India was a large exporter of gold. This shifted during the early twentieth 
century, with new economic policies during the 1950s leading to an increase in the smuggling of 
gold into India from the Gulf. Today, connections between marriage practices in India and 
India’s consumption of gold mediate relations in the Arabian Sea. The relationship between oil, 
gold, and trade on the Arabian Sea has shifted as national policies have changed and as greater 
numbers of workers participate in this trade.  
 Prior to independence, India was one of the main exporters of gold in the world. At India’s 
independence, Jawaharlal Nehru and, later, Indira Gandhi cultivated an economic policy with the 
aim of greater self-sufficiency. One feature of the new economic measures was greater control 
over the import of gold into India and the levying of duties on the import of precious 
materials.538 Increased restrictions were also placed on the export of Indian gold. The result was 
that, by 1961, the “price of gold in India [was] almost twice the price of gold on the world 
market.”539 Due to these restrictions and the demand for gold in India, gold smuggling became a 
lucrative endeavor for merchants in the Gulf. Originally, merchants in Kuwait used smugglers 
based in Dubai to carry goods to India. However, in the early 1950s, coinciding with increased 
oil revenues in Kuwait, Kuwaiti merchants became less interested in smuggling and Dubai 
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merchants overtook the endeavor.540 In Dubai, the gold trade helped the economy recover from 
the effects of the Depression of 1929 and the collapse of the pearl trade.541 
 Despite the self-sufficiency measures implemented by the Indian government, the 
smuggling of gold created an avenue for Indians to participate in global economies of trade. Gulf 
merchants purchased gold legally in London, Zurich, Paris, and New York.542 This gold was then 
taken to Dubai and smuggled into India via dhows entering the port in Bombay. In Bombay, 
Indian agents paid either in dollars, pounds, or rupees (preferably rupee coins, as they were the 
same in Dubai and India) for the gold. In 1966, one British agent noted the complexity of this 
gold economy and the role of Indian migrants within it. He wrote, “It is interesting in this context 
that even, for instance, the Indian textile worker in Bradford [England] plays his part in the 
business by selling his sterling earnings at a high premium.”543 At times, textiles from Bombay 
were also taken in exchange for gold. These textiles were then sold in Iran, where there was a 
high demand.544 
 Some members of the British administration worried that the smuggling was hurting the 
Indian economy and, in turn, necessitating more British loans to India. These administrators 
feared that the result was an overall negative impact upon British currency.545 However, the 
majority of the British administration was reluctant to hurt the gold smuggling in the Gulf in any 
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way, as administrators also recognized that such smuggling was the “staple of the economy.”546 
These administrators argued that the trade was so ubiquitous it would be “impossible to stop.” 
They further argued that no law was being broken in the Trucial States, today the UAE, and it 
was only once the gold reached India and Pakistan that crimes were being committed. Therefore, 
the gold smuggling was out of British jurisdiction. Most important, from the British 
administration’s perspective, was the fear of “political repercussions which might well lead to 
the Ruler concerned denying us the various facilities we require and to increased demands for 
economic assistance.”547 For the British, access to oil came before the enforcement of smuggling 
laws. In 1962, Abu Dhabi began exporting oil and British companies had lucrative deals for both 
oil exploration and development. A central aspect of British interest in the Gulf was Britain’s 
increasing reliance on oil and, in turn, Britain’s dependence upon the cooperation of the rulers of 
the Gulf in order to access the oil reserves there. In the 1960s, British administrators were trying 
to extract as many oil concessions as possible without giving more economic support to the Gulf 
economies. 
 In addition to the importance of gold smuggling to the economies of the Trucial States, 
gold smuggling was also a concern to the Indian government. When India petitioned the British 
government to allow an Indian consulate in 1962 in Dubai, the British administration of Dubai 
immediately suspected it was because the Indian government wanted to “keep an eye on” gold 
smuggling and report on it to New Delhi.548 The British administration stated in letters that it 
valued India’s presence in the Commonwealth and that it understood there were around three 
thousand Indians living in Dubai that would benefit from the establishment of an Indian 
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consulate. Nonetheless, the British believed that the ultimate motive behind the proposed 
consulate was so that India could control the gold smuggling. The British had no interest in 
controlling this trade and, furthermore, wanted to maintain their own exclusive political control 
in the Trucial States. Therefore, they did not want to weaken the exclusive agreement that put 
England in charge of the Trucial States’ external affairs.  
 When discussing the Indian government’s desire to open a consulate, one official 
explained that “Indians love gold,” both as an ornament and as protection against inflation. 
Additionally, one analyst predicted, “only liberalization of the imports of goods into Persia and 
of gold into Pakistan and India could entirely stop the trade, and it is unlikely that any of these 
countries will be able to afford liberalization in the foreseeable future.”549 This prediction proved 
to be true in India, and despite a slowdown in the early 1970s when Indira Gandhi cracked down 
on smuggling in Bombay, gold smuggling continued until the early 1990s, when liberalization of 
India’s economy included the lifting of trade restrictions and custom duties.550 
 Today, oil money is used by laborers to move gold into the country. The movement of 
gold and the way in which dowries are given all indicate emerging practices that were shaped in 
the twentieth century with the convergence of political maneuvering and family practices. The 
result is that neoliberalization and transnational migration impact the form that dowry, often 
considered a “traditional” practice in India, takes. This convergence of factors also helps define 
gender roles in the family, in part due to the restrictions placed on women’s emigration from 
India. 
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Migration to the Gulf as a Gendered Activity 
 The migration of Indian men to the Gulf allows men to define their roles as fathers and 
sons. I was repeatedly told that a “good man,” or a man fulfilling his familial duties, helps 
procure gold for his sisters’ or daughters’ dowries. This is particularly necessary because poor, 
uneducated women in India are unable to acquire this dowry for themselves through migration. 
Due to the restrictions set up by the Indian government, it is impossible for a woman under thirty 
years of age to migrate to the Gulf for work if she has not matriculated (i.e., passed Tenth 
Standard, or the second year, of high school).551 The order that prohibits these women from 
traveling abroad for work reads: “Women below the age of 30 years may not be granted 
emigration clearance, who seek any kind of employment including employment as housemaids, 
domestic workers, hair dressers, beauticians, dancers, stage artist, labourers, general workers, 
etc., in any foreign country.”552 The rule is framed as seeking to protect not only women, but also 
the reputation of Indians abroad. In large part, these policies were in response to reports that 
women working as domestic workers in the Gulf, and in particular in Kuwait, were being abused 
and articles in newspapers that claimed Indian women were working as prostitutes in the Gulf.  
 Recruiting agents in India repeatedly told me that Indian women face harassment when 
working abroad. According to the employees at the recruiting agencies with whom I worked, the 
ability to travel abroad in order to have more choice in the time and nature of marriage is a 
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highly gendered activity. Men can travel in order to seek the financial stability to marry and even 
find the funds to pay for themselves to live away from their parents. Families in India often told 
me of the expectations they had for their sons in the Gulf, and young men working in the Gulf 
told me their motivation in migrating was to support their families and fulfill their duties as sons. 
In general, daughters were not able to fulfill these obligations. These gendered expectations are 
not only held by families, but are also found in general stereotyping done by Gulf workers, 
recruiting agents, and Indian government policies. According to many recruiting agents in 
Mumbai, women who migrated for unskilled labor, in particular, were thought to be going to 
work as prostitutes. At every agency I visited, I asked if the agency helped to place women 
looking for work as housemaids, waitresses, and sales persons in the Gulf. With the exception of 
one very large company that supplied manpower to Saudi Arabia, I was told that the agency did 
not perform such work. The reason given was that women were “taken advantage of” in the Gulf 
and women who did want to work in the Gulf were “not the good type of girl.”  
 The questionable morality of women working abroad was also implied in news stories 
about women trying to work in the Gulf as entertainers. The Times of India frequently ran 
articles in 2009 and 2010 discussing “dancing girls” working in the Gulf and, in particular, 
Dubai. In these articles, reporters interviewed concerned patrons who claimed that the “girls ply 
the trade,” meaning the women worked as prostitutes. Patrons supported this claim by stating 
that the “girls” were not allowed tips and, therefore, the only reason they would dance well 
would be in order to entice clients. In these articles, Dubai was portrayed as a place where 
unskilled “girls” could make large amounts of money, but only by participating in prostitution.553  
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 The current policies regarding women migrating to the Gulf and the Indian government’s 
interest in the moral position or virtue of women in the Gulf are not new. From the late 1950s 
through the mid-1960s, the Indian government dealt with a series of complaints regarding the 
“immoral traffic in women.”554 Connecting these complaints and the contemporary moment are 
the fears for women’s virtue, the assumed obligation of the Indian government to protect that 
virtue, and the subtle backdrop of class as an analytic space in which these gendered anxieties 
regarding virtue play out. Poor women have unequal access to migration and employment 
abroad, and this reinforces the inequalities they face in India due to both their gender and their 
economic position. This inequality is further highlighted when these restrictions are compared 
with upper-class women’s movement. For example, upper class young women, such as daughters 
of recruiting agents, go abroad to England or the United States to study and I was never told of 
the immorality of this activity.  
 Beginning in the late eighteenth century, India was represented as a mother and “written, 
recited, and pictured with filial affect.”555 Such representations of India seem to have permeated 
the contemporary moment, as they continue to inform the restrictions on women traveling 
internationally. India’s reputation is located in the body of women abroad and poorer women, in 
particular, are constructed as unable to protect themselves. The effect is that working class and 
                                                                                                                                                       
explored in further detail by Pardis Mahdavi. See, Pardis Mahdavi, Gridlock: Labor, Migration, and 
Human Trafficking in Dubai, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
554 One example comes from letters written by Rubiyabia, a Muslim woman from Mumbai, to the Indian 
Government in the late 1950s and early 19560s. In her letters, Rubiyabai was concerned because her 
daughter, Zuleka, had married a man she identified as “Arab” and she was afraid that Zuleka was forced 
into prostitution upon arrival in Bahrain. In this and in the other cases I found in the archives, neither the 
allegation of forced prostitution nor the allegation of the wife’s ill treatment by her “Arab” husbands was 
substantiated. However, fears of the ill-treatment of women moving to the Gulf continued to be a pressing 
issue. Letters from Rubiyabai to Ministry of External Affairs and Counsel for India at Bahrain. NAI, PVI 
Section, 1962. VI/402/3(118)/62. 
555 Sumathi Ramaswamy, The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India, (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2009), p. 9. 
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most middle class women are unable to enter into the oil economy. As a consequence, women 
must rely on their fathers or brothers to procure money for their marriages. While the stated 
purpose is the protection of women, the result is that young women who have not matriculated 
are unable to travel legally for work. This undermines the ability of these women to migrate in 
order to inform their marriage decisions or to access the larger salaries that are available in the 
Gulf. It also means these women are only able to work abroad illegally. The result is that women 
are put in positions where they may be imprisoned by Gulf governments, and they are vulnerable 
to violations of their labor rights, as they have no legal status in their host country. Neither 
Yogesh’s sister nor Ramchandra’s sisters could legally travel to earn money for marriage. As a 
consequence, most women must rely on their fathers or brothers to procure money for their 
marriages. 
 
Muslims and Dowry 
 Middle class Indian women who live in the Gulf are also reliant on their fathers or 
brothers for dowry and this is true for both Hindus and Muslims. While dowry in India is often 
discussed in relation to Hindu marriage practices and the examples I give above concern Hindu 
men, dowry, and gold in particular, held importance for Muslims in India as well. The following 
examples illustrate the importance of dowry for Indian Muslims and the prevalence of dowry 
within an aspiring middle class.  
 In the summer of 2011, both American and European financial markets appeared volatile 
and, as a result, the price of gold rose higher and higher. During this time, Shabana, an Indian 
Muslim living in Ajman, UAE, and I were chatting frequently. Shabana’s father and husband 
both worked in the Gulf. Because they were from an upper middle class family, Shabana was 
 
 284 
able to live in the Gulf with her husband and his family. Despite the family’s relative wealth, 
Shabana was very attentive to the price of gold as her sister, Asma, was preparing to marry in 
Kerala. As the time neared for the wedding, Shabana repeatedly expressed concern over the price 
of gold. In a group conversation, she asked, “Why is gold increasing at a skyrocketing pace? 
What has gold rates to do with US dollar or oil? Or is there no gold in the gold mines?” She 
added later that the increased prices “make people’s life more miserable than it already is.” 
Shabana’s friends generally commiserated with her regarding the price of gold and the timing of 
her sister’s wedding. One of her friends noted that “people don’t trust any commodity but gold” 
and that this was because shares on the stock markets are “rubbish.” Other friends blamed 
Indians for the high price of gold: “Maybe if Mallus (Malayalam speakers from the state of 
Kerala in South India) [and] Gujjus (people from the Indian state of Gujarat) stop buying so 
much it will probably drop.” Another pointed to the link between marriage, gold, and India and 
commented that gold is so expensive because “more and more Mallus are getting married.” Both 
Kerala and Gujarat are Indian states known for their trading and have a visible presence in the 
Gulf. The assumption of the speaker was that the wealthy from these states were getting married 
in higher numbers and thus driving up the price of gold. Shabana and Asma’s family felt 
compelled to supply a large amount of gold for Asma’s wedding. Their father had migrated in 
the 1960s to work in the UAE and through hard work and “some luck” he currently managed a 
small factory there. By providing a large dowry of gold for Asma’s wedding, the family was 
attempting to assert their relatively new class position and ensure their daughter married a good 
man. 
 Earlier that year, I had also had a conversation about dowry with Shabana’s sister, Asma. 
One day, as we were having tea, Asma looked at me and sighed. “Dowries are very important in 
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India,” she told me. This worried her as she prepared for her marriage. She said that for Muslims 
in Kerala, the rich are expected to give a house, gold, and a car. The poor are only expected to 
give a car and gold. I asked her about mahr, the gift given from the groom to the bride in Muslim 
marriages (nikāh). She replied that poor Indian Muslim grooms only give INR 100 ($2 USD) and 
the rich give 100 AED (approximately INR 1,400 or $27 USD). This is just a “menial” amount, 
she told me. Asma said that, according to religious beliefs, she felt no one should expect 
anything for mahr. However, due to the wealth of her fiancé’s family, she does expect a small 
amount of gold. Shabana and Asma both knew a girl who had studied in the US and they were 
surprised by how little a family gives here. She told me that in India, “A ring is not enough.” She 
also contrasted Indian practices with the mahr given in the Gulf and said that Arab girls expect 
houses and cars. However, in India, the mahr does not “even out” the dowry. She sighed again 
and said, “It’s not fair, the Arab girls can ask of anything.”556 While Arab girls may ask for 
anything, in India, grooms ask for gold. For Asma, she was reliant on her father’s and brother’s 
contributions to her dowry to secure her marriage. 
 
Masculinity and Migration 
The claims sisters and mothers made on men’s labor influenced many men’s choice to 
migrate to the Gulf. Migrating and purchasing gold for dowries became one way in which these 
men defined themselves as “men” and situated themselves in their families and communities. 
This manifestation of masculinity is articulated differently than are representations of 
masculinity in India that rely on a man’s status as married. The latter form of masculinity can 
create difficulties, especially when young men have difficulty marrying because of increasing 
                                                
556 In this conversation, Asma contrasted Arab and Indian Muslim practices. She makes that claim that 
according to religion “one should not expect anything,” but later says that Arab brides (or their families) 
make high demands on grooms.  
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unemployment and lack of opportunities.557 High unemployment sometimes meant north Indian 
families would allocate resources so that a son’s employment or marriage were prioritized at the 
expense of his sisters’ marriages.558 Transnational migration, on the other hand, provided 
alternate routes through which men could express and define their masculinity. This masculinity 
and the inequalities inherent in patriarchal systems are reinforced by both men and by women, 
such as Asma’s and Yogesh’s female relatives. 
This definition of masculinity must also consider how transnational migration affects the 
wife of the migrant. Mr. Pandeya’s wife, Padma, told me that she often begged her husband not 
to travel overseas, as she wanted him home with her. She enjoyed her husband’s companionship, 
but she also felt that she was mistreated by her in-laws when her husband was away. As opposed 
to Mr. Pandeya’s sisters, who did little labor within the home, Padma said that when she was 
living with her in-laws and without her husband, she did a large portion of all household tasks. 
These patriarchal relations not only defined women and their femininity, but also defined men 
and their efforts to demonstrate their masculinity. 
Hegemonic masculinity is defined as the practices that allow for men’s dominance of 
women to continue. Studies of hegemonic masculinity often consider it at three levels: local, 
regional, and global. R. W. Connell and James Messerschmidt write, “Processes such as 
economic restructuring, long-distance migration, and the turbulence of development agendas 
have the power to reshape local patterns of masculinity and femininity.”559 While not arguing for 
a hierarchical relation, some approaches assume that global practices restructure local practice, 
                                                
557 Prem Chowdhry, “Crisis of Masculinity in Haryana,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 49 
(December 3, 2005): 5189–98; Osella and Osella, “Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala.”  
558 Craig Jeffrey, Timepass: Youth, Culture, and the Politics of Waiting in India, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 177-178. 
559 R W Connell and James W Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” 
Gender & Society 19, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): pp. 849-850. 
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with little movement happening in the other direction. What I would want to highlight here is the 
way in which a local form of masculinity – specifically, the way in which Indian men define 
their roles in families through supplying their sisters’ and daughters’ dowries – is actually 
defining the shape of global economic movements and practices. In the case of Indian men 
migrating to the Gulf, the practice blurs scholarly definitions of local, regional, and global 
boundaries and relations. Rather, we see the historically contextualized system of relations 
formed by dowry being reinforced and more people being able to participate in the practice of 
dowry through transnational migration. Similar to how these men shape economic exchange 
between India and the United Arab Emirates, migration also helps to reinforce practices that 
have been taking place since the British colonial period in India.  
In addition to being a type of masculinity that does not rely on a man’s marriage or 
cohabitation with his wife and children, migrants’ masculinity while in the Gulf is often depicted 
as dangerous and policed. One weekend while I was at the beach in Dubai, a group of young 
Indian men arrived who were clearly out of place. These men were short and dressed in the 
clothes worn by laborers on oil projects on their days off – polyester pants and plastic flip-flops. 
In addition, they were slightly shorter and much thinner than many of the men from Europe and 
the Middle East who were relaxing or playing sports on the beach. The Indian men stood in a 
group and stared out at the crowded beach. As they did so, a group of young European men 
walked up and (to my horror) chased the Indian men off. Reminiscent of Yogesh’s discomfort in 
the mall because the space was socially policed to keep out laboring Indians (a category that was 
too close to his own), the public beach was also a space from which these men were excluded. 
The day following this encounter, I spoke about it to an Emirati man I knew. He explained to me 
that the men who had been chased off were dangerous and would have made women 
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uncomfortable with their presence. This reading of South Asian men as dangerous and lecherous 
provides yet another articulation of Indian migrants’ masculinity – one imposed on them by 
others as a result of the migrants’ socioeconomic position as foreign laborers.560 
Migration both reinscribes and reshapes social practices and the expression of gendered 
norms that are related to the consumption of commodities and access to capital. For Indian 
laborers in the Gulf, gold and oil have value based on historical and cultural significance. 
Furthermore, gold and oil also exert a “structural form of compulsion” on these migrant 
laborers.561 This means that gold and oil are commodities that may be approached, in a Marxian 
sense, not only as representative of class relations but also as objects that mediate historically 
situated social practices. As a result, the consumption and distribution of commodities and 
capital, in particular gold and oil, are practices used by Indian laborers in the Gulf to express 
family relationships and gender roles. In turn, gold and oil are constituted as socially meaningful 
objects through the making and expressing of kinship. Migrants make sense of their migration 
and cement their kinship relations through contributing to female family members’ dowries by 
consuming gold and distributing it to future husbands or fathers-in-law. Many migrants felt 
obligated to do this by their parents and siblings. The result was that masculinity depended on 
migrants’ acquiescence to familial pressures.  
 
 
                                                
560 The segregation of space is neither unique to the area of the beach nor to Dubai. Andrew Gardner’s 
work on South Asians in Bahrain tells many instances of spatial and social discrimination. In addition, 
other nationalities, including young men from Iran, also experience this spatial segregation. Andrew 
Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2010); Behzad Sarmadi, “'Bachelor’ in the City: Urban Transformation and Matter Out 
of Place in Dubai,” Journal of Arabian Studies 3, no. 2 (December 2013): 196–214. 
561 Moishe Postone, “Deconstruction as Social Critique: Derrida on Marx and the New World Order,” 
History and Theory, (October 1993), p. 381. 
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Migrant Dreams and Modernity 
 By migrating in order to purchase dowry, men were often deferring their own dreams. 
Mr. Pandeya would have preferred to stay at home with his wife, and Yogesh wanted to live in 
India and study religion. Workers often told me how much they missed their homes, their wives, 
and their mothers. They also wanted to purchase goods for themselves, but felt pressure from 
their family, and sometimes friends, to send money home or to buy gold to take home. During a 
conversation with one older man who was returning to work in the Gulf, we found ourselves 
talking about food and how much he enjoyed the food his wife cooked for him when he was 
home. When I asked him about food in the Gulf he told me:  
I am going only for work. My family needs the money. You can find jobs 
in India, but they don’t pay as well. I will compromise to whatever food I 
have to, because I am sacrificing to go to make money for my family. So I 
will adjust, just like my family will need to adjust, because I am not at 
home. 
 
This worker understood that both he and his family were sacrificing in order to send him to the 
Gulf. The goal of going to the Gulf was to provide for families and earn money. Conversations 
with this worker, as well as Yogesh, Ram, Mr. Pandeya, and Mr. Ramchandra, elucidated that 
helping sisters and daughters to marry was one of the primary ways in which many workers 
supported their families, and that this was often effected through the consumption of gold. 
 All of the workers I interviewed indicated that they were going to the Gulf to help 
supplement their families’ daily expenses and the majority said they were also working in the 
Gulf in order to pay for their sisters’ weddings. Only after noting these first two needs did 
workers identify other motivations for working in the Gulf, such as facilitating their own desire 
to marry, building a house, sending children to school, and/or buying new farm equipment. Such 
supplementary reasons for working in the Gulf still concerned providing for their families, but 
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more specifically, workers saw themselves as helping to improve their families’ position and, in 
the case of Muslims or lower-caste workers, to stop being “backwards.” A few workers told me, 
with sincerity and excitement, that they were going to “make India modern.” This concept was 
difficult for me to define, as some workers understood modernity to mean helping their families’ 
position. Clean water, electricity, or tractors were felt to have immediately tangible benefits for 
their families. But “making India modern” also implied other, more difficult to articulate dreams.  
 Mr. Sheikh, the head of an organization for the improvement of worker rights in the Gulf 
and a former semi-skilled worker there, explained to me his understanding of workers’ dreams. 
With regard to workers traveling to the Gulf, Mr. Sheikh said, “The villagers don’t know about 
where they are going and the ‘middle man’ sells dreams to him. Villagers only dream of going 
and flying in an airplane, because he has always dreamt of this.” For Mr. Sheikh and the men 
with whom he worked, modernity meant clean water, consistent electricity supply, fast cars, and 
high-rise buildings. Modernity was far away, hard to reach, and not fully known. In 
conversations, as I sought to understand what people meant by “making India modern,” I learnt 
that modernity was hierarchical and a process that involved several steps. Quite a few people 
explained to me that Dubai was more modern than India but still not as modern as the United 
States. This was because Dubai lacked certain freedoms and the international centrality of the 
United States. In my interlocutors’ dreams, modernity involved living in the city; doing what you 
want; love matches, as opposed to arranged marriages; and having enough capital to buy the 
accoutrements they saw on TV shows and on display in malls. It also involved “getting fat” and 
wearing shiny shirts and large watches. For many young Indian men facing limited opportunities 
in their home villages, migration to the Gulf offered opportunities to fulfill their dreams and 
“move forward and up” in the graduated hierarchy of modernity.  
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 Going abroad potentially allows a man to fulfill his dreams, but this must be weighed 
against his obligations to his family, community, and country. Buying gold for sisters’ dowries 
and fulfilling other family expectations often clashed with the dreams of young men. However, 
in the case of the Gulf migrants with whom I spoke, the majority postponed their dreams and 
sent money back to their families as expected. In the stories told by migrant workers and 
recruiters, familial obligations and dreams were constantly being negotiated. Workers said they 
were going to the Gulf “to make India modern” but their understanding of this “modernity” 
seemed to be rooted in infrastructural features of modernity: airplanes, constant electricity, and 
clean water. Ambiguously connected to this are the other factors associated with modernity and 
neo-liberal reforms. Gold and oil were tangible commodities that could be used to critically 
engage with, question, and construct obligations and dreams. Deciding between dreams and 
obligations while working on oil projects to purchase gold is thus one way in which workers and 




The Circulation of Men and the Exchange of Women 
The consumption of gold both structures and is structured by relationships. To return to 
the work of Gayle Rubin, which I discussed earlier in the chapter, Rubin notes the relational 
quality of inequalities and exchanges. She writes, “‘Exchange of women’ is a shorthand for 
expressing that the social relations of a kinship system specify that men have certain rights in 
their female kin, and that women do not have the same rights either to themselves or to their 
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male kin.”562 In the case of workers in the Gulf, women were not excluded from making claims 
on their brothers and women were not the only ones experiencing these inequalities. For men 
working in the Gulf, many stated that they would rather be at home, in their villages, and with 
their families than in the Gulf. Many also said they would rather work in the Gulf but have 
greater control over their money. Workers indicated that they found the work challenging, the 
hours long and tiring, and that they largely worked in the Gulf in order to help their families. For 
these unskilled and semi-skilled workers, the life they lived in the Gulf was not their first choice. 
The experiences of the workers with whom I spoke elucidate how kinship is relationally 
constructed through the circulation of men and women and claims made upon both based on 
their specifically gendered positions. For male migrants, this circulation is based on the need to 
help supply their sisters’ or daughters’ dowries, which often takes the form of gold acquired 
through working on oil projects. Men fulfill family obligations and define themselves as men by 
migrating abroad, and in doing so help shape regional oil practices and transnational economic 
activities.  
 
                                                
562 She also notes that when women are trafficked, they can be trafficked “simply as women.” In contrast, 
men are also contracted, but as “some other … social status, rather than as men.” Rubin, “The Traffic in 












 Every year a large oil and gas exposition is held in Abu Dhabi – the Abu Dhabi 
International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference (ADIPEC). ADIPEC takes over the huge 
Abu Dhabi National Exhibition Centre for a week, and it includes stalls of hardware vendors, 
human resource experts, oil and gas publications, the large oil companies, and contractors. 
Wandering through the conference in November 2010, I was overwhelmed by the scale of the oil 
industry and the size of the equipment used. Also at ADIPEC were panels and sessions of 
interest to people in the industry. Panels offered that year included, “New Frontier Challenges,” 
“Sustainability and the Development of Human Capital,” and “Carbon Management in the Oil 
Industry.” Additional, smaller sessions covered topics related to technology, geology, and 
management.  
 In addition to these panels and sessions, the oil company Total held a session for students 
who were interested in jobs in the oil industry. The session, conducted mostly in Arabic, but with 
some French and English also spoken, was geared towards encouraging young Emirati men and 
women to apply for training and possible jobs at Total. The woman leading the session outlined 
the history of Total in Abu Dhabi, which she dated back to 1939. Moving from the company’s 
historic presence in the UAE to the present, she discussed Total’s large, off-site projects in the 
Persian Gulf and the company’s move to diversify and expand into the gas industry as well. To 
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encourage citizens of the UAE to join the company, she mentioned the high salaries Emiratis 
make and that Total had two pay scales: one for expatriates and another for UAE nationals. She 
also noted that working for Total, or another large oil company, did not mean the UAE national 
had to leave their family for long periods of time. She explained that, after training, “expats tend 
to move on to international jobs, whereas UAE nationals tend to only go abroad for one to two 
years max, but they always return.” Attempts by Total to increase the number of Emirati 
employees were not unique. Khalījīs were almost absent from the oil industry, and oil 
companies, in response to pressure from Gulf governments, were attempting to increase the 
numbers of khalījīs working in the industry, especially in highly skilled positions. The reasons 
for the contemporary lack of Emiratis in the oil industry date back to the work done to evacuate 
politics from the oilfields in the 1960s and the nature of the distribution of oil rents to the 
population. The lack of Emiratis or other khalījīs in the oil industry and the historic relationships 
between the Gulf and South Asia are two reasons for the large numbers of Indian expatriates 
living in the Gulf. 
The regional specificity of hiring locals for oil and gas projects is neither an accident of 
history nor is it a purposively constructed situation. Rather, the migratory networks developed 
historically and in the contemporary moment by workers, employers, agents, and government 
officials have given oil production in the Arabian Sea its specific character. From the strikes by 
Indians in the oilfields to the restructuring of emigration laws, Indian laborers and lawmakers 
have attempted to exert control over the labor conditions in the Gulf oilfields. Likewise, the 
strikes and political activities of khalījī workers have also been influential moments in the 
shaping of the kafala, or sponsorship, system. These moments were further impacted by the 
activities of merchants, oil companies, and the British administration in the Gulf. Today, the 
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result of all these combined factors can be seen in the contemporary kafala system in which 
workers have limited means to negotiate their working conditions. 
As I sat in Total’s recruitment pitch at ADIPEC, young Emiratis, both men and women, 
came and went. Sitting in the back of the room for the entire talk were seven young Indian 
students, six men and one woman. These students attentively took notes regarding the 
recruitment and training processes for Total. These students had lived in the UAE all their lives, 
but retained their Indian citizenship due to the restrictive nature of citizenship in the UAE. Only 
children born to an Emirati father automatically qualify for citizenship, and children who are 
born to Emirati women married to non-Emiratis may apply for citizenship. The process for 
people not from the Gulf to become citizens is difficult and it is rare for non-citizens to be 
granted citizenship even if all requirements are met.563  
The Indian students at the information session were just a handful of the millions of 
Indians living in the Gulf. Children of Indian managers, business people, and professionals, these 
Indian students hoped to find jobs in the Gulf, they told me, because the salaries at oil companies 
are high and because they enjoyed living in the UAE. Having never lived in India, they still 
considered India their homeland, but wished to continue to make their homes in the Gulf. 
                                                
563 Requirements to apply for citizenship include living in the UAE for at least twenty years, speaking 




Key social spaces for Indians in the Gulf are Indian associations. These associations often 
host events in honor of Indian holidays. At 
these events, organizers often attempt to 
minimize the internal differences of India. 
For example, Muslim holidays and Hindu 
holidays are celebrated at the same time. At 
one event I attended, Onam, a Hindu 
festival celebrated by Malayalam speakers, 
and Eid al-Fitr, a Muslim holiday, were 
celebrated together. One member of the 
association told me that celebrating together indicated “harmony” [Image 5: Indian Association 
banner for Eid and Onam]. This unity was further illustrated as children took turns performing 
songs and dances associated with each holiday. In addition, linguistic differences within India 
were minimized. At a celebration for the Hindu Diwali festival, the singer sang a song that made, 
as described to me by an attendee, a “loop of India. [The singer] was singing in all the people’s 
languages: Malayalam, Tamil, Orissan [sic], Assam language, Gujarati, Hindi.”  Members of the 
Indian associations articulated this unity, and one Indian student who lived with her parents in 
the Gulf told me: “India is a combination of different cultures, religions, caste and system. These 
are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and many religions. But all comes under one unity, with one 
strength.” This strength and unity were further reflected by the fact that these diverse Indian were 
gathered together outside the actual boundaries of the nation.  
An examination of Indian migration to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates offers a critical opportunity to examine the interactions of migrants, 




the nation-state, and transnational institutions and actors. Most migrants to the Gulf understand 
their migration to be temporary, even if it, in fact, spans decades. In addition, questions of 
citizenship and belonging are not of central importance to the host society. As a result, many 
Indian migrants feel they are outsiders to Gulf societies and this experience is prevalent even 
among Indian citizens who have spent their entire lives in the Gulf and are Muslim (and, thus, 
share the religion of their host country). Many Indians find meaningful cultural and social 
grounding in Indian voluntary associations located in the Gulf States. Voluntary associations 
structure interactions between Indian citizens, the Indian government, and the UAE government 
and, in doing so, provide a space in which family, community, nation, and industry are defined 
and presented. 
As Indians participate in the holiday celebrations at Indian associations based in the Gulf, 
they reconstruct the scale of the nation through their representation of it as an imagined whole, 
the centrality of which defines the membership for the association. Through these performances 
and events, India is produced as a locality in ways reminiscent of the scale-making done in the 
first years of India’s independence by workers in the Gulf. Both historically and today, Indians 
define their nationality, make claims on their government, and push the meanings of citizenship 
while abroad. In addition, family structures and gendered obligations in India inform oil 
production on the Arabian Sea. 
As explored in this dissertation, Indians have lived in the Gulf historically as laborers, 
skilled workers, and traders, and their presence continues today. The political activities of Indian 
workers in the oilfields and of Indian traders have impacted not only the politics of the Gulf 
countries and postcolonial India, but have also shaped regional oil production. These Indians did 
not migrate in a vacuum and the social associations and networks they formed with recruiting 
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agents, oil company managers, and government bureaucrats gave regional oil its particular shape. 
Also influential in regional oil production is the manner in which workers move from the village 
to the job site, negotiating relationships with subagents, agents, government bureaucrats, and oil 
company management along the way.  
Examining the formation and development of oil production in the Arabian Sea through 
the lens of labor migration sheds light on governance in postcolonial nations, provides new 
approaches to global history, and critically examines the nature of commodities. Oil’s materiality 
and workers’ solidarities informed the political possibilities that emerged at historic and 
contemporary job sites in the Gulf. A historical genealogy of oil company staffing from the 
1940s to the present shows that colonial administrators and oil company managers encouraged 
large numbers of Indians to migrate to the Gulf and that these administrators and managers 
helped shape the labor hierarchies at play in the Gulf today. The resulting labor circulations and 
transnational industries influence how postcolonial nations define sovereignty and citizenship. 
Tracing the circulations of labor and oil in the Arabian Sea encourages us to rethink the 
definition of regions. As goods, people, and ideas move transnationally, borders, both conceptual 
and geographic, are destabilized and redrawn. 
The “migratory pipelines” Indian workers shape in order to arrive in the Gulf are similar 
to the pipelines of the industry. Labor circulations through the Arabian Sea are central to the 
production of oil and to shaping the place of the Arabian Sea. In this dissertation, I have used 
ethnographic and archival materials to investigate how workers move and illuminate not only the 
personal consequences of migration for workers and their families, but also how migratory 
pipelines shape and are shaped by oil practices and institutions. Using transnational history and 
multi-sited ethnography, I engaged critically with the themes of migration and labor by 
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evaluating how networks are formed; investigating the pipeline of labor migration, from the 
village to the job site; and including all parties involved in migration, from government officials 
to oil company managers to the workers themselves. I mapped the interplay between the 
materiality of oil, worker actions, and oil companies. I demonstrated the importance for analyses 
of labor to extend beyond the sites of production to workers’ networks of affiliation. This 
extension challenges the boundaries of transnational organizations, nations, regions, and empires 
by recognizing that laborers, like oil itself, circulate on the Arabian Sea in dynamic, ever-shifting 
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